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FROM THE EDITORS
Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale holds a unique position in the roster of dis-
tinguished American naval officers of the last century. In “Reflections on the 
Stockdale Legacy,” Martin L. Cook, current holder of the Stockdale Chair of 
Professional Military Ethics at the Naval War College, vividly recalls the extraor-
dinary moral courage and leadership displayed by Stockdale during his nearly 
eight years of captivity in a North Vietnamese prison camp. But the core of the 
Stockdale legacy, he maintains, lies rather in Stockdale’s deep intellectual engage-
ment with the classic literary and philosophical works of the Western tradition 
and in his appropriation of those works for the professional education of military 
officers. The famous course developed by Stockdale while President of the Naval 
War College some thirty-five years ago, “The Foundations of Moral Obligation,” 
continues to be offered in Newport to limited numbers of students. But, Cook 
believes, there is room throughout today’s Navy for a rediscovery of the admiral’s 
broader insights concerning character development in our officer corps. (Ad-
ditional discussion of ethics in the Navy’s officer ranks is offered in an article by 
Captain Mark F. Light appearing later in this issue.)
Two articles offer broad perspectives on the future of the U.S. Navy in the 
emerging strategic environment. In “Naval Operations: A Close Look at the Op-
erational Level of War at Sea,” Wayne Hughes explores the concept of operational 
art in a maritime context, stressing the importance of operational or campaign 
planning in testing and validating new strategic concepts. Although formal 
adoption of the operational-art construct is a relatively recent event in the Navy, 
Hughes points out that the prominence long given to logistics in naval thought 
and planning in fact constitutes long-standing informal acknowledgment of a 
dimension of naval warfare distinct from strategy and tactics. Robert B. Watts, in 
“The New Normalcy: Sea Power and Contingency Operations in the Twenty-First 
Century,” makes the case that the Navy needs a better appreciation of the nature 
of major crisis contingencies in the contemporary world that invite or require na-
val responses. Mass migrations, natural disasters, and the like, he argues, provide 
increasing challenges in the transparent information environment of today, and 
the Navy should rethink the way it prepares for and conducts such operations. 
Captain Watts, USCG, currently holds the U.S. Coast Guard chair at the National 
War College. Captain Hughes, USN (Ret.), is on the faculty of the Department of 
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Operations Research at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has recently stepped 
down from the Advisory Board of the Naval War College Press, where he has 
served with distinction for the past quarter-century. 
One of the great (if insufficiently noticed) success stories in the U.S. Navy of 
recent years is ballistic-missile defense. In “The Aegis BMD Global Enterprise: 
A ‘High End’ Military Partnership,” Brad Hicks, George Galdorisi, and Scott 
C. Truver comprehensively survey this history and the current state of play in 
the increasingly BMD-capable fleet, with particular attention to the growing 
cooperation between the U.S. and allied navies in this strategically vital arena. 
Rear Admiral Hicks, USN (Ret.), commanded an Aegis cruiser and has served as 
Program Director, Aegis BMD. George Galdorisi and Scott Truver are frequent 
contributors to this journal.
Two articles that follow take up the issue of airpower, albeit in very differ-
ent strategic contexts. Veteran airpower analyst Benjamin S. Lambeth offers in 
“Learning from Lebanon” a detailed and authoritative account of Israel’s 2006 
monthlong conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon, focusing on the question wheth-
er the Israelis’ lackluster performance in this mini-war can be traced to an unwar-
ranted confidence on their part in the efficacy of airpower in coercing a deter-
mined adversary. He concludes that the Israel Air Force in fact performed its role 
as well as could have been expected and that Israel’s overall failure owes more to 
its underestimation of Hezbollah, the failure of its leadership to undertake a seri-
ous strategic assessment of the situation at the outset, the lack of preparedness of 
Israel’s ground and air forces to operate together in a mid-intensity conflict, and 
perhaps most of all, bungled strategic communications. In “China’s Aerospace 
Power Trajectory in the Near Seas,” Daniel J. Kostecka traces the development of 
the maritime air capabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy from 
a narrow concern for coastal defense to the increasingly expansive reach it has 
acquired in recent years—extending, as Chinese spokesmen have themselves said, 
not only out to but beyond the “first island chain.” He discusses particularly the 
likely role of China’s newly acquired aircraft carrier, while also calling attention 
to continuing weaknesses the Chinese continue to face in less conspicuous areas, 
such as tankers, rotary-wing aircraft, and airborne antisubmarine warfare. Daniel 
Kostecka is an analyst for the Department of the Navy.
Further focus on China is provided by Scott D. McDonald, Brock Jones, and 
Jason M. Frazee in their “Phase Zero: How China Exploits It, Why the United 
States Does Not.” The authors (serving military officers in the Marine Corps, 
Army, and Air Force, respectively) argue that traditional Chinese strategic cul-
ture embodies a very different understanding of “phase zero”—that is to say, 
preconflict, or “shaping”—operations from the one that has emerged in the U.S. 
military over the last several years. They argue that the American focus has been 
primarily on security cooperation and influencing third parties, whereas the 
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Chinese concept more seamlessly bridges conflict and nonconflict environments 
and is squarely focused on bending the will of the adversary. The authors argue 
the United States would be well-advised to rethink its doctrine and practices in 
this area from this perspective.
Finally, Mark F. Light takes on “The Navy’s Moral Compass: Commanding 
Officers and Personal Misconduct.” Based on a careful analysis of historical met-
rics as well as personal interviews with senior naval officers, Light’s assessment 
concludes that current rates of dismissal of commanding officers for reasons of 
personal misconduct are unsustainable and call for a fundamental rethinking of 
Navy education, training, and promotion policies. In particular, he argues for 
a revised format for Navy officer fitness reports that focuses more explicitly on 
qualities such as character and integrity. Captain Light, USN, a graduate of the 
Naval War College, currently serves in the Department of Command, Leadership 
and Management at the Army War College. 
NEW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS 
New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Naval 
History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy, 10–11 September 
2009, edited by Craig C. Felker and Marcus O. Jones, is available for sale from the 
Government Printing Office online bookstore, at bookstore.gpo.gov/. This book, 
the twentieth in our Historical Monograph series (sponsored by the Maritime 
History Department), is a selection of the twelve best papers presented at that 
symposium, one of the most widely known annual forums for naval and mari-
time history. The contributors are all professional historians; the works reprinted, 
which range from the U.S. colonial era through the 1960s, represent the vitality 
of recent study in naval and maritime history.
THE REVIEW ON E-READERS 
Beginning with the last (Spring 2012) issue, the Naval War College Review is being 
posted on our website not only in separate articles, essays, and departments but 
also as a whole issue (with cover, in color, at low file size) for convenient down-
loading to any e-reader that can display “PDF” files. It is readable, for example, 
on iPads and Droids, in a variety of applications (Kindle, GoodReader, iBooks, 
and others). Issues before our redesign in 2000 are already posted as scanned 
whole issues. 
IF YOU VISIT US 
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 334, 
309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main 
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236).
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REFLECTIONS ON THE STOCKDALE LEGACY
I
The Fifteenth Annual Stockdale Lecture, delivered on 25 January 2012 at 
the University of San Diego, California, by Martin L. Cook
t is a great pleasure and an honor to be invited to deliver this year’s Stockdale 
Lecture. When I consider those who have preceded me in giving this annual lec-
ture, I am truly humbled to be added to that roster. I am also honored to hold an 
academic chair at the Naval War College that bears Admiral Stockdale’s name, so 
it is especially fitting that I offer some reflections on what my chair’s namesake 
means to me, but more importantly for the Navy.
I am relatively new to the Navy and am still learning its distinctive language 
and culture. When I went to work for the Navy, one thing struck me immediately
—the large number of activities and institutions that bear Admiral Stockdale’s 
name. Here is a list of the ones I know about, and I’m sure it’s only partial:
• This annual Stockdale Lecture at San Diego.
• The Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership at the U.S. Naval Academy, 
created as a nexus for addressing questions of ethics and character at the 
Academy.
• The Stockdale Chair of Professional Military Ethics at the Naval War 
College—my own position.
• The “Stockdale course” at the Naval War College. This is a course I teach 
with Dr. Tom Gibbons each trimester at Newport. It was originally created 
by Admiral Stockdale himself when he became the President at the Col-
lege. The course is called Foundations of Moral Obligation, and in it we 
study major philosophical traditions of ethics. Admiral Stockdale, as I’m 
sure many of you know, wrote quite a bit about his belief that his study of 
philosophy at Stanford—in particular the Roman Stoics—was fundamental 
to his ability to survive the POW experience.
• The Stockdale Group at the Naval War College, which is a group of senior-
class students doing research on ways to improve Navy leader development.
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/22
 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
• The Annual Stockdale Leadership Award, two of which are given annually 
for outstanding leadership, one in the Atlantic Fleet and the other in the Pacific.
I think the most remarkable thing about this list is the underlying point of 
continuity—that every major institution and activity explicitly dedicated to 
questions of ethics and leadership in the U.S. Navy is named after James Bond 
Stockdale. Indeed, this fact is sometimes a source of considerable confusion. 
People who see my title, for example, often assume I must be at the Stockdale 
Center at Annapolis. I’m sure the various other Stockdale institutions and per-
sonnel encounter similar confusion.
Perhaps naming such things after Stockdale has been the case so long that we 
no longer pause to reflect on what a remarkable fact it is. Why would the Navy’s 
culture appear to take it as obvious that anything to do with ethics and leader-
ship should bear the Stockdale name? Of course Admiral Stockdale was a great 
Navy leader. But there are many great leaders in the history of the Navy. Couldn’t 
even one of the things I mentioned be named after William F. Halsey, Raymond 
A. Spruance, Chester W. Nimitz, Richmond K. Turner, Stephen Decatur, or Oliver 
Hazard Perry? 
Stockdale is distinct from those other leaders in that much of his courageous 
leadership occurred while he was a prisoner of war. Furthermore, his character 
and leadership were tested in extreme circumstances of torture and suffering. 
Those actions and accounts are noble and inspirational. There is no doubt that 
Admiral Stockdale exhibited exemplary strength of character and an unbreak-
able commitment to honor that is to be admired and celebrated. But there’s little 
reason to take the leadership and character revealed in those circumstances and 
make them somehow normative for naval leadership in general. Great naval lead-
ership will be required in circumstances like his only very rarely (thank God!). 
Indeed, Stockdale’s last true command was in the grade of commander, as a 
“CAG,” a carrier air group “boss.” Between his nearly eight years as a POW and 
at least one more year repairing his body and writing reports and filing charges 
against prisoners he believed had violated the Code of Conduct, he was com-
pletely outside normal Navy life for nearly ten years. Wouldn’t it stand to reason 
that if we were to look for models of leadership to which future Navy leaders 
should aspire, Halsey or Spruance would be better and more natural choices, 
because their leadership under fire was tested in major naval battles? So if it’s 
neither the unique quality of his leadership nor his exemplary conduct as a leader 
of prisoners of war, what is it about Stockdale that makes it all but self-evident 
that anything to do with ethics, leadership, and character in the Navy should bear 
his name?
I believe that ultimately neither his actual leadership in command nor even 
his strength of character (although those both give credibility to his other work) 
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explain this. I believe his name is associated with leadership and ethics more 
because his of post–prisoner of war activities. No other great Navy leader and no 
other former prisoner of war went on to write, think, and speak as widely and 
deeply about the meaning of all he had been through as did Stockdale. I believe 
it is the scholar side of the sailor-scholar Stockdale was that makes him unique 
among great Navy leaders. 
In recognizing Stockdale as an exemplar of a kind of military virtue, I believe 
the Navy is implicitly recognizing the importance of the reflective, self-aware, and 
(dare I say?) philosophical dimensions of the military profession he exemplified 
and advocated. It is fitting that Stockdale’s collection of speeches and essays, por-
tions of which we read every trimester for the first lesson of the Stockdale Course, 
is entitled Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot.
This evening I hope to draw out some of the major threads of Stockdale’s phi-
losophy and attempt to apply them to issues in military leadership development 
now and for the future. In the end I will argue that although through the recogni-
tion the Navy gives Stockdale it acknowledges some very important truths about 
what’s essential in leadership, in practice the Navy and the other services largely 
fail to make the adjustments and changes in culture and education necessary to 
make those truths integral to leader development.
Stockdale’s written work returns again and again to a few central themes. The 
first of these he got from the Stoics—that life is not fair. On the face of it, this 
sounds trivial or banal. But as one thinks more deeply, the point is profound. 
The central point of Epictetus’ Enchiridion (the Stoic book that most influenced 
Stockdale) is that one must reflect deeply on one crucial point, the distinction 
between what is truly something one can control and all the rest, which one can-
not. That seems a blinding flash of the obvious, until you see where Epictetus 
goes with it. In the end, all one controls is one’s inner reaction to events and one’s 
own actions. What one ultimately cannot control is what those events are. As 
the first sentence of the book reads, “Some things are in our control and others 
not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, 
whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, 
reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.” 
It was this central idea that was vital to Stockdale as a prisoner. Every external 
aspect of his life was under the control of others. What was done to him and to 
the other POWs was not “fair”—they all knew the Geneva Convention require-
ments, and it would be easy to obsess about the Vietnamese flagrant violations 
of international law. 
Further, Stockdale had been flying directly overhead when the second sup-
posed engagement with the destroyer Turner Joy, which led to the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution and therefore the U.S. involvement in the entire Vietnam 
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War, occurred. As he later said, “I had the best seat in the house to watch that 
event, and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets—there were no 
PT boats there. . . . There was nothing there but black water and American fire 
power.” So to add a still deeper level of unfairness to his situation, Stockdale knew 
for a fact that the legal justification for the war itself, and therefore for the chain of 
events that had got him where he was as a prisoner, was completely false because 
the supposed attack had never taken place. He, of course, had been ordered not 
to disclose this fact, and one of his greatest fears was that under torture he might.
When I thought about this somewhat jarring historical revelation, I realized 
Stockdale exemplifies an absolutely foundational virtue required and expected of 
all American soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen—absolute clarity about their 
roles in a constitutional democracy. 
He was a loyal and diligent servant of the American Republic. He wrote in later 
years that he considered the war both unjustified and poorly conducted, but his 
clarity about his role is worthy of our reflection—he knew he didn’t make policy. 
He reported what he saw accurately and wrote later of the guilt felt by those who, 
under pressure, gave false reports of an attack. But having given his honest report, 
he was crystal clear that he was an agent of policies (even foolish ones) he had 
not chosen and, unless the orders were illegal, it was not within his purview to 
evade or modify them. 
Perhaps this passage from Epictetus came to his mind: “Remember that you 
are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to make it. If short, 
of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it is his pleasure you should act a poor 
man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally. For 
this is your business, to act well the character assigned you; to choose it is an-
other’s.” For Stockdale, the fundamental military virtue is the tough-mindedness 
Epictetus requires. One passage in Epictetus consistently shocks my students in 
the Stockdale course at Newport: 
With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply loved, 
remember to tell yourself of what general nature they are, beginning from the most 
insignificant things. If, for example, you are fond of a specific ceramic cup, remind 
yourself that it is only ceramic cups in general of which you are fond. Then, if it 
breaks, you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child, or your wife, say that you 
only kiss things which are human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of 
them dies. 
I suppose what shocks my students is the equation of loss of wives and chil-
dren with broken crockery (although we all know people who have been undone 
by as little as a broken cup, too). But anyone who has lived long enough to have 
experienced loss, failure, and guilt knows there’s a profound truth here—that 
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such disasters destroy some people, while others find the inner resilience to pull 
up their socks and move on. I believe Stockdale would ask us what we’re doing to 
develop such inner resilience in our personnel. 
In the face of unfairness, Stockdale’s major lesson is that regardless of the situ-
ation in which one finds oneself, one must be brutally realistic about what one 
can and cannot control. His Medal of Honor citation reads as follows:
Recognized by his captors as the leader in the Prisoners’ of War resistance to inter-
rogation and in their refusal to participate in propaganda exploitation, Rear Adm. 
Stockdale was singled out for interrogation and attendant torture. . . . Stockdale 
resolved to make himself a symbol of resistance regardless of personal sacrifice. He 
deliberately inflicted a near-mortal wound to his person in order to convince his 
captors of his willingness to give up his life rather than capitulate. . . . [T]he North 
Vietnamese . . . , convinced of his indomitable spirit, abated in their employment of 
excessive harassment and torture toward all of the Prisoners of War. 
There is one crucial Stoic observation to make about this citation—that while 
Stockdale’s actions achieved a good result, in that they caused the Vietnamese to 
change their treatment of prisoners, he didn’t do what he did because he counted 
on that outcome. The outcome he could not control. He did it because of his 
own internal sense of duty, regardless of the outcome. That he could control. On 
another occasion he was asked who didn’t make it out of Vietnam. He replied as 
follows:
Oh, that’s easy, the optimists. Oh, they were the ones who said, “We’re going to be out 
by Christmas.” And Christmas would come, and Christmas would go. Then they’d 
say, “We’re going to be out by Easter.” And Easter would come, and Easter would go. 
And then Thanksgiving, and then it would be Christmas again. And they died of a 
broken heart. . . . This is a very important lesson. You must never confuse faith that 
you will prevail in the end—which you can never afford to lose—with the discipline 
to confront the most brutal facts of your current reality, whatever they might be. 
So what are the implications for today’s military leaders if we take Stockdale 
seriously to heart? I believe we’d have to rebalance the focus on technical and 
operational expertise (which is where almost all our focus is today) with explicit 
discussion and development on the seemingly “soft” (dare I say philosophical?) 
internal intellectual and personal development of our people. In crisis, it’s not 
technical knowledge or operational experience alone that sees us through. It’s 
inner resilience and strength. Stockdale has very clear ideas about how best to 
develop that strength. 
Stockdale himself took the initiative to study philosophy “on the side,” when 
the Navy sent him to Stanford for a two-year course in history and economics to 
prepare him for future responsibilities in policy making. He grew frustrated with 
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his courses in those subjects. He noticed that whenever he asked a question that 
seemed genuinely interesting to him, the professor would cut off the conversa-
tion, saying, “Now we’re getting into philosophy.” That motivated Stockdale, 
against the advice of his adviser, to cross over to the philosophy department and 
begin course work there. 
When he departed Stanford, his favorite professor of philosophy gave him a 
copy of the Enchiridion. He admits that when he looked at it his first reaction 
was that it was totally irrelevant to him as a man of action, but he read it out of 
respect for his professor. Only later, in the crucible, did Epictetus’ words come 
to life and become his salvation. Nobody in the Navy and nothing in the Navy’s 
concept of how to develop officers had ever so much as suggested that he have 
the very educational experience he credits with saving his life. Nothing the Navy 
had given, offered, or required of him as a developing officer did anything to give 
Stockdale the foundation his character needed to be ready to endure what would 
be required of him. That was entirely his initiative, undertaken at personal cost 
of additional work and effort for self-development.
When in busy military deployments do we find time for professional devel-
opment beyond focusing on technical mastery? When would the captain of a 
ship invite the wardroom to a discussion of Stoicism over dinner? When, for 
example, do Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) during their division-officer tours 
lift their horizons beyond getting their formal SWO qualification to think more 
fundamentally about officership and their deep self-understanding as military 
professionals? 
I think Stockdale would suggest it shouldn’t be a crazy suggestion that these 
things happen. Indeed, he would fear that officers who lack such inner depth, 
regardless of their technical and operational skill, are missing something funda-
mental, perhaps something that might save their lives or allow them to maintain 
their integrity under extreme pressure. He might, for example, look at the Army’s 
great efforts to reground the professional ethic through the Center for the Army 
Profession and Ethics (see its website at www.cape.army.mil) and the Army’s 
sustained attention to issues of ethics and professionalism in recent years as 
something the other services would benefit from studying and emulating.
In one chapter in Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot, Stockdale recounts 
a conversation he had with an NBC executive who afterward became a lifelong 
friend. The executive criticized the usual press approach to political candidates, 
quizzing them on their positions on specific issues of the day. The executive went 
on to say that because those issues shift rapidly, the opinions of the moment 
would in the end be meaningless as a guide to what politicians would actually 
do in office. Stockdale reflected back on the conversation (with which he heartily 
agreed): 
17
War College: Summer 2012 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 C O O K  13
Character is probably more important than knowledge. . . . Of course, all things being 
equal, knowledge is to be honored. . . . But what I’m saying is that whenever I’ve been 
in trouble spots—in crises (and I’ve been in a lot of trouble and in a lot of crises)
—the sine qua non of a leader has lain not in his chesslike grasp of issues and the 
options they portend, not in his style of management, not in his skill at processing 
information, but in his having the character, the heart, to deal spontaneously, honor-
ably, and candidly with people, perplexities, and principles.*
This invites the question of how we appropriate the Stockdale legacy. Where 
do we consciously and explicitly strive to develop this resilient, self-aware, and 
philosophically informed character in our officers? Is the weight of the technical 
and operational knowledge essential to successful operation of ships, aircraft, 
and submarines, companies, and battalions being balanced with attention to 
self-awareness, character, and the clarity of philosophical thought Stockdale here 
stresses?
There is also a danger in raising the necessity of character development in the 
“can-do” culture of a military service. If the question is taken to be serious, there 
is the risk of a typical military response—establishing a new program to ensure 
that character is developed. To some degree, all of the service academies have in 
fact done this, creating “character development” bureaucracies that grow like 
weeds and generate motivational-speaker-level events of dubious value.
I doubt that Stockdale would have much use with those programmatic re-
sponses. He would say what is required is exposure to deep thought and internal-
ized self-reflection of the sort that only intellectually rigorous examination can 
provide. While motivational-speaker character development can provide brief 
and perhaps exciting passing moments, what Stockdale is looking for runs far 
deeper. 
It is beautifully described in Plato’s discussion of the training of the Auxilia-
ries in his ideal Republic. The Auxiliaries are where the virtue of courage resides 
in the Republic. They are that part of the city that takes to the field to defend it. 
They are the professional military. Plato says they must have internalized utterly 
unshakable convictions that they are to be obedient to the laws of the lawmak-
ers, regardless of pain, pleasure, desire, or fear. To achieve this, much more than 
motivational speaking will be required. Plato describes it as follows:
The dyers, when they want to dye wool purple, first choose from all the colors the 
single nature belonging to white things; then they prepare it beforehand and care for 
it with no little preparation so that it will most receive the color; and it is only then 
that they dye. And if a thing is dyed in this way, it becomes color-fast, and washing 
either without lyes or with lyes can’t take away its color. . . .
* James B. Stockdale, Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1995), pp. 31–32. All subsequent page references are to this work.
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To the extent of our power, [we are] doing something similar when we selected the 
soldiers and educated them. . . . [T]hey should receive the laws from us in the finest 
possible way like a dye, so that their opinion about what’s terrible and about every-
thing else would be color-fast because they had gotten the proper nature and rearing, 
and their dye could not be washed out by those lyes so terribly effective at scour-
ing: pleasure . . . and pain, fear, and desire. . . . This kind of power and preservation, 
through everything, of the right and lawful opinion about what is terrible and what 
not, I call courage. (Republic, Book IV)
Stockdale, I’m pretty sure, would have embraced that definition of courage from 
Plato: “This kind of power and preservation, through everything, of the right 
and lawful opinion about what is terrible and what not.” What is the process of 
dyeing the soul so deeply that it gains that power? The first and critical aspect of 
the Stockdale legacy is to invite us to ask that question deeply.
Another of Stockdale’s recurrent themes is the importance of what he calls at 
various times “the pressure cooker,” or the “crucible.” He worried that plebe year 
at Annapolis had gotten too easy because of misguided attempts to reduce stress 
on midshipmen. He feared that education had lost some of the rigor necessary 
for knowledge to seep deeply into the soul. 
Joseph Brennan, a philosopher who taught the first iterations of the Stock-
dale course at the Naval War College with Stockdale, wrote an essay in which he 
reflected on their collaboration. He says they began the course with a concept 
central to Stockdale’s thought: “The alchemical transformation that may occur 
when a human being is subjected to intense pressure with a crucible of suffering 
of confinement” (p. 171). It is important to note that Stockdale did not especially 
want to call this course an “ethics” course. Indeed, he was quite skeptical about 
the explosion of ethics courses being offered in business, dental, and medical 
schools throughout the land. As Brennan put it, “He did not want his course to be 
the military equivalent of what he called ‘ethics for dentists’” (p. 170). The danger, 
he feared, was that ethics would be reduced to a branch of psychology. Instead, he 
deeply believed that only rigorous examination of the classics of the humanities 
would provide the real depth required. To read deeply in Plato, Aristotle, Kant, 
and Nietzsche was to show students that “much of what goes by the name social 
science serves up ideas expressed earlier and better in classical philosophy and 
modern literature” (p. 170).
If Stockdale is right about this, I think it poses a fundamental challenge to 
the culture of military education at virtually all levels. Let me cite the example I 
know best from my time at the Air Force Academy. The Air Force Academy (like 
all the academies, to various degrees) is, at its heart, an engineering school. As 
an extreme example, I once got into a fairly long argument with the Air Force 
officer charged with reporting the research being done by the Academy’s faculty. 
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The metric he insisted on using was that only externally funded research proj-
ects (all of which fell in the engineering and science departments) even counted 
as research. I pointed out repeatedly that, using that metric, no publications in 
philosophy, literature, history, or social science would ever even appear in the 
“research report” of the institution. I lost the argument, by the way.
To take another example: cadets sharply distinguish two types of courses. 
Some are “real” subjects—math, science, and engineering. All the rest are “fuzzies”
—not a term of approbation. Fuzzies include history, literature, and philosophy
—not to mention art or music.
Or to work farther down the career path, what role do subjects in the humani-
ties play in Professional Military Education curricula at all levels? Even if we leave 
aside the purely technical schools, which focus on teaching specific skills, there 
is virtually nothing. I taught in a department at the Army War College called 
Command, Leadership, and Management. There were two whole lessons dealing 
with ethics in the curriculum. But the real heart of the department was focused 
on the Defense Department budget process, mind-bogglingly difficult charts on 
the planning, budgeting, and execution process; various “flavor of the month” 
management theories; and notional-force-structure planning exercises.
I don’t mean for a minute to suggest these are not things senior officers need 
to know; many of these students would be managing those complex systems 
in the not-too-distant future. But the results-oriented and pragmatic mind-set 
cultivated by military culture is generally impatient with anything that isn’t im-
mediately and practically relevant.
By contrast with that approach, consider Stockdale’s reflections on the Stock-
dale course’s effects on students:
We studied moral philosophy by looking at models of human beings under pres-
sure, their portraits drawn from the best materials we could find in philosophy and 
literature. The professional implications for military men and women followed. We 
did not have to draw diagrams [or, one might add, PowerPoint slides]; the military 
implications came up naturally in seminar discussions. (p. 171)
These seem to me the main elements of the Stockdale legacy—the importance 
of a deeply reflective self-understanding, grounded in a clear-eyed and realistic 
appreciation of oneself and the world in which one acts. It stresses the central 
importance of character and, indeed, its primacy over technical knowledge and 
practical know-how. Most counterculturally of all for the military, Stockdale as-
serts that serious reading of the humanities is the single most important means 
to developing those attributes, because only such reading addresses fundamental 
human questions with rigor and depth.
If we were truly to take Stockdale seriously and live up to the intuitions that 
have caused so many Navy institutions to borrow his name and authority, we 
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/22
 16  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
would have to rethink a great deal about military culture, military education, 
and officer development. Or in the end does Stockdale play for the Navy and the 
other services the role of so many other saints and heroes throughout history, 
that of objects of veneration but not examples to be followed, not people whose 
teachings we truly heed? Are we content to relegate Stockdale to portraits on 
the wall, plaster statues of the saint, and eponymous programs that only scratch 
the surface? I submit we do him a great disservice if we don’t take seriously the 
thoughts of this deeply philosophical fighter pilot.
For those in the Reserve Officer Training Corps and junior officers who are 
in the audience tonight, a special word. You are at the threshold of self-sacrificial 
service to our nation. When you swear your oath to the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States, you give up a good deal of moral autonomy and commit to discipline 
your mind and body to be prepared to meet the unpredictable, but certain, chal-
lenges your profession will send your way. Stockdale’s message to you would be, 
don’t sell yourselves short. Don’t be content to remain on the surface and focus 
only on knowledge and skill. His example should lead you to take every opportu-
nity (and make them if you aren’t given them) to think deeply and broadly. When 
someone tells you, “Well, we’re getting into philosophy here,” don’t take that as 
a reason to get back to the practical. Take it as the challenge to press right on. As 
Socrates put it twenty-five hundred years ago, “The unexamined life is not worth 
leading.” And as the words over the entrance to the Delphic oracle reminded 
everyone in the classical world, γνῶθι σεαυτόν—gnothi seauton, “know thyself.”
I’d like to close with Admiral Stockdale’s description of his parachute descent 
into seven and a half years of hell:
On September 9, 1965, I flew at 500 knots right into a flak trap, at tree-top level, in 
a little A-4 airplane—the cockpit walls not even three feet apart—which I couldn’t 
steer after it was on fire, its control system shot out. After ejection I had about thirty 
seconds to make my last statement in freedom before I landed in the main street of 
a little village right ahead. And so help me, I whispered to myself, “Five years down 
there, at least. I’m leaving the world of technology and entering the world of Epicte-
tus.” (p. 189)
The “training” that saved Stockdale’s life was a slim volume written by a Roman 
slave-philosopher in the second century. What would it mean for Professional 
Military Education if we thought deeply about Stockdale’s message? And even 
more importantly, what would it mean for all of you who wear the uniform of 
the United States of America?
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MARTIN L. COOK
Dr. Cook is the Admiral James B. Stockdale Professor of Professional Military Ethics 
in the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership at the Naval War College, in 
Newport, Rhode Island. Since earning his PhD at the University of Chicago, he has 
taught also at several colleges and universities, as well as the U.S. Air Force Academy 
and the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Cook became the Stockdale Professor at the 
Naval War College in 2009. The present text is a close adaptation of his remarks as 
delivered.
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Rear Admiral Christenson became the fifty-third Presi-
dent of the U.S. Naval War College on 30 March 2011. 
The fourth of six sons of a Navy Skyraider pilot and a 
Navy nurse, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Acad- 
emy in 1981.
At sea, he commanded USS McClusky (FFG 41), De-
stroyer Squadron 21 in USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), 
Carrier Strike Group 12, and the USS Enterprise (CVN 
65) Strike Group. He most recently served as President, 
Board of Inspection and Survey. He also served as the 
antisubmarine warfare officer and main propulsion 
as sistant aboard USS Cook (FF 1083); as aide to Com-
mander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 1 in USS Long Beach 
(CGN 9); as weapons officer aboard USS Downes (FF 
1070); as Destroyer Squadron 21 combat systems officer, 
in USS Nimitz (CVN 68); and as executive officer of 
USS Harry W. Hill (DD 986). He deployed eight times 
on seven ships, twice in command of McClusky.
Ashore, he commanded the Surface Warfare Officers 
School in Newport, and as a new flag officer he served 
as Commander, Naval Mine and Anti-submarine 
Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas. He also 
served at the U.S. Naval Academy as a company of-
ficer, celestial navigation instructor, assistant varsity 
soccer coach, and member of the admissions board; 
at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, in the Strategic 
Initiatives Group; and on the Joint Staff, in J5 (Strate-
gic Plans and Policy) and as executive assistant to the 
assistant chairman. 
He graduated with distinction and first in his class from 
the Naval War College, earning his master’s degree in 
national security and strategic studies. He was also a 
Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy.
Rear Admiral Christenson has been awarded the De-
fense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (five 
awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (two awards), 
the Navy Commendation Medal (five awards), and 
the Navy Achievement Medal.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
I HAVE BEEN THE PRESIDENT FOR A FULL YEAR NOW, and what a 
wonderful year it has been.
They say the best time for war colleges is after wars have ended and when 
budgets are headed downward. It certainly feels true in Newport.
There is an urgency to innovate. Under the leadership of Fleet Forces Com-
mand, the Navy and Marine Corps “got the band back together” and executed 
an ambitious amphibious exercise, BOLD ALLIGATOR. The last issue of the Naval 
War College Review had a superb article by our Professor Don Chisholm entitled 
“A Remarkable Military Feat: The Hungnam Redeployment, December 1950.”
The Navy Warfare Development Command, now completely relocated from 
Newport to Norfolk and in an amazing new building, has not only maintained 
its natural relationship with Newport but has begun to build strong relationships 
around the world in the fleets. Our War Gaming Department maintains a full 
calendar in Newport but is a frequent collaborator in Norfolk. 
There is an emphasis on history. Not only did the War of 1812 give us our 
national anthem, but in it our Navy was reborn. Everywhere you read, you see 
the Navy remembering that amazing struggle. Our Professor Kevin McCranie’s 
recently published Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in the War 
of 1812 tells the story well.
There is a commitment to education. Despite the significant fiscal challenges, 
the Navy remains committed to education. The Advanced Education Review 
Board meets frequently in Washington; the Naval War College here in Newport, 
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, and the Naval Academy in Annapolis 
have visibility and support at the very highest level of leadership in our Navy.
 All things are ready, if our minds be so.
SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, ACT 4, SCENE 3
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There is a realization that our military must never let up in its effort to be the 
most professional military in the world. Also in the last issue of the Review were 
two outstanding articles on civil-military relations. The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, recently told our students very sincerely 
how important the profession of arms was to him. In fact, in May it will be my 
great honor to spend two days at Duke University studying that very topic with 
some of our nation’s best. In this election year we are all reminded of our obliga-
tion to be an example.
And the Navy has asked the War College to develop a Leadership Continuum. 
Long held up as an example of how to develop independent, courageous, victori-
ous leaders, the Navy nevertheless wants to be even better. That our College of 
Operational and Strategic Leadership has such an important direct role to play 
in that assignment has energized faculty and students alike.
I want to thank all the people in Newport and around our Navy who have 
made this the best job in the world. To all our neighbors over the past thirty 
years my family and I say thank you for making this the best career we could ever 
dream of. We have come into your lives and quickly gone away again, wherever we 
have served, but you have always made us proud to serve you and call you friends. 
JOHN N. CHRISTENSON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College 
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Captain Hughes is a designated professor in the De-
partment of Operations Research at the Naval Post-
graduate School, Monterey, California. He is a gradu-
ate of the U.S. Naval Academy and holds a master of 
science degree in operations research from the Naval 
Postgraduate School. On active duty he commanded 
a minesweeper and a destroyer, directed a large train-
ing command, served as deputy director of Systems 
Analysis (OP-96), and was aide to Under Secretary of 
the Navy R. James Woolsey. At the Naval Postgradu-
ate School for twenty-six years, he has served in the 
Chair of Applied Systems Analysis, as the first incum-
bent of the Chair of Tactical Analysis, and as dean of 
the Graduate School of Operational and Information 
Sciences. Captain Hughes is author of Fleet Tactics 
and Coastal Combat (2000), Fleet Tactics: Theory 
and Practice (1986), and Military Modeling (1984), 
and he is a coauthor of A Concise Theory of Combat 
(1997). He served as a member of the Naval War Col-
lege Press Advisory Board for over twenty-five years, 
until 2012. 
Naval War College Review, Summer 2012, Vol. 65, No. 3
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NAVAL OPERATIONS
T
A Close Look at the Operational Level of War at Sea
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
oday’s American navy writes prolifically about maritime strategies but has 
not devoted equal attention to campaign plans or analysis that tests the strat-
egies’ viability. We illustrate herein how the operational—or campaign—level 
links policy and strategy to the tactical and technological elements of war at sea. 
First, we relate how the U.S. Navy reluctantly came to accept the existence of an 
operational level of warfare but having done so will find it useful. Second, we de-
scribe important properties of naval operations in terms of constants, trends, and 
variables in warfare at and from the sea. Third, we demonstrate how operational-
level planning would help if the Navy and the nation were to adopt six clearly 
stated, twenty-first-century strategies that would serve present and future na-
tional policies better than do current strategy documents. 
VIEWS OF NAVIES REGARDING THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR
In both peace and war, we frequently carry out our roles through 
campaigns [that] focus on the operational level of war. . . . There are 
three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. . . . The operational level 
concerns forces collectively in a theater.
GENERAL C. E. MUNDY AND ADMIRAL F. B. KELSO
The Operational Level of War at Sea Introduced and Described
The U.S. Navy first acknowledged the existence of an operational level of war 
at sea when Admiral Kelso, as Chief of Naval Operations, and General Mundy, 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, signed the first “naval doctrine publication,” 
entitled Naval Warfare, in the spring of 1994.1 In part the change had come from 
27
War College: Summer 2012 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 24  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
pressure for common terminology after World War II. In part it had come at the 
urging of the Marine Corps, which saw the advantage of applying “operational 
art,” standing between strategy and tactics. The second edition of Naval Warfare, 
issued in 2010, reaffirms the three levels of war and concentrates specifically on 
the operational level as its doctrinal domain.2
The three elements of war, in the Navy’s eyes, had previously been strategy, 
tactics, and logistics. Part of the reason that logistics were prominent was the geo-
graphical span of naval operations. Distances scarcely imagined by ground force 
commanders are involved at sea; a map of a maritime theater generally covers a 
geographical area an order of magnitude larger than that for a ground campaign. 
The activities of a naval campaign (or operation) are probably at least 80 percent 
the processes of operational logistics. Therefore it is reasonable—and clarify-
ing—to say that the American navy’s three levels of war at sea have now become 
strategy, operational logistics (or merely operations), and tactics. In what follows, 
we apply this utilitarian perspective of three levels of war to describe naval opera-
tions. We make no reference to operational art in past U.S., German, or Soviet 
army applications for ground operations. Nor do we have space to describe how 
naval operations are linked to joint operations. We are consistent, however, with 
the quite adequate descriptions of joint operations in Naval Warfare (NDP-1).3
The Traditional View of Navies
Sir Julian Corbett and American admirals Bradley Fiske and J. C. Wylie, among 
others, thought strategy included the operations in a naval campaign. This view-
point permeates Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.4 Fiske’s The Navy 
as a Fighting Machine describes his vision of a fleet this way: “Imagine now a 
strategical system . . . so that the navy will resemble a vast and efficient organism, 
all the parts leagued together by a common understanding and a common pur-
pose; mutually dependent, mutually assisting, sympathetically obedient to the 
controlling mind that directs them toward the ‘end in view.’”5 Wylie is the most 
explicit. He points out that in most of history naval theorists have said that tactics 
apply when the opposing forces are in contact. Then, “the plans and operations 
are ‘tactical.’ Everything outside of contact is ‘strategic.’”6
Among non-American examples there are no better illustrations than Italian 
admiral Romeo Bernotti’s two fine books on tactics and strategy written in the 
first decade of the twentieth century. While still a lieutenant and instructor in 
the art of naval war at the Royal Italian Naval Academy, Bernotti wrote his highly 
respected Fundamentals of Naval Tactics. In 1911 followed Fondamenti di strategia 
navale (Fundamentals of Naval Strategy). The latter has never been published in 
English, but both books apply quantitative analysis so effectively that Bernotti’s 
biographer, Brian Sullivan, says they foreshadowed operations analysis that we 
28
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/22
 H U G H E S  25
usually date from World War II. Bernotti’s untranslated book on strategy is al-
most entirely devoted to naval operations—that is, campaign planning and execu-
tion. The text is replete with geometric and mathematical guides for operational 
activities that include “strategic” reconnaissance and search procedures, along 
with the distinction between strategic and tactical scouting methods; strategic 
mobility, cruising speeds, and combat radii; and logistical activities, accompanied 
by a quantitative comparison between serial replenishment at sea and support 
from nearby bases. 
In the years prior to World War II, most professional studies at the U.S. Naval 
War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, emphasized either tactics (and tech-
nology) or operations (and logistics). The war games played there—over three 
hundred of them between 1919 and 1940—were intended either to execute a 
presumed strategy in a campaign or to teach and test battle tactics. These games 
revealed early on that the strategy then intended to guide the campaign in the 
Pacific was unexecutable. They correctly showed that a strategy of rapid relief 
of the Philippines (under Japanese attack, of course) would take too long. Over 
twenty years a change to a more realistic Pacific strategy took place, slowly but 
relentlessly. There was no wishing-will-make-it-so in Naval War College strategic 
thinking, because execution was tested for feasibility by strategic (i.e., opera-
tional) games.7 The operational level, tested in “battles” at the tactical level, had 
evaluated the intended strategy and found it wanting.
The U.S. Navy’s skills at operational planning and methods for conducting 
campaign analyses have greatly expanded since the days when Naval War College 
gaming was so central. Analytical successes achieved during the Cold War were 
valuable in refining plans for nuclear deterrence and protecting the sea-lanes to 
Europe.8 
Kinds of Naval Operations
A categorization broadly applicable to most states is that navies perform one or 
more of four tasks. Every navy’s composition will be, or ought to be, constructed 
on the basis of its intended contribution to the following functions:
On the seas . . . 
1. Ensure safety of goods and services: navies protect the movement of 
shipping and means of war on the oceans and safeguard stationary forces, 
to include nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) and 
coastal patrols.
2. Deny safety of enemy goods and services: navies prevent the movement 
of enemy shipping and means of war and threaten enemy forces, such as 
SSBNs.
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From the seas . . .
3. Deliver goods and services: navies put land forces ashore to seize and 
hold territory and deliver air and missile strikes for a variety of purposes. 
(Recently our own navy has added delivery of disaster assistance as an 
explicit “core competency.”)
4. Prevent enemy delivery of goods and services: navies protect the 
homeland from threats coming by sea.
American Naval Operations
Before examining operations in the contemporary scene, it is useful to review 
the traditional views of sea power, because the U.S. Navy is now emerging from 
an anomalous period, one that began in 1945, in which it performed two func-
tions only. The first was defending the sea lines of communication that linked 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on both sides of 
the Atlantic. The second was projecting power from sea to land in many places. 
The first function was never put to the test. The second was performed without 
loss and almost flawlessly in support of a great many land operations overseas. 
The oceans are very large, two-dimensional highways for commercial ship-
ping. Whoever controls the seas has a great advantage, the loss of which leads 
to dire consequences. There is incontestable historical evidence that sea powers 
usually defeat land powers. See any of A. T. Mahan’s works, commencing with The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783—they show the sweeping effect 
of command of the seas in history, from Greek and Roman times through the 
Napoleonic Wars. A more recent book to this point is John Arquilla’s landmark 
Dubious Battles. Arquilla quantifies an even bolder assertion, that in wars since 
1815 not only have sea powers usually defeated land powers but land powers 
more often than not initiated the wars that they then lost.9
Both Mahan and Arquilla offer rich explanations of the strategic reasons why. 
For example, a land power usually must maintain a substantial army. Only the 
most prosperous of land powers can simultaneously field an army and deploy a 
navy—as, for example, when France, the great land power of the eighteenth cen-
tury, was confronted at sea by Britain’s Royal Navy. Neither Mahan nor Arquilla, 
however, explains the operational advantages that a sea power exploits over a 
land power. We will explain the advantages explicitly, under two great constants: 
operational maneuver and efficiency of movement. 
The Traditional Composition of a Fleet
In the past, naval operations have been carried out by four categories of naval 
forces. The first three are described best by Julian Corbett, the preeminent naval 
writer of a century ago. 
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A battle fleet, capital ships and accompanying forces, meets and destroys the 
enemy’s battle fleet. Mahan said, correctly, that the purpose of a battle fleet is to 
destroy the enemy’s fleet in order to achieve command of the sea. But a battle 
fleet was usually ill suited to perform other roles. Corbett famously identified two 
other kinds of forces as well.
The first of these (and the second category of forces) comprised cruisers, 
which attack enemy commerce or defend our own from attack. Capital ships of 
the battle fleet have been inefficient at or incapable of defending “trade,” even 
after establishing unchallenged 
command of the seas. Raiders, 
pirates, and privateers were his-
torically the threat. Since World 
War I surface raiders have been 
replaced by submarines and also, 
since World War II, by long-range, shore-based aircraft or missiles. A state that 
could not challenge a big navy for sea control could resort to guerre de course, a 
guerrilla war at sea, threatening commerce and denying to the sea power risk-free 
operations. Hence, defensive “cruisers” represented a necessary navy component, 
sufficient in numbers, speed, and radius of action to defeat cruiser-raiders. Sub-
marines that supplanted surface raiders had to be opposed by large numbers of 
antisubmarine forces, which are also “cruisers” in Corbett’s terminology. Mine 
warfare is another form of cruiser warfare.
Corbett also pointed to flotillas that operate in littoral waters too dangerous 
for capital ships. A flotilla consists of small combatants with short radii of action 
but considerable firepower. It survives less by armor or defensive firepower than 
by numbers of units and stealthiness, exploiting the coastal “terrain” and attack-
ing in coordinated operations that we now call “swarms.”
The emphasis of Mahan and Corbett is on control of the oceans—Functions 1, 
2, and, indirectly, 4. To serve Function 3, the amphibious force, a fourth category 
of fighting fleet, was introduced and developed by the Navy and Marine Corps for 
World War II, when it comprised assault transports, tank landing ships, medium 
landing craft, and the like. But Function 3, the delivery of goods and services from 
the sea, is much broader than an amphibious force’s opposed-assault capability. 
Since the last opposed landing, at Inchon in 1950, the nation has enjoyed near-
flawless success in safe, unopposed delivery of ground and air forces from the sea. 
Books by P. H. Colomb and Frank Uhlig make clear that this category of operations
—power projection for land operations—is what dominant navies have been 
concerned with most of the time.10 Throughout history, influencing events on 
land has been a function sometimes as important and performed as frequently 
as safeguarding the sea-lanes. And why not? “The seat of purpose is on the land” 
The war games played [at the Naval War Col-
lege between 1919 and 1940] revealed early 
on that the strategy then intended to guide the 
campaign in the Pacific was unexecutable.
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has been and remains a cornerstone for every navy, a tenet to remember even 
when a contest for command of the sea temporarily dominates its operations.11
It is clarifying to distinguish the amphibious assault ships intended for forcible 
entry by marines from the many more and different kinds of ships for the am-
phibious lift that delivers and sustains army, marine, special forces, and air forces 
overseas. Mahan and other writers of his era emphasized that sea power included 
a merchant fleet. This was in part because when he wrote a commercial fleet was 
the means of delivering armies overseas.
An Incongruity and Its Significance for the Twenty-First Century
Observe there is no evident congruence between the four functions and four 
traditional force types—that is to say, between the ends and means of naval op-
erations. A nation’s operating forces are its means of achieving its maritime (or 
national) strategy’s ends. Though the functions will abide, there is no inherent 
reason why the force categories of the past must hold in the future. The U.S. Navy 
may wish to examine whether the paradigm of a battle fleet of capital ships physi-
cally concentrated to achieve decisive battle is obsolete. It would be highly useful 
to explore whether Functions 1 and 2—safeguarding the movement of ships at 
sea and denying safe movement to the enemy—can be achieved without capital 
ships, such as ships of the line, battleships, or aircraft carriers. No one knows with 
certainty, because the U.S. Navy’s command of the seas has not been recently 
challenged. Even the formidable Soviet navy concerned itself mainly with sea 
denial, rarely with sea control. Later we will suggest that a more distributable and 
survivable navy for the twenty-first century might do triple duty as battle fleet, 
cruisers, and—at least in part—flotilla. Such a fleet cannot serve, however, for 
efficient projection of sea power to the land. 
To pursue the several relationships would constitute a study in itself. It is a 
subject we have no space to consider in detail, but it is pertinent that the nature 
of future ships, aircraft, and sensors in a missile-age navy derives as much from 
operational as from tactical considerations.
OPERATIONAL CONSTANTS, TRENDS, AND VARIABLES
Understanding the processes of combat is a better approach to tactics 
[than principles are]. Processes are the navigator’s science and art; prin-
ciples are the stars he uses to find his way. . . . The key to fruitful study . . .
is an appreciation of how battles transpire in time and space.
WAYNE P. HUGHES, JR.
The principles of war—and from Sun Tzu until now there have been at least 
twenty-two sets of them—must by definition apply to war at sea, but because 
they are general and abstract they inherently have limited practical value.12 
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Operational constants—things that abide—are more utilitarian, because they 
can be deduced from the history of naval operations. Trends—things that change 
from age to age in one direction—are likewise deduced from history, are usually 
brought about by new technology, and apply as much at the operational level as 
the tactical level at sea.13 The sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by small Egyp-
tian missile boats on 21 October 1967 was an abrupt indicator of the lethality of 
small missile ships and their power to take out more than their weight of enemy 
warships at sea.14 The fatal attack foretold a swift change, an abrupt transforma-
tion of naval combat. The significance was grasped at once by the Israeli navy, 
which ordered small Sa’ar combatants armed with Gabriel missiles and employed 
them nearly flawlessly in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. 
There is a third category we shall call variables. Variables at the operational 
level of war stem not from technology but from social and political change. 
Variables are not a trend in one direction but change according to geopolitical 
circumstances. The present interest in irregular warfare and resistance to terrorist 
attacks, such as the one on USS Cole (DDG 67) at Aden, brought about a great 
change of emphasis in the world’s navies (and armies), but throughout history 
there have been many examples of sneak attacks in ports or restricted waters. 
The well named “Long War of the Twenty-First Century” appears to have dura-
bility, but any historian will say that what is wrought by societies and geopolitics 
will change in direction. The rise of China and its well documented interest in 
sea power is one such impending change, one that ought to temper any single-
minded U.S. Navy emphasis on projection of power and, relatedly, humanitarian 
operations.
No catalog of constants, trends, and variables in naval operations has been 
compiled as has been done at the tactical level, but it is useful to offer salient 
examples of each.15 
Two Great Constants: Operational Maneuver and Efficiency of Movement
“Operational maneuver from the sea” is a modern term coined by the U.S. Marine 
Corps, but the efficacy of expeditionary operations and the efficient support of 
land forces operating across oceans have been and remain constant advantages 
of maritime superiority. Twenty-five years ago, in the heyday of the NATO alli-
ance, a thoughtful German army officer named Otto Bubke wrote a short essay 
describing the operational reasons why command of the sea is so advantageous.16 
On one hand, he argued, sea control prevents an enemy from attacking from the 
sea. On the other, it gives a maritime state the power to choose its scene of ac-
tion, somewhere on a land power’s coast.17 The reason for the latter, he stressed, 
was the operational-movement advantage of ships over ground transportation. 
At sea an amphibious force moves around five hundred nautical miles a day. Fast 
containerships move farther still, though in the twentieth century the norm for 
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merchant ships was more like four hundred. On land an army moving at opera-
tional speed against weak opposition advances about twenty-five statute miles 
a day. The famous German blitzkriegs in Poland and France in 1939 and 1940 
moved no faster than that. The ancient Roman road system was designed to allow 
a legion to move thirty miles a day.18 In 1066, King Harold of England had to rush 
north to defeat a Norwegian attack near York and then immediately back south 
to face William of Normandy at Hastings (where William would earn the epithet 
“the Conqueror”). Harold’s army 
averaged thirty miles a day during 
the round-trip. In DESERT STORM, 
the American army’s famous “left 
hook” crossed Kuwait to reach the 
Iraq border eighty miles away in four days, thus moving at twenty miles a day. A 
decade later, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, American ground forces advancing 
against light to moderate opposition took twenty-one days to reach Baghdad, 
which was 250 miles from the Kuwait border—a rate of advance of twelve miles 
per day.
Thus, in speed of operational movement ships have more than an order-of-
magnitude advantage over armies advancing against no or light resistance. They 
always have and likely always will. The number of logistical personnel required to 
move a force to the scene of action and sustain it there is probably two orders of 
magnitude less for ships than for land transport. In weight of combat potential 
carried per unit of energy expended, the advantage of ships may be as much as 
three orders of magnitude. The introduction of aircraft and aerial logistics com-
plicates this simplified description, but aircraft have never changed the threefold 
advantage of ships over ground transportation sufficiently to offset a sea power’s 
operational advantage. Ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads potentially at-
tenuate a sea power’s advantage if they are used intercontinentally, but to date 
they have not significantly altered the advantage of naval operations in speed or 
efficiency of movement.19
Otto Bubke did not say, nor do we, that the sea power’s advantage is the power 
to attack a strong land power’s physical center of gravity, because the land power 
will know what that vital spot is and defend it. Nor does the sea power’s advan-
tage always allow it to strike quickly and decisively; Great Britain found out that it 
could not land on German soil in World War I, and even an alternative operation 
against the Dardanelles proved too ambitious. In World War II the Normandy 
landings had to be deferred until 1944. But Bubke shows with rare clarity that 
because a sea power cannot be invaded, it does not have to maintain a large stand-
ing army, and it can often find and fund allies for coalition operations against the 
dominant land power that threatens them all.
Though the functions of force will abide, there 
is no inherent reason why the force categories 
of the past must hold in the future.
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Another Constant: Two Different Campaign Processes
J. C. Wylie was the first to distinguish two different “strategies,” or ways of con-
ducting a campaign. One is “sequential,” in which each operational success is 
another step toward victory, and a battle won becomes the foundation of the 
next. The classic example is the sweep of the Fifth and Third Fleets across the 
Central Pacific in amphibious assaults from the Gilbert Islands to the Philippines 
in less than a year. Mahan spoke of achieving one decisive battle, but in the last 
two centuries two or more “decisive” battles have been necessary to achieve com-
mand of the sea. 
The other way of conducting a campaign described by Wylie is through the 
“cumulative” results of many small actions. The world wars’ submarine cam-
paigns in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean are representative, and all 
guerres de course are antecedents. Those who do not find the distinction self-
evident will find a thorough discussion in Wylie’s classic Military Strategy.20 Wylie 
also points out the advantage of pursuing both operational modes in concert.
Sequential and cumulative campaigns were common in the age of fighting sail, 
the battleship era, and aircraft-carrier era. Although there have been no big sea 
battles in the missile age, this operational constant continues to hold. A sequence 
of short, sharp missile battles occurred in the eastern Mediterranean in the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War, and it deserves careful study. A sequential campaign on the 
open ocean in the missile age was waged by the British navy in the Falklands War. 
It started at sea and ended on land. A superb introduction to it is by its opera-
tional commander, Admiral Sandy Woodward, Royal Navy. His felicitous mem-
oir, One Hundred Days, is the best and very nearly the only personal description 
of the burdens of modern command at sea—long-range aircraft, short-range 
Exocet missiles, and a submarine put unremitting pressure on him at the opera-
tional level, and sometimes the tactical level as well.21 
A long cumulative maritime campaign that transpired during most of the 
1980s (actually, a pair of identical and opposing ones) was conducted by Iraq and 
Iran against shipping in the Persian Gulf. It included many—over a hundred—
missile attacks.
One More Constant: The Importance of Espionage for Operational Effectiveness
We will examine below as a great trend the improvements in operational recon-
naissance and surveillance. There can be little doubt, however, that clandestine 
information gathering—espionage—with a similar goal has affected states and 
naval operations for a very long time. A prominent tool of espionage has been 
code breaking, illustrated by MAGIC’s effect in determining Japanese operational 
intentions. In the Battle of the Atlantic, ULTRA on the Allied side—though offset 
at times by code breaking on the German side—created big swings in the loss 
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rates of Allied shipping and German U-boats. In the Cold War, U-2 and SR-71 
flights were prominent in “strategic” (i.e., operational) early warning. The impor-
tant observation for our purposes is that the value of espionage is not tactical but 
operational. It may bring about battles—for example, the battle of Jutland and 
other North Sea engagements in World War I—but it rarely affects battle tactics 
or outcomes.
A Great Trend: Changes to Scouting Effectiveness
The scouting process enjoys a trend, stemming from advances in technology, to 
greater detection range and accuracy. “Scouting” is the gathering and delivery of 
information; that once-popular term is more compact than “intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance” (even though often abbreviated as “ISR”). Through-
out most of naval history operational scouting was difficult for fleets. When a 
blockaded fleet escaped to sea, the blockading fleet was hard put to regain con-
tact. After the French fleet escaped Admiral Horatio Nelson’s blockade of Toulon 
and other French ports in 1798, he spent weeks sailing all over the Mediterranean 
trying to track it down before he finally found and destroyed it in the battle of 
the Nile.22 Until the first decades of the twentieth century, privateers, raiders, 
and pirates preyed on shipping without untoward risk. A great transformation 
occurred between 1910 and 1920 with the introduction of aerial reconnaissance 
for wide-area search, accompanied by instant wireless-radio reporting.23 Within 
a decade surface raiders became obsolete, and guerre de course at sea, to be suc-
cessful, had to be conducted by submarines, which could to a much greater extent 
remain undetected by aircraft. Locating an enemy fleet and even individual sur-
face raiders became much less of a guessing game. Aerial scouting at sea changed 
the nature of naval operations irrevocably. 
And the trend continues, with satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 
and other means to enhance surveillance at sea. Electronic intercept exacerbates 
the vulnerability of radiating warships to detection. Processing the information 
has now become a greater challenge than collecting it. Thus the current trend 
is a shift of emphasis from the means of scouting—to collect comprehensive 
data—to the fusion and interpretation of massive amounts of information into 
an essence on which commanders may decide and act.
Tactical and operational scouting overlap to no small extent—in fact so much 
so that they can be distinguished only by their effects. A UAV may be in the air 
for surveillance and operational warning of an approaching threat, or it may 
serve the tactical purpose of guiding weapons to the target. The initial efficacious 
campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan is a good illustration of operational 
and tactical scouting conducted with the same aircraft. 
The watchword of operational scouting is comprehensiveness. The watchword 
of tactical scouting is timeliness.
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Three More Trends
Increasing Range of Land-to-Sea Threats. Increasingly the sea is subject to attack 
and even domination from the land. At first land-based aircraft were not very 
effective unless their crews were specifically trained to navigate and hit moving 
targets afloat. For the past thirty or forty years vulnerability to land attack has 
grown because of the tactical-operational trend toward increasing range and ac-
curacy of scouting systems (or ISR), accompanied by the increasing range and 
accuracy of guided missiles, both ballistic and cruise. Today’s defender is increas-
ingly hard put to deal with either kind of antiship missile, let alone both. This 
leads to the possibility of a coastal no-man’s-land where neither shipping can 
flow nor surface warships can operate until command of the sea, including air 
superiority over the adjacent land, has been established. The trend restores em-
phasis on Function 1 (secure seas), which in large measure was taken for granted 
in the U.S. Navy after 1990, when Function 3 (projecting power) was the sole 
focus of attention.
Increased Port Vulnerability. Strikes into ports and airfields ashore have, over the 
past seventy years, virtually eliminated the “fleet in being,” held safely in reserve. 
Starting with the British strikes on Italian battleships in Taranto in 1940, the 
hazard to ships in port has grown. A recent example is the use of missiles in two 
Indian attacks on Pakistani ships in Karachi in 1971. In the realm of irregular 
warfare, the terrorist attack on Cole in port at Aden and U.S. Navy efforts to pre-
vent recurrences point to an important change of operational perspective that 
applies even in “peacetime.”
Growth of Claims to Ocean Ownership. In the past “ownership” was a ques-
tion largely restricted to land war. Today the question of ocean dominion—
accompanied by increasing claims of ocean sovereignty—is a visible trend that 
will continue. Fishing rights have long been contentious, but now seabed min-
eral resources have led to expanding international claims and counterclaims that 
threaten to curtail freedom of transit on the high seas or to lead to conflict at sea.
A Variable: Changed Operational Plans Due to Social and Political Developments
The current emphasis on irregular warfare is a change that is not a trend. It does 
not stem from scientific progress; its cause is human, not technological. Non-
state terrorist attacks and other criminal activity, such as smuggling, have led the 
world’s armed forces to act against a threat different from those the U.S. Navy 
prepared to oppose in the twentieth century. The problem’s maritime aspect is 
represented by piracy, stolen cargoes (for example, Nigerian petroleum), and 
terrorist threats to shipping. Maritime forces contend with drug running and il-
legal immigration, including “boat people” fleeing unstable societies. At present, 
however, our navy’s most frequent role is to deliver and sustain forces contending 
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on land in irregular warfare for purposes of stability, security, and reconstruc-
tion. Meanwhile, the foremost role of a great sea power—presently the United 
States—presumably is still the security of all nations’ shipping on the high seas. 
Navies have conducted small wars to suppress rebellion, piracy, and slave 
trading many times in the past. But it is prudent to anticipate that fleet actions 
will occur again in the future, because China must and will go to sea to achieve 
great-power status.
Part Variable, Part Trend: Fewer Battles at Sea
Sea battles for maritime supremacy in Greek and Roman times were much more 
prevalent than today. This was also true in the Mediterranean in the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries, when Ottoman Turks and the leading powers of Europe
—Spain, France, and the Holy Roman Empire—contended with each other in 
prolonged and bitter operations on land and sea. In the seventeenth century, the 
Dutch and English fought repeated wars almost completely restricted to the seas. 
The phenomenon was tied to technology: at the time, a new fighting fleet could 
be built in just a few years. A wealthy state’s defeated navy could be back in action 
soon after having suffered a crushing and “decisive” defeat.
The nineteenth century was a transition, one in which the ships became big-
ger, more expensive, and more heavily armed. It became harder for a defeated 
state to replace its losses or construct a new navy. In the early twentieth century 
the trend of fewer battles continued throughout the battleship era. This led to a 
startling phenomenon. From 1890 to 1910 no fewer than seventy-four classes of 
pre-Dreadnought battleships were built. Yet during the entire battleship era only 
seven decisive battles for command of the sea occurred.24 
But the variables of statecraft too are responsible for fewer battles and less con-
flict on the high seas. In part the trend may be traced to the dominance of Great 
Britain and its policy of enlightened self-interest during the Pax Britannica, dur-
ing which the Royal Navy protected the shipping of all friendly nations. A period 
nearly free of sea battles lasted from 1815 to early in the twentieth century. The 
infrequency of fleet actions explains to a large extent why capital-ship designs in 
the battleship era were so numerous, so experimental, and sometimes so foolish. 
The stability of the Pax Britannica was finally destroyed before World War I by 
the rise of Germany and its High Seas Fleet, along with the navies of many other 
states who felt compelled to compete. The existence of many fleets continued 
through World War II and generated many naval operations and battles. After 
World War II, American naval dominance created a new era of stability and an 
absence of decisive fleet actions—although there was no lack of naval operations, 
as the ascending U.S. Navy and other, declining navies projected their power 
overseas.
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Thus the infrequency of naval battles is due in part to technology that 
spawned bigger and more expensive warships, aircraft, satellites, and command-
and-control systems. In part it is the product of a nontechnical, social phenom-
enon in which states have been content to let one dominant sea power protect 
their sea-lanes. But that is changing. There has been reluctance in other states to 
rely on big, expensive American warships to protect against piracy, for example. 
As the societal variables wax and wane, we should also anticipate a resurgence of 
confrontations at sea that will accompany the rise of a peer competitor against a 
dominant sea power, which, of course, are currently the Chinese People’s Libera-
tion Army Navy and the American navy, respectively.
THE PROCESSES OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND THAT GOVERN A 
CAMPAIGN
A fairly careful scrutiny of the opponent’s thought patterns and their un-
derlying assumptions should be an early component of our own planning 
process. . . . An examination of this type might uncover something crucial 
in reaching toward establishment of control.
J. C. WYLIE
Clear Decisions and Integrated Actions 
In theory, strategists determine the desirable aims in a theater of operations, spe-
cifically where and when to act and why.25 They also normally decide the forces 
to commit to the campaign. The tactical commander determines how to confront 
and fight the enemy at the scene of action by transforming the combat potential 
of forces into combat power. Lying between strategic intent and tactical fulfill-
ment, the operational commanders’ role is to assure for themselves sea control for 
safe transit and delivery of the forces carrying combat potential to the strategists’ 
scene of action and to sustain them for the duration of the campaign. What we 
take from Wylie is that we cannot determine how best to control an enemy until 
we know the opponent sufficiently to get inside his mind and methods. Abstract 
enemies at unspecified locations will not take us far in concrete planning.
In practice, the three levels are an overlapping web of responsibilities and 
authority. Before a campaign is initiated, some combination of strategic and 
operational thinking estimates the combat potential needed to achieve the objec-
tive against the expected opposition, then calculates whether that quantity can 
be delivered and sustained. It is a responsibility of the operational commander 
to tell the strategist realistically how fast the forces containing the requisite com-
bat potential can be brought to the scene of action. Of course, the strategist has 
a staff to make these estimates, but the staff does not have to perform the acts 
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of delivery and sustainment, and the operational commander’s staff usually has 
better local knowledge of the temper and talents of the opposition. Tactical com-
manders will also make their own estimates about sufficiency and will have their 
own opinions about the enemy as they construct battle plans to create combat 
power and employ it.
Seamless Planning and Execution
One is struck by the seamlessness of the discussions of war on and from the sea in 
the writings of the best authors. They also emphasize the difference between op-
erations and tactics at sea and those on land. The closer one looks, the more one 
detects overlap between the policy-strategy, operational-logistical, and tactical-
technological elements in the successful conduct of war at sea. That does not 
obviate the advantage of artificially distinguishing separate purposes for strategy, 
operations, and tactics, as long as the officer corps does not become pedantic 
about isolating responsibilities in different decision-making bins. 
Let us look at two familiar, critical junctures in the Pacific War through a new 
lens to show the separate but interwoven characteristics of strategy, operations, 
and tactics. Both examples are taken from 1942, when Japanese and American 
forces were evenly matched in quantity, quality, and tactical prowess.
Illustration of Actions by Defenders
Through the spring of 1942, the United States was on the defensive in the Pacific 
while the Imperial Japanese Navy conducted a swift, successful campaign of con-
quest in French Indochina, the British Malay States, and the Dutch East Indies, 
while concurrently establishing a maritime perimeter to protect its resource base 
in Southeast Asia.26 Through the battle of Midway, the Japanese navy decided 
where and when to act. Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet—the operational 
commander, Admiral C. W. Nimitz—had the role of marshaling our defenses. 
The strategist, Admiral E. J. King in Washington, had plenty to say, but the formal 
role he pursued, and vigorously, was to send reinforcements, from the Atlantic 
and from new construction, to the theater as rapidly as possible. 
A curious thing about the battle for Midway Island is the dual role played by 
Nimitz before the battle. A close reading of his decisions shows that he was at the 
outset his own tactical commander. He positioned the carrier task forces of R. A. 
Spruance and F. J. Fletcher and assigned their aircraft carriers specific and differ-
ent tactical roles; he directed all the long-range reconnaissance; and he ordered 
the air attacks from Midway Island. These were not operational decisions; they 
were tactical decisions and crucial to our success. Only Nimitz at Pearl Harbor 
had the power to control long-range air search and activate the initial air attacks 
from Midway, which were ineffective but valuable in that they distracted Admiral 
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Chuichi Nagumo. Nimitz did not and could not let go of the tactical reins until 
the task forces’ three lurking, undetected carriers, constrained by radio silence, 
had themselves detected the Japanese Striking Force’s four carriers. When it was 
possible for Fletcher to assume tactical command, Nimitz backed off. Then when 
Fletcher’s command suite was crippled, he did not hesitate to pass the conn, 
seamlessly, to Spruance.27
Illustration of Actions by Attackers
The campaign for Guadalcanal was the first time the United States exercised sig-
nificant strategic choice in the Pacific. The extended campaign for Guadalcanal 
and the larger Solomon Islands campaign are splendid examples of the interre-
lated roles of strategy, operational 
(or logistical) support, and tactics, 
in all of which sea, air, and ground 
forces all collaborated. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged 
on by Admiral King, decided after the battle of Midway that the geographical 
area around the Solomon Islands in the southwest Pacific was of supreme impor-
tance and a suitable location for a fighting defense, known later as the offensive-
defensive phase of the Pacific War. Because the Japanese, though licking their 
wounds suffered at Midway, were also constructing an airfield on Guadalcanal 
from which to dominate the surrounding airspace, King wished to block their 
advance by a swift assault to seize the airfield before it became operational. Time 
was critical, so the landing was specified for early August 1942. 
Admiral Nimitz, the theater commander, had to decide whether the forces 
envisioned would be adequate. There were ample ground forces in the Pacific but 
enough transport to deliver and sustain only one Marine division as far away as 
the Solomons. It would be the task of the tactical commanders, notably Admirals 
Fletcher and R. K. Turner and Marine general A. A. Vandegrift, to land the 1st 
Marine Division, establish a perimeter on Guadalcanal, and activate the airfield 
(to be known as Henderson Field). Much of the Pacific Fleet would be committed 
to support the landing and block a Japanese response. 
Thereupon came about a bitter six-month-long campaign for Henderson 
Field—a reaction from the Japanese navy had been predicted but not its vigor. 
Historians have covered the campaign in detail but have not said enough about 
the initial operational constraint on the American side, the lack of transport. 
On the Japanese side the failure lay in an initially piecemeal, if swift, response, 
sending too little too late to push the Marines into the sea. This was in part 
due to mismatch at the strategic level between the importance of the end and 
willingness to send tactical commanders the means to destroy the American 
States have been content to let one dominant 
sea power protect their sea-lanes. But that is 
changing.
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fleet and beachhead. This confusion arose in part because Japanese intelligence 
underestimated the American forces ashore and afloat, and in part because the 
Japanese army and navy underestimated the resolve of American land, air, and 
sea forces, which, after a shaky start, fought well and exhibited a very high degree 
of interservice cooperation. 
Then the reason for Japanese failure became logistical. The decisive American 
campaign advantage was that the United States could reinforce and sustain its 
lodgment with food, fuel, and ammunition because it controlled the air in day-
light hours, while the Japanese were forced to reinforce and support their troops 
only at night. Taking nothing away from the Marines, who had to defeat the 
Japanese army in every battle on the perimeter of Henderson Field, the campaign 
was won by the decisive operational effects of starvation and disease suffered in 
the many Japanese battalions on the island.28
Tension between United Action and Delegated Authority
The ideal in a war is to achieve similar collaboration of all commanders verti-
cally and laterally, so that cohesive action results. It should be easy to understand 
why perfect unity is hard to achieve, because prosecution of a campaign entails 
decentralized authority and responsibility. The art of fencing, or samurai swords-
manship, is a poor analogy for a military operation because swordsmen are in 
sole control of their actions and do not have to cooperate with anybody else. A 
better analogy is football, because it is a team effort in a campaign (the game) 
comprising a series of battles (the plays). 
Evidently the ideal is rarely attained. The best, but imperfect, results come 
from:
• Sound doctrine that fosters operational and tactical unity of action.
• Sound training that prepares all echelons for teamwork. The basis of cohe-
sion is notably unobtainable at high echelons when government officials 
neither know nor care about the intricacies involved in cooperative action 
in a maritime campaign or about the difficulty of retraining to a new opera-
tional objective.
• Sound experience that comes from enough of the right kind of war making 
to know what to expect of companions in positions of authority and respon-
sibility. This is a great limitation when interpersonal experience has been in 
fighting an inapplicable kind of war. 
These three cornerstones of success are preparations at the operational level, not 
the responsibility of tacticians—at least not at sea.
42
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/22
 H U G H E S  39
AMERICAN NAVAL OPERATIONS TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE
This is a static [Roman] world. Civilized life, like the cultivation of Auso-
nius’s magnificent Bordeaux vineyards, lies in doing well what has been 
done before. Doing the expected is the highest value—and the second 
highest is like it: receiving the appropriate admiration of one’s peers for 
doing it.
THOMAS CAHILL 
Two Underappreciated Transformations
In How the Irish Saved Civilization Thomas Cahill uses the poet Ausonius as a 
foil to show why gentrified Romans could not see that changes all around them 
would soon lead to their empire’s collapse.29 Naval operations are not poetry, 
and American perspectives are far from those of the Roman Empire, but this is 
not a time for U.S. leadership to be admired for doing the expected in planning 
the Navy’s future. The American navy has not been contested at sea since 1945. 
In all subsequent operations—including major conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and 
Southwest Asia—it has enjoyed the unconstrained benefits of delivering combat 
power from a safe sea sanctuary. With few exceptions, its doctrine, training, and 
preparation for fighting enemy ships in missile combat have had to be based 
vicariously on the experiences of other navies. That probably explains why our 
navy has not recognized the significance of two big transformations.
A tactical transformation was from the carrier era to the missile era of warfare, 
along with two additional complications: the impending influence of robotic 
systems and of cyber operations. The combat effects of missile warfare at sea were 
not crucial until the geopolitical transformation in East Asia, which now impels a 
reconsideration of the American strategy to influence China and our Asian allies 
in the twenty-first century. 
The operational solution to retain strategic influence in the western Pacific 
must reflect China’s growing antiaccess tactics and also anticipate that China, for 
quite logical reasons, will soon construct a sea-control navy of its own. 
The fundamental changes in East Asia are accompanied by U.S. fleet obliga-
tions in many and varying places around the world—first, to fight irregular wars; 
second, to maintain coastal presence for peacemaking; and third, to attain local 
sea control and deliver combat power from the sea. The latter is the U.S. Navy’s 
familiar post–World War II role, of course, in which combat power, manifested 
in ground and air forces, was delivered unfailingly and efficiently at every scene 
of action—and was consistently taken for granted. 
We have emphasized the decisive shift to missile warfare. We have not as yet 
spoken of undersea warfare, which has been neglected in the U.S. Navy for two 
decades. Antisubmarine and mine forces need to concentrate on the difficult 
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waters of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Yellow Sea, and the China 
Sea, where mine, submarine, and antisubmarine operations must be conducted 
amid bottom clutter and surface-craft noise in waters as shallow as thirty fath-
oms. Submarines in greater numbers must burnish old-fashioned skills to sink 
ships of many kinds in deep and shallow seas. A lot of catch-up is needed to 
exploit new technological opportunities in undersea warfare.
The Content of Viable Strategies
Service documents list six “core capabilities” for the U.S. Navy: Forward Pres-
ence, Deterrence, Sea Control, Power Projection, Maritime Security, and Disaster 
Response.30 
When the first four capabilities were first described in the 1970s, our primary 
opponent was well known in the way Wylie prescribes; the national military 
strategy to constrain the Soviet Union was well defined, Navy campaign analyses 
were extensive, and fleet exercises were frequent and generated well documented, 
influential results. Today the desirability of such capabilities is inarguable, but 
the taxonomy is useless as a guide for future fleet configuration. The capabili-
ties are too vague to be tested without specifying locations or enemies, and they 
say nothing about weight of effort—the forces and tactical skills that must be 
devoted to each. To date the list of core capabilities has had no effect whatsoever 
on U.S. fleet composition. It does nothing to help develop an affordable navy to 
support national strategies.
In the twenty-first century the nation will need clearly expressed, testable 
strategies affecting the naval component of American forces. For purposes of 
illustration, I suggest that the following six strategies would adequately describe 
the primary ends and means of a comprehensive national security plan. 
For China. Forces with the power to influence China and our friends in Asia and 
to ensure freedom of the seas for all nations would serve as the means to the 
end of maintaining effective American presence in the western Pacific. Insofar as 
possible, the same forces must be designed to limit any conflict to China’s own 
seas in a way that avoids abrupt escalation into a long, debilitating war.
For Iran. Forces to deter any form of aggression by Iran ought to embody clearly 
the air and missile power needed to wreak destruction on the Iranian economy 
and means of war, as well as the naval power to isolate Iran by winning control of 
the Strait of Hormuz and seas on both ends of it. The forces for such an air-sea 
strategy will probably provide the best affordable means to respond to any other 
state threatening violence, while avoiding a costly war on the ground.
For Irregular Warfare. Forces can be deployed in many distributable packages and 
maintained economically for long-lasting antipiracy, antidrug, and antismuggling 
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operations or to support short, successful operations such as those conducted by 
ground forces in Grenada, Panama, and the first Lebanon crisis. 
For Nuclear War. Navy forces are part of a national capability to deter an attack 
with nuclear weapons by any of a growing number of states that have them. 
Navy SSBNs and ballistic-missile-defense ships should contribute according to 
the provisions of that strategy. In addition, the strategy ought to specify how to 
combat terrorists and nonstate actors—presumably, as in the past, by denial to 
terrorists of weapons of mass destruction insofar as possible.
For Cyberspace. The nature of national cyberspace “forces” is not the only thing 
that makes this strategy different from the others. The White House and Defense 
Department have both issued cyberspace doctrines, which they call “strategies.” 
The former aspires to be international policy, but (despite its title) it is not a 
testable strategy. The latter is probably adequate as a strategy that can serve as the 
basis of campaign planning and testing. For example, it explicitly calls for training 
and experimentation.31 A cyberspace strategy and campaign plans are desirable 
because international, nonlethal cyberwarfare is going on right now. An execut-
able national strategy is desirable because, first, cyberspace operations affect 
daily commercial, social, and government activities; second, cyberwar will play a 
significant role in a shooting war; and third, we have a peacetime opportunity to 
learn more about how electronic “forces” defend our systems and can attack an 
enemy in a fast-changing virtual environment. Yet the capabilities for defending 
and attacking cyber links are different in nature from the more tangible, count-
able objects of the other five strategies. Vice Admiral Arthur W. Cebrowski prob-
ably had such a distinction between links and objects in mind when he espoused 
“network-centric warfare.”32 
For Homeland Defense. Vital, difficult, and expensive though it is to keep home-
land defenses up to date, the strategy ought not to affect U.S. fleet design. There 
are those who think Navy vessels for overseas irregular warfare should contrib-
ute to defending our coasts. Perhaps so, but let the national government first 
design a comprehensive homeland-defense strategy that emphasizes the Coast 
Guard and domestic law-enforcement agencies. Then we can see how an afford-
able Navy might contribute—for example, with collaborative research and the 
development of tools for coastal action.
{LINE-SPACE} 
This is a personal set of strategies to illustrate what is meant by having enough 
content and focus to be translated into executable war plans and tested by cam-
paign (operational-level) analyses: simulations, war games, transparent math-
ematical representations (“models”) of the process, and experiments at sea. It 
may not be the best list. For example, the strategies do not include major ground 
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combat operations like Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, or 
IRAQI FREEDOM. Paradoxically, those operations illustrate how planning and 
campaign analysis are done. Because they were tested in real war, they show both 
the rich reward and severe limitations of campaign studies that estimate the 
forces needed, help design the operational scheme, and forecast the casualties and 
time it will cost to execute the plan.33
An Appraisal of Consequences 
Observe that a strategy without testing is merely a desire—a hypothesis. Cam-
paign planning and analysis help find out whether a strategy is viable and 
whether assigned forces are suitable to execute it. It is not our purpose to discuss 
shortcomings in today’s forces. We 
will merely assert that it is possible 
to design a better fleet to fulfill the 
U.S. Navy’s role in the first four 
strategies, and within the current 
shipbuilding budget envelope. We have not especially concerned ourselves herein 
with the budgetary implications of future navy forces—costing is not inherent in 
the planning of current operations. But it takes only a quick reminder of coming 
national financial pressures to observe that future defense strategies must adapt 
to the nation’s means to pay for them.
Observe, next, that each of the six is a national strategy. Though our emphasis 
here is on maritime activities, the Navy can neither express a strategy as policy 
nor implement it alone. Still, that is no reason why it should not be aggressive 
in describing the strategies and helping to test them for executability. The U.S. 
Navy can—indeed, it must—anticipate each strategy and build forces that serve 
as long-lived means to support it.
Observe that to be effective the strategies must be unclassified and widely 
read—by opponents, so they understand their feasibility and potential impact; by 
international friends, so they know our faithfulness and desire for collaboration; 
and by American policy makers, to engender unity of purpose. An advantage of 
distinguishing three levels of war is in separating a strategy that can (and must) 
be widely disseminated from the often-secret operational plans and actions 
needed to execute it.
Observe that the unified combatant commands cannot determine strategies 
even for their own theaters. A theater commander’s task is to develop operational 
plans with the forces assigned. For influencing China, U.S. Pacific Command is 
the focus, and its commander will naturally work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
to develop and test effective operations in peace and war, with emphasis on 
maintaining long-term American influence in East Asia. In executing his peace-
time responsibilities, the Pacific combatant commander will also anticipate and 
In the twenty-first century the nation will need 
clearly expressed, testable strategies affecting 
the naval component of American forces.
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describe combat capabilities better suited for the future, presumably in the form 
of more distributed and more survivable surface ships, submarines, aircraft, and 
ISR elements.
The fleet intended to influence China must be capable of serving many and 
varying American policies, from cooperation to competition, confrontation, or 
conflict. Yet its ships and aircraft must be constructed with thirty- and forty-
year lifetimes. Even the simplest policies of cooperation applied to the People’s 
Republic of China and the Republic of China have been deliciously multifaceted 
in the ways they have been executed by past American presidents and the De-
partment of State. Their strategic thinking comprises wheels within wheels of 
subtlety. Cooperation implies port visits, joint exercises, humanitarian assistance, 
and other ways of signaling friendship. But in prior manifestations the Navy 
has also been employed as a tool to send confrontational signals with warships. 
Moreover, every American policy variant must be prepared to react to Chinese 
initiatives with a single, robust fleet composition.
Observe that each strategy must be designed so that most nations welcome, 
or even insist on, American action. This is not as difficult as it may seem, if one 
structures each strategy with that in mind. Twenty-first-century American strate-
gies should include collaborators, reflecting that felicitous term, now out of favor, 
“a thousand-ship [international] navy.”
Observe the issue of pace in the first four strategies. American navy planning 
during the Cold War placed the fleet forward in substantial numbers, because 
a Soviet attack would demand an instant NATO response before escalation to 
nuclear war. By contrast, exploration of deployments today is likely to show that 
for each of those four strategies a modest peacekeeping force at the scene is more 
desirable, if it can be followed by a formidable air and sea buildup. Our national 
strategies should be designed to signal substantively—as distinct from the mere 
use of threatening words—in time of crisis that the United States, backed by 
world opinion, intends to act forcefully. To some readers this will be a jarring 
point of view, because it has not been practiced by the U.S. Navy since before 
World War II, but it has advantages in both campaign flexibility and affordability. 
Patience is usually a greater virtue than immediate response when preparing to 
apply overwhelming force.
THE UNIFYING ROLE OF OPERATIONAL ART 
The operational level of war at sea introduced as doctrine in 1994 by the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations is useful. It 
promotes congruence between campaign planning and execution. It heightens 
awareness of operational logistics. It clarifies the roles of theater commanders. 
It disciplines policy and strategy, by showing that until a strategy is tested by 
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Strategy (1911; repr. Annapolis, Md.: Naval 
Institute Press, 1988).
5. Bradley Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine 
(1916; repr. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 
Press, 1988), p. 220. In the third section 
we will discard Fiske’s ideal of a single 
controlling mind, but the metaphor of a 
navy as a complicated fighting machine is 
near-perfect. 
6. J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General 
Theory of Power Control (Piscataway, N.J.: 
Rutgers Univ. Press, 1967; repr. Annapolis, 
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 43. The 
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a Sailor.” It should be no surprise that Wylie 
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campaign analysis and fleet exercises it is only a hypothesis and a desire. It coun-
tenances open publication of a strategy, while leaving room to develop secret 
operational plans for its execution.
We have seen that a useful way to appreciate how naval operations differ from 
strategy and tactics is to describe their distinguishing constants, trends, and 
variables. We have observed that the conduct of a successful maritime campaign 
falls outside the explanatory three levels of warfare but instead must be an artful, 
integrated web of decisions and actions. 
At the tactical level, future plans must recognize the impending influence of 
robots and cyber operations in the missile age of warfare. We have inferred that 
these changes will lead to a more distributable fighting force of scouts, subma-
rines, ships, and aircraft configured for mutual support and survival. The future 
fleet must be capable of safeguarding the movement of worldwide commercial 
shipping and of achieving command of any sea—eventually. Smaller, offensively 
potent elements that will probably constitute the next battle fleet may also serve 
as “cruisers” and part of “the flotilla.” We will not know until our strategic aims 
are clearly stated and the fleet is designed. Then campaign analysis will be able 
to test the tactical employment as well as the operational deployment of future 
naval forces.
Some strategists and policy makers may wish to arrange the six strategies in 
a grand mosaic. For example, a strategy against terrorists sometimes heard is 
“homeland defense, overseas offense.” A comprehensive antiterrorist strategy 
will embrace components of irregular warfare, cyber operations, and homeland 
defense. There is nothing wrong with this ultimate goal, but our purpose here is 
not to arrive at a comprehensive strategy. Our purpose has been to illustrate the 
vital role of operational art in testing every strategy. 
N O T E S 
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15. See Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 
pp. 172–73, 224–27. To keep a long essay 
from growing longer I have omitted other 
examples some readers may think of.
16. Otto Bubke, Clausewitz and Naval Warfare 
(Bergisch Gladbach, West Ger.: Federal 
Armed Forces Office for Studies and Exer-
cises, August 1987).
17. There is a third, but tactical, advantage of a 
superior navy—geographical effects at sea are 
muted or absent. There are no defensive posi-
tions as they exist in land combat, so a small 
initial advantage in combat power is more 
likely to be decisive. John Arquilla noted 
in Dubious Battles the case of a land power 
whose naval leaders spoke boldly of what 
they would do until the war started and then 
abruptly turned cautious.
18. Rates of advance of land forces are more 
complicated and variable than at sea. In 1990, 
R. L. Helmbold completed a comprehensive 
four-volume study that will likely never be 
exceeded in its thoroughness. For our pur-
poses the first volume is the most relevant: 
Rates of Advance in Historical Land Combat 
Operations (Bethesda, Md.: CAA, June 1990). 
There is nothing comparable published on 
the rate of movement of naval forces at sea, 
and probably there need not be.
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19. For a more detailed look at the movement 
advantage of ships, see Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., 
“Naval Maneuver Warfare,” Naval War College 
Review 50, no. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 25–49.
20. Wylie, Military Strategy, see esp. chap. 3 and 
a subsequent appraisal (p. 101) found in a 
chapter, “Postscript: Twenty Years Later,” writ-
ten for the reprint edition. 
21. Sandy Woodward with Patrick Robinson, One 
Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands 
Battle Group Commander (Annapolis, Md.: 
Naval Institute Press, 1992).
22. Another example was the Trafalgar cam-
paign, in which Napoleon intended to seduce 
Nelson to the West Indies with Villeneuve’s 
fleet, so that the French could dominate 
the English Channel long enough to get 
Napoleon’s invasion army on English soil. But 
Nelson deduced Napoleon’s operational aim 
and moved too fast for the French, leading 
to the destruction of the French and Spanish 
fleets off Cape Trafalgar, inducing Napoleon 
to abandon his cross-channel invasion and to 
campaign instead against Austria and Prussia 
in the east.
23. The short operational lives of Graf Spee and 
Bismarck early in World War II show a failure 
in Germany to perceive this transformation.
24. There were two decisive fleet actions in the 
Sino-Japanese War (1894), two in the Spanish-
American War (1898), and two in the Russo-
Japanese War (1905), but only one, the battle 
of Jutland (1916), in World War I. We dismiss 
several engagements, including Coronel, 
Falklands, Dogger Bank, and Heligoland 
Bight, as cruiser warfare or skirmishes. Before 
any more significant sea battles were fought, 
the battleship era was over.
25. Wylie, Military Strategy, pp. 77, 78, and 97 
(the epigraph is found on p. 87). Wylie here is 
more general, saying the aim of strategy is to 
achieve some degree of control (or influence, 
or domination) for a purpose. A strategy, 
then, is “a plan for doing something to achieve 
some known end.” Our working definition 
above avoids a long development, while 
reflecting the way orders are frequently issued 
to operational commanders for execution. 
26. We ignore raids by American carriers in the 
first six months, regarding them as a form of 
cruiser warfare.
27. Readers of the several drafts have sharpened 
this article. Most would have added points 
for which there is no space. One of the astute 
comments contrasted Nimitz’s role with that 
of Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, “who could 
have been of far more use had he not been in 
EMCON [i.e., radio silence] aboard Yamato. 
. . . The person in the best position to make 
a decision [must put himself where he can] 
do so.”
28. Far more casualties were suffered on both 
sides from sickness than from combat. On 
the Japanese side, by December the troops 
were literally starving, because we had almost 
severed their sea communications.
29. Thomas Cahill, How the Irish Saved Civiliza-
tion (New York: Random House, 1995).
30. For example, NDP-1 (March 2010), pp. 
25–30.
31. U.S. President, International Strategy for Cy-
berspace (Washington, D.C.: May 2011); and 
U.S. Defense Dept., Department of Defense 
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Wash-
ington, D.C.: July 2011).
32. Vice Admiral Cebrowski (1942–2005) was, es-
pecially as President of the Naval War College 
(1998–2001) and after retirement from active 
duty as director of the Office of Force Trans-
formation in the Department of Defense, a 
leading advocate of the broad transformation 
of the U.S. military, especially along the lines 
of the concept of web-based network-centric 
warfare. See James R. Blaker, Transforming 
Military Force: The Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski 
and Network Centric Warfare (New York: 
Praeger, 2007).
33. The poor estimates of casualties and time 
to completion are nothing new, but they 
demonstrate the need to pursue a war’s 
design and objectives to a conclusion despite 
uncertainties.
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Sea Power and Contingency Operations in the Twenty-First 
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n September 1994, the Caribbean nation of Haiti burst into political unrest that 
drove twenty-six thousand migrants out to sea on board overcrowded and un-
seaworthy craft in an unprecedented mass migration to the United States. Several 
months later, over thirty thousand Cubans followed suit, attempting to reach the 
mainland on literally anything that could float. On 31 August 2005, a “weapon of 
mass destruction” in the form of a category-five hurricane exploded in the Gulf 
coast city of New Orleans, killing over 1,300 citizens and forcing the evacuation 
of tens of thousands. Finally, on 20 April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon explor-
atory oil rig exploded, heralding an unprecedented environmental disaster whose 
final impact has yet to be determined.
What these events shared, with their catastrophic nature and international 
impact, was a link to the sea. Although vastly different in cause, circumstances, 
and scope—ranging as they did from a man-made political event to recovery 
from the wrath of nature—these crises all saw a signifi-
cant application of sea power in reaction and recovery 
operations. Given the inherent flexibility of sea power 
and the vast naval capability of the United States, this 
would seem appropriate. There is little doubt that sea 
power is a tremendous asset in dealing with crises, in 
terms both of the ability to respond rapidly and of the 
capacity for long-term sustainability in recovery oper-
ations on-scene. The arrival of a fleet in a contingency 
essentially brings a floating, self-contained city into 
the area—a mobile source of supply, command and 
I
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control, and multidimensional capability. The rapidity with which modern sea 
power can be deployed and its long-term sustainability make it seem tailor-made 
for dealing with a large-scale crisis.
Naval forces have responded to a host of contingencies worldwide throughout 
the long history of U.S. sea power. During the Cold War, these responses varied in 
type but usually relied on, or set the scene for, some direct or indirect application 
of combat power.1 But today’s crisis operations are far more complex and infi-
nitely more diverse, presenting sea power with challenges and scenarios in which 
it would not have been applied in the past. This tendency has been reflected to 
some extent in current doctrine that seeks to expand noncombatant sea-power 
scenarios like humanitarian assistance and domestic response;2 recent experi-
ence, however, has demonstrated that crisis-contingency events, especially in the 
domestic setting, extend far beyond the scope of familiar mission sets. 
Today, crises have become so magnified that the problem must be considered 
in an entirely new light—that of the “crisis contingency,” a number of crises 
combined into an event of unprecedented scale and impact, the effects of which 
develop with unprecedented rapidity. Adapting to these events is challenging. 
Doctrinal exhortations aside, in practice such operations are often seen as, at 
best, secondary to maintaining readiness for combat. This makes difficult the task 
of adapting sea power from a purely war-fighting instrument to one capable of 
responding to the crisis contingency. The underlying reasons for this difficulty 
are complex; they include bureaucratic and service inertia, inapposite training, 
MASS MIGRATION
Background. In the summer of 1994, indigent Haitian migrants began leaving 
the island on a heretofore unheard-of scale. While migration from Haiti via sea 
had always been familiar—averaging roughly 400–800 people per month—
“mass migration” had only occurred once before, and then on a much smaller 
scale. The cause was a combination of political unrest and (unfounded) rumors 
that the United States had altered its immigration policies and would grant 
Haitians citizenship once they arrived. Over twenty thousand Haitians sailed 
in small, wooden, vastly overloaded, unseaworthy sailboats; the U.S. response 
quickly took on the nature of a massive search and rescue operation, with the 
overarching goal of strategic interdiction. In the ensuing months similar politi-
cal rumors sent equally large numbers of Cubans to sea.
Sea-power forces. The sudden mass migrations required the immediate 
surging of the entire Coast Guard Atlantic fleet (some twenty-two major cut-
ters), supplemented by Coast Guard Pacific assets and ten warships from the 
U.S. Navy. Twenty-four thousand Haitians and thirty thousand Cubans were 
interdicted and rescued, in Operations ABLE MANNER and ABLE VIGIL.
External/unique factors. The mass migration operations were widely re-
garded as successful in terms of the rapidity of response, operational coordina-
tion between the services, and number of lives saved. Social media played little 
role: the Internet was in its infancy, and unlike other contingencies there was 
no “land” component. Planning for a future mass migration has attempted to 
use the lessons of 1994 and expand the strategy to include other government 
agencies and the impact of new technologies on a migration event.
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and a naval culture narrowly focused on a very specific combative tradition that 
is becoming increasingly irrelevant in real-world operations requiring flexible 
response.
Given the frequency of crisis contingencies, their potential strategic impact, 
and the commitment of resources effective response requires, it can be argued 
that crisis-contingency operations represent, if not a new mission set immediate-
ly, at least a new area of operations that naval forces will adopt as a core mission 
in the near future. Experience has demonstrated that crisis contingencies demand 
an entirely new set of skills, tactics, and techniques if sea power is to be applied 
to them effectively. But recent lessons in how this may be accomplished have not 
been readily learned. Sea-power theory remains largely focused on a vision of 
state-vs.-state warfare that is increasingly unlikely, while calls for sea power in 
response to crisis contingencies have increased dramatically.3 A deliberate and 
dedicated effort to adapt old cultural viewpoints to the new reality is needed. 
DEFINITIONS: THE NEW CRISIS CONTINGENCY 
The link between sea power and crisis is not new; sea-power advocates have long 
argued that one of the primary missions of naval force is to stand ready, deployed, 
to respond to a wide variety of crises overseas. History is rife with examples of sea 
power performing ably in this role since the age of sail. But “crisis” is tradition-
ally defined as some form of conflict; in the vast majority of these cases, crisis 
response was almost exclusively a matter of the traditional application of military 
(“kinetic”) power or the threat of force against potential enemies.4 Naval power is 
by tradition “hard” power, designed and trained for employment in combat; any 
“softer” elements usually revolve around intimidation (“gunboat diplomacy”) in 
the national interest.5 
New elements challenge this model. Although naval power is still used in the 
traditional way, crises have changed considerably in the modern era, as have the 
requirements for response to them. In recent times naval power has been used 
increasingly in nontraditional crisis response, not only internationally but also 
domestically, in a wide range of disasters, evacuations, mass migrations, and 
homeland security events. These operations have been outside the military sphere 
and have differed from those within it in a number of respects. Whereas in the 
past, coordination with agencies other than traditional military forces was rare 
or nonexistent, crisis-contingency operations are inherently multiagency. Prior 
to the information age, crisis operations were conducted largely out of the sight 
and mind of anyone but members of the immediate operational forces and their 
military chain of command, allowing for a considerable degree of flexibility and 
adaptability. Today these operations are carefully scrutinized in the political and 
public spheres, by means of almost instantaneous communication technologies. 
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The days of a military-only response where public reaction could wait for a pre-
pared briefing are long past. These elements and others demand a new definition 
for these diverse operations to manage the modern crisis contingency. 
What is a crisis contingency? Crises happen every day throughout the world, 
and they obviously cover a wide range in terms of impact and required response. 
Not all of them rise to the level of a crisis contingency. In the broadest sense, crisis 
contingencies can be defined by their size, speed, and impact. Crisis contingen-
cies happen on a grand scale, and they happen quickly; in the current vernacular, 
they are “wicked” problems.6 The actual incident may be anything within a broad 
range of possibilities, including social or political crises (such as mass migra-
tions), a natural or man-made disaster, or an environmental event. Nonetheless, 
crisis contingencies share a number of elements that are significant for the em-
ployment of sea power. Scale and impact are all-important. A crisis contingency 
may begin as a localized event (such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which 
initially was thought to be contained within a small geographic area); it has the 
potential to spread to theater-level proportions ultimately requiring massive re-
sponse. Second, the crisis and its effects unfold and ramify with a speed that out-
strips the efforts of traditional “first responders” and local emergency manage-
ment agencies. Third, the crisis contingency affects some element of the national 
strategy or threatens national or potentially international security. Finally, the 
KATRINA
Background. The “storm of the century” struck the Gulf coast on 29 August 
2005. Although damage was severe along the entire coast, through three 
states, the most severe damage occurred when levees were breached at New 
Orleans, flooding the city and causing over 1,300 deaths. Although the Na-
tional Response Plan was activated early in the disaster, government response 
as a whole received widespread criticism for delay and inefficiency.
Sea-power forces. As a domestic response agency, the Coast Guard ulti-
mately deployed forty-two cutters and seventy-six aircraft prior to and immedi-
ately after the storm; it was credited with saving over thirty-one thousand lives 
during the evacuation. The Navy ultimately deployed nineteen ships and 346 
helicopters to recovery operations. The widespread damage required a highly 
diverse response; offshore operations primarily focused on support to units 
ashore and on command and control.
External/unique factors. The Defense Department involvement was in-
tensely controversial. According to the National Response Plan, disasters are 
primarily the response of affected states until such time as their assets are 
overwhelmed and federal assistance is requested. Even then, federal assis-
tance may not take the form of military forces. During Katrina, there was inad-
equate understanding of how the plan was meant to work, delaying a formal 
request for federal assistance. Although National Guard units were on the 
scene quickly (largely due to the efforts of an individual commanding general), 
Navy forces were not committed until midweek, and even then piecemeal. Sig-
nificant elements of sea power (hospital ship, combatants, and a carrier) were 
not assigned until well after the event and in the wake of enormous public 
pressure for increased federal presence. These forces ultimately contributed to 
the long-term recovery operation, not initial response. 
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complexity of the crisis demands response across the power spectrum, of which 
sea power is but one (albeit important) part.
In addition to these strategic elements, a number of other characteristics are 
unique, collectively, to a crisis contingency. 
Short Notice. Modern crisis contingencies tend to afford little warning of their 
impact on the national psyche and the demand they will pose. These factors 
would seem obvious. Speed, however, has become all-encompassing with respect 
to not only the suddenness of the actual event but also the rapidity with which, 
due to the impact of modern communication methods, it is seen and magnified 
in the public sphere. Mass communication has made these events completely 
transparent and accordingly drives action into the political realm. It is an unfor-
tunate reality that the camera often does not convey reality, and information in-
stantaneously broadcast and interpreted on the Internet—by just about anyone
—is likely to be distorted or untrue.7 An event magnified in this way creates an 
almost instant public demand for action and, very soon after, a political demand 
for response. Even in cases where sea power is already poised to respond, politi-
cal will can change the nature of its response or demand the use of assets not 
originally intended, making effective planning extremely difficult.
Surge Requirements. Crisis-contingency operations almost universally require 
immediate surges of force into affected areas. This requirement can be problem-
atic with regard to the availability of forces and operational expertise, especially 
in the domestic arena.8 Naval forces are deployed forces. The United States posi-
tions naval forces worldwide, poised to respond to overseas crises within a very 
short time, primarily with shows of force or applications of kinetic power. Crisis 
contingencies, however, have entirely different requirements, both operationally 
and materially, requiring tailored forces trained and supplied for specific types 
of responses that are not kinetically based. This is obviously a problem if the 
forces are already committed elsewhere. Even sea-power assets that traditionally 
focus on domestic operations (such as Coast Guard cutters) have to be redirect-
ed and assigned alternative missions, which can be very difficult to do on short 
notice, given established deployment cycles. The demands of normal overseas 
and domestic missions are such that ships in port are likely to be undergoing 
extensive maintenance and therefore are not readily available without significant 
operational degradation.9
Intense Interagency Involvement. As crisis contingencies are extremely diverse, 
responses to them are often very wide-ranging, relying on agencies focused on 
specific elements (food, shelter, etc.) outside the familiar military realm. This is 
a relatively new factor in contingency planning and response, although govern-
ment agencies have always existed to deal with various aspects of crises, with 
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emphasis on interagency coordination common in the aftermath of 9/11.10 This is 
not characteristic just of crisis contingencies but is evident across the entire spec-
trum of conflict. The U.S. approach to irregular warfare, for example, now stresses 
an interagency combination of “hard” and “soft” power overseas. Executive-
branch departments (such as State) have found themselves engaged in opera-
tions (such as provincial reconstruction efforts) completely outside their tradi-
tional paradigms. Domestically the Department of Homeland Security stresses 
an “all of government” interagency approach, mandating coordination among 
its twenty-two subordinate agencies in both planning and execution.11 While the 
interagency approach has the advantage of bringing specific areas of expertise 
to bear, it increases enormously the problem of operational coordination. This 
is most obvious in the civilian-military context, where the inherent differences
between military and civilian-agency culture are often magnified. But even 
within government, federal, state, and local agencies, bureaucratic coordination 
problems are immense; these groups often do not speak the same administrative 
languages, let alone share operating procedures or equipment.12
Flexibility and Adaptability. Crisis-contingency operations are complex, diverse, 
and subject to a rapidly changing environment. These factors demand flexibility 
and adaptability in both planning and response. Of course, flexibility and adapt-
ability are inherent in sea power itself. But crisis-contingency operations exhibit 
a diversity that challenges mobility and versatility in a number of unique ways. 
Crisis contingencies are not only diverse but “new,” as elements of the post-9/11 
paradigm. Planning has traditionally relied on experience, combined with due 
consideration of new capability, but changes have been so rapid since 9/11 that the 
value of “lessons learned” in the past has been greatly lessened. 
DEEPWATER HORIZON
Background. On 20 April 2010 the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil rig exploded, 
killing eleven workers and creating what was initially perceived as a minor oil 
leak. This initial assessment soon changed to a “spill of national significance,” 
automatically triggering federal response. Ultimately, it was estimated by CNN 
that 185,000,000 gallons of oil had been spilled.
Sea-power forces/external factors. Lessons are still being correlated and 
analyzed for the DWH oil spill. However, a number of strategic elements are 
immediately apparent. The initial surge response proved inadequate; the size 
of the disaster quickly required massive reinforcements of interagency person-
nel. The sea power employed during this event was quite different from that 
of previous incidents; ships offshore provided command and control but also 
operated with a host of local, state, and federal entities created to deal with 
the event, requiring heretofore unheard-of flexibility. Moreover, the politics 
were almost overwhelming throughout the event, as local, state, and federal 
levels each tried to determine appropriate spheres of control while respond-
ing to almost instantaneous social and traditional media analysis. The intense 
political pressure and influence on tactical operations that resulted made this 
operation truly representative of the new normalcy. 
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Although, for example, the United States has faced both mass migrations and 
hurricanes in the past, it was not then attuned to, and therefore did not draw, 
conclusions addressing the political complexities of interagency coordination 
or the rapidity of public communications and media; historical lessons of the 
kinds needed now are unavailable. Operational forces often find themselves in 
situations without relevant precedent (such as the effective destruction of an 
American city, as in Katrina). This means that effective response to these events 
requires corporate flexibility, adaptability, and initiative—characteristics that are 
not normally associated with government bureaucracies. 
Increasing Public Scrutiny. Perhaps no other factor is more influential in mod-
ern crisis-contingency operations than the immediate flow of information into 
the public sphere. This goes far beyond reporting and analysis by traditional 
media. Although media portrayal of operations has been a factor in modern 
military planning since Vietnam, the incredibly rapid rise of the Internet and of 
information-sharing vehicles in social media has created an entirely new para-
digm that goes beyond simple transparency. Today it is possible not only to view 
operations in real time but also to promulgate information about them world-
wide for almost immediate commentary and analysis. This ability has had enor-
mous influence on both military and crisis-contingency operations. In Iraq, for 
example, the actions of a small group of soldiers at Abu Ghraib, when viewed in 
the global context through the amplification in the social media, directly affected 
national strategy.13 
In hindsight, the technology that revealed what was going on at Abu Ghraib 
was a small taste of things to come, for the pictures used there were simple im-
ages. In 2005, live video feed sent to the social media had an enormous impact on 
Katrina response operations, quickly fostering the impression (rightly or wrong-
ly) that the government was wallowing in incompetence. During the recent 
Deepwater Horizon oil response this effect was magnified significantly, not only 
through multiple manipulations of the social media but also owing to a growing 
use of the medium to speculate on a wide range of conspiracy theories concerning 
government actions, all of which had to be addressed in a frenzy of government 
briefings and presentations designed to maintain operational credibility.14 The 
rapidity with which this information was generated, combined with the ability to 
misinterpret or propagate it for personal or political gain, constituted an entirely 
new distraction that had to be addressed by operational forces, so much so that 
significant capability was diverted for this purpose. These factors bring us to the 
final, and perhaps most significant, element of the modern crisis contingency.
The Political Element. Clausewitz is perhaps most famous for his often-quoted 
view of the relationship between war and politics, a relationship that has long 
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been subject to fierce debate in military and academic circles. But in terms of a 
crisis contingency—arguably a unique form of conflict—there is no doubt of 
the influence of the political sphere. The instant availability of information (real 
or imagined) as noted above makes crisis-contingency operations intensely po-
litical at every possible level, creating a truly remarkable situation for operation-
al forces. This is evident in two distinct areas: the creation of a political picture 
from “below,” and direct intervention from “above.” 
Information generated from below—that is, from the Internet, social media, 
or individuals not involved in the response—creates immediate and direct po-
litical pressure as rumors or innuendo intensify into a “viral” event. Politically 
this creates the tendency to focus on events that are extremely “tactical” but very 
public, slowing coordinated operations to a crawl and making strategic plan-
ning and action difficult or impossible; forces deployed in the crisis can become 
so focused on tracking down images or rumors that they lose the “big picture” 
completely. This tendency is exacerbated by the ability of senior officials (both 
military and civilian) to communicate to all levels of the chain of command, 
directly and instantaneously. This effectively allows the head of an agency or a 
senior member of government to direct tactical operations while bypassing the 
established chain of command. This effect has been noted and complained of 
in combat arenas since the Vietnam War, but today the information technology 
that enables it has become vastly more powerful and pervasive. Whereas twenty 
(or even ten) years ago a response element would have had to answer only to its 
immediate superior, it is now not uncommon for field units to receive messages, 
questions, and tasking directly from the highest levels of their organizations or 
the government, directing or insisting on being kept constantly informed of the 
narrowest and most detailed matters.15 
{LINE-SPACE}
These core elements are present to various degrees across the full range of crisis-
contingency operations, from mass migrations to natural and man-made disas-
ters. While their extent and impact vary, all share a number of strategic common-
alities: they are relatively new, present significant challenges to strategic planning 
and response, and potentially represent “game changing” effects. These elements 
must be considered when examining how sea power can contribute. 
SEA POWER IN THE CRISIS CONTINGENCY
Sea power means many things to many people. Historically in the United States, 
“sea power” has been viewed in the Mahanian context of large, conventional, 
naval forces operating far “forward” in foreign waters either to influence interna-
tional events or to apply kinetic power.16 This has been an evolutionary process as 
the United States emerged as a world power and developed a large, “blue water” 
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navy to ensure freedom of the seas and represent the nation’s global interests. 
Although American sea power in this sense certainly has diverse components 
(Navy, Marines, Coast Guard), the general paradigm of sea power is one of large 
ships operating overseas in these traditional roles.17
Sea power possesses a number of characteristics that have been historically 
consistent, especially mobility and flexibility. The sea remains the great global 
common that allows for the deployment of national power relatively quickly—
the movements of ships are restricted only by adverse environmental conditions 
or international law. Two modern elements, sustainability and comprehensive 
command and control, have proved very successful in naval operations during 
time of war. All these factors can be key to success in crisis-contingency opera-
tions as well, but adapting them to that purpose has been problematic. 
Sea power in contingency operations is by necessity naval power on a fleet 
scale—responses to crisis contingencies by single ships or aircraft are not sufficient
—but it is naval power with a difference, in that it is not for kinetic operations but 
rather is tailored to some extent for the demands of the specific contingency. Sea 
power employed in response to a mass migration, hurricane, or environmental 
event should be as diverse as the contingencies themselves—and it is, in theory. 
But theory can fall short when butting against practical and political barriers. The 
problem becomes apparent when examining four advantages of sea power—mo-
bility, flexibility, sustainability, and command and control—vis-à-vis the modern 
crisis contingency. 
Mobility
The inherent mobility of sea power means largely what it does in the traditional 
role—modern technology allows global reach in three dimensions and almost in-
stant operational coordination worldwide. But the primary barrier to mobility in 
crisis-contingency operations is not technological. If mobility is to be exercised, 
ships must actually sail, and it is here—in the commitment of resources to a crisis
—that things become culturally problematic. Despite the need, the answer to a 
crisis contingency is not always to employ sea power immediately. This cultural 
hesitancy has two aspects.
The first is so deeply ingrained in the American psyche that it is more a matter 
of legend than of practical discussion. The United States has a long-standing tra-
dition of rejecting the use of military forces in the domestic context, a rejection 
that dates back to the Revolution. It was codified in law with the passing of the 
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which directs that military forces (specifically the 
U.S. Army) cannot engage in domestic law enforcement.18 The legislation is often 
misinterpreted as meaning that any domestic use of military forces is illegal; that 
is not the case, but it is nevertheless widely believed in both civilian and military 
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circles.19 Thus before naval forces can be committed to a crisis, a comprehensive 
legal review is often demanded, something that takes time—time that is usually 
not available.
Another cultural barrier arises from service ethos. Bluntly, warships are de-
signed and train to fight. In the modern high-tech era, naval warfare is a very 
specific (and expensive) proposition. It demands very sophisticated and special-
ized equipment. The radar on an Aegis cruiser, for example, is exceptionally good 
at tracking and destroying enemy aircraft—but only that. In a crisis contingency 
that marginalizes that purpose of a platform’s defining systems, the purpose of 
the platform itself could be called into question. According to this logic, if a vessel 
is employed (albeit successfully) for a purpose for which it is not designed, the 
door is opened for its increasing use for that purpose and not its proper one. In 
the grand scheme of things, warships used for other purposes are not training 
for war; in the short term this leads to a loss of readiness for combat, while in 
the longer term it could mean the elimination of platforms altogether in favor of 
others more suitable for noncombat missions. Although this seems to be a largely 
philosophical argument, in a shrinking budget environment it is not without a 
certain politically compelling logic. 
The effects of these factors are not insignificant. In recent crisis contingencies 
(the mass migration operations of 1994 and Katrina) the arrival of naval vessels 
was delayed while legal and operational impact issues were addressed, in the 
Katrina case so long as to become a national embarrassment.20 Bureaucratic rea-
sons, not materiel, were the culprits, ultimately to the detriment of the response. 
Hesitancy can be fatal in an operation requiring rapid response, and culture and 
bureaucracy can conspire to encourage just that. 
Operational Flexibility
Naval forces operating in combat demonstrate a remarkable flexibility with 
respect to a host of missions—deep strike, amphibious operations, coordinated 
air campaigns, etc. Complete control of the “three dimensional” battle space in a 
wide range of operating environments is a well honed and established capability, 
one that is constantly practiced and demonstrated. But crisis contingencies do 
not represent any such operational environment, and that presents a major chal-
lenge to forces whose skills are finely honed for war. 
Flexibility in the strategic sense is largely a matter of planning and creating a 
successful force mixed to deal with the specific campaign and coordinating the 
operations of units toward a common objective. Naval forces sailing into a battle 
area will be tailored to meet the mission they will carry out there (an amphibious 
assault, as opposed to a strike, for example), but there is little experience available 
in tailoring forces to meet a modern crisis contingency and its challenges. History 
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plays a part in this; crisis contingencies are sufficiently rare that determining what 
forces should be used is largely a matter of strategic speculation that is, in turn, 
subject to a host of political and cultural factors. 
For example, because the requirements of worldwide deployment as estab-
lished by the national military strategy remain in place, how to be ready for a 
crisis contingency while still meeting operational commitments is a conundrum 
demanding engagement at the highest planning levels, one that raises questions 
with no easy answers. Should, for example, an aircraft carrier be used as a contin-
gency support platform vice a strike platform overseas? How should its mission 
capabilities be modified? What are the ramifications for overseas operations and 
strategy in the long term? Even when forces are identified, ships may be required 
to surge on very short notice, but as noted previously, defining an appropriate 
state of readiness in the face of extensive maintenance commitments is problem-
atic. Even these barriers to strategic flexibility do not begin to address the com-
plexities of specialized training for a contingency or deal with “the interagency”
—which we shall consider below. 
Sustainability
Contingencies require interagency support in forms foreign to many traditional 
military operations. This presents an interesting paradox. Simply put, most agen-
cies that are designed to deal with crisis contingencies are not military yet often 
require the support of operational capabilities that only the military can provide 
on the scale required. The needs can be fantastically diverse. Agencies working on 
the ground in a contingency require not just food and shelter but also the means 
to coordinate their actions with other agencies and to perform a vast number 
of administrative tasks; they often require transport and, in some cases, protec-
tion. Support requirements are sometimes not limited to government agencies; 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become significant participants in 
both national and international contingencies.21 
Some of the support required in a crisis contingency is fundamentally differ-
ent from that of sustained combat, hinging on humanitarian-style operations 
(rescue, rebuilding, etc.) and a myriad of factors almost unknown to military 
planning. Support is not just a matter of transporting and stockpiling goods; 
ships can certainly become floating warehouses and transports easily enough. 
But the reality is that modern logistics is difficult even for regular military op-
erations, involving highly coordinated processes that maximize space availability 
and combat effectiveness and must be administered by extensively trained per-
sonnel. Unfamiliar support requirements and materials outside the traditional 
military inventory can make things extremely challenging. Without aggressive 
advance planning and interagency cooperation, as well as extensive training for 
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these types of operations, there is considerable potential for strategic failure. But 
again, this type of detailed planning takes time, effort, and funding, and it runs 
hard against the cultural barrier of dedicating warships to training for war and 
conducting operational deployments overseas. 
Command and Control
The modern battle fleet is probably the best example of technology optimized for 
command and control. Today a naval combatant is capable of virtually instan-
taneous global communication and coordination. This connectivity is mobile, 
extensive, reliable, and generally independent of facilities ashore that could be 
constrained by adverse conditions or be destroyed. All this would seem tailor-
made for the crisis contingency. But there are two immediate and significant 
problems: interoperability with typically unknown and potentially incompatible 
systems, and an almost unlimited demand for information. 
Despite attempts to correct the glaring deficiencies that were revealed dur-
ing 9/11, interagency interoperability, especially in the communications realm, 
remains a persistent problem.22 Incompatibility between military and civilian 
systems is bad enough in local contingencies; in a crisis contingency that covers 
potentially hundreds or thousands of miles it can become a “confusion multi-
plier” on the theater and national levels. 
The inability of agencies and groups to communicate is a difficult problem 
but one that can be solved through initiative and inventiveness. The inordinate 
demand for information in a crisis contingency is another matter. As noted, these 
operations are inherently political, owing to the constant and often immediate 
scrutiny they receive. Katrina generated hundreds of information requests from 
higher authorities that had to be vetted, analyzed, and answered, rapidly and in 
detail; in the Deepwater Horizon operation, these numbered in the thousands.23 
Information management in both cases was so vast a problem that it required 
redirection of effort at least, and at worst threatened to shut down operations.24
The inherent communications capability of deployed sea power makes it a 
natural communications hub for coordination of operations ashore and the focal 
point for response to the demand for information from the political sphere. But 
without prior planning and anticipation of the volume and intensity of the com-
munications requirements it is debatable whether any standard command-and-
control node will be capable of meeting the demands of the crisis-contingency 
environment.
{LINE-SPACE}
This completes a somewhat cursory overview of the challenges that the elements 
of the modern crisis contingency present to the traditional components of sea 
power. Given that these operations will likely increase in both frequency and 
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complexity in the future, we now turn to how sea power can adapt to meet this 
new challenge. 
THE WAY AHEAD 
There is little doubt that the inherent operational and strategic capabilities of 
sea power make it valuable both in initial response to crisis contingencies and as 
an anchor for recovery efforts that rely on sustainability and effective command 
and control. Despite barriers to its employment and operational difficulties, sea 
power has played a significant and effective role in contingencies in the past. But 
the world is changing, and the way ahead will not be easy. If sea power is to adapt 
to the challenges of the new crisis-contingency environment, a number of steps 
must be taken. 
Formally recognize the challenges of the new normalcy. Effective use of sea power 
in crisis-contingency operations demands a response that is both tailored and 
specific to the contingency. Fleet power in the area can provide value simply by 
being present—after all, ships can certainly adapt to meet immediate tactical 
needs—but real value is derived only by planning that maximizes operational 
and strategic effectiveness in a wide range of situations. This in turn demands 
recognition of crisis contingencies as a core naval mission, requiring training 
and preparation at the level of (or perhaps exceeding) those dedicated to prepa-
ration for combat. While this prospect has been addressed to some extent by the 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, actual commitment to these types 
of operations is still unclear. For the future, planning for crisis contingencies must 
not only become a priority but be moved to the forefront of doctrine and training.
This will not be an easy task. Overcoming cultural values alone will be an 
enormous hurdle, amounting to a shift of over a hundred years of blue-water, 
Mahanian tradition to a more fluid mind-set that stresses the value of sea power 
in a multitude of mission areas. But the demands of the environment illustrate 
the need, and the idea is not without precedent. The U.S. Army, for example, 
stressed the large-scale conventional-warfare model until the demands of ir-
regular warfare in the aftermath of 9/11 clearly illustrated the need for change, 
a change that is ongoing today.25 This was accomplished only through a service-
wide recognition of the need for change, a thorough analysis of the requirements, 
and a solid plan for implementation. This must be emulated by the naval services 
if they are to operate effectively in the crisis-contingency environment. 
Procure ships that stress multi-specialization and multimission capabilities for 
crisis contingencies. Despite the end of the Cold War and significant reduction 
of the traditional threat, the United States continues to build large combatants 
designed primarily for fleet engagements against a symmetrically armed oppo-
nent. Given the global commitments the United States imposes on its navy and 
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the service’s continued commitment to conventional operations, it is unlikely 
that this will change significantly in the near future. One could simply assume 
that large, capable combatants are inherently multimission and easily adaptable 
to the crisis contingency, but this is not entirely valid. Larger vessels that focus on 
overseas warfare missions (such as aircraft carriers and cruisers) do not necessar-
ily bring multimission capabilities; in point of fact, the training requirements for 
these vessels and their operational commitments often make them increasingly 
specialized in their warfare mission areas.26 Without dedicated design efforts and 
subsequent training, this will be a difficult pattern to break.
But this is an area that is ripe for change. Multimission capability relevant to 
the crisis contingency can be obtained materially by redesign of combatants so 
as to dedicate systems for this purpose. The littoral combat ship, for example, at-
taches specialized “modules” when required for various missions (mine warfare, 
antisubmarine warfare, etc.). This concept could be expanded to other combat-
ants as a way of achieving some degree of specialization in crisis-contingency 
operations. But hardware is only a first step. Ship personnel must be trained in 
these forms of operations, when their mandated warfare training requirements 
are already enormous. This again will require a recognition of the importance 
of crisis-contingency operations vis-à-vis traditional warfare missions and then 
reevaluation of training requirements.
Train staffs for interagency operations. Training ships’ crews to operate in di-
verse environments is one thing; training fleet operators and strategic planners, 
another. Despite the “all of government” approach taken to contingencies since 
9/11, military forces still have limited experience in operating with other agen-
cies, especially those focused on contingency operations.27 It can be argued that 
the situation has at least been acknowledged and some steps have been taken 
for improvement—the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower calls for 
improved interagency cooperation—but at the “operator level” there is still very 
limited understanding of how nonmilitary agencies work or of what level of co-
operation would be required in various crisis contingencies.
This issue must be addressed not only among practitioners of sea power but 
throughout the government itself. This can be accomplished in two ways. The 
first is through a broad program of education. Various institutions pursuing 
Joint Professional Military Education (such as service colleges) have taken on the 
challenge with regard to homeland security, but they have focused on terrorist 
threats rather than the broad range of possible contingencies. Until a dedicated 
educational program is undertaken at all levels of government to stress inter-
agency coordination in contingencies, forces will continue to arrive on the scene 
with limited understanding and direction and to be forced to improvise.
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Operationally, fleets are directed at sea by staffs, with expertise in appropriate 
warfare areas. This concept can be expanded to crisis-contingency operations and 
responses. The Navy and Coast Guard have experimented with this approach in 
specific joint operations, including coordinated counternarcotics deployments.28 
Trained, deployable command-and-control cadres that can instantly address the 
requirements of a specific crisis contingency would be highly valuable. But again, 
a shift in service mind-sets would be required, ensuring that individuals are not 
only trained in this area but are given appropriate career incentives to do so.
Aggressively address information and knowledge management. As noted, the in-
stant availability of information in crisis contingencies has led to a near obsession 
with tactical actions at the expense of strategic operations; senior officials, service 
secretaries, and heads of agencies and departments can and do reach directly to 
the lowest levels to direct or question actions on the ground. Warfare is no longer 
simply an extension of politics; it is now an almost instantaneous expression of 
the immediate political will. 
It can be argued that this new element can be mitigated to some degree during 
actual combat operations (which to date are not continuously exposed to social 
media), but not so during a crisis contingency, and the effect is both immediate 
and potentially catastrophic. The infusion of constant, senior direction driven by 
tactical snippets of political information fundamentally changes the nature of 
operational response—and not for the better.
It would be naive to assume that this will change in the near future. But it must 
be addressed, probably with a new and aggressive effort to devise a cell, or system, 
to streamline knowledge management up and down the chain of command. As a 
dedicated communications node on the scene, the fleet is a natural locus. Ships 
might be assigned personnel trained directly in knowledge management working 
in designated communications spaces, streamlining the flow of information to 
a focal point within the command—potentially a new command element (with 
staff) specifically for knowledge management. The recent lessons of Katrina and 
the ongoing study of the Deepwater Horizon event provide plenty of examples, 
which need to be analyzed with the understanding that the problem will not be 
confined to the past. As communications and social networks improve and pro-
liferate even more, it will only increase. It must be dealt with if operational forces 
are to be effective in crisis contingencies. 
{LINE-SPACE}
Sea power represents a well established and tremendously flexible means of pro-
jecting national power. For the United States it has traditionally taken the form 
of forwardly deployed forces ready to respond to a crisis with kinetic power or 
to engage in combat. The modern crisis contingency challenges this paradigm. 
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The strategic impact of crisis contingencies, the rapid demand for action, and the 
clear capability that sea power provides are indicative of a new normalcy. If sea 
power is to remain a viable component in future operations, it must adapt to the 
reality of the crisis contingency through a comprehensive review of capabilities, 
missions, and barriers to implementation. The world is changing; it is time for 
sea power to adapt. 
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or more than three decades, beginning soon after the end of World War II, the 
United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other. The concept 
of “mutual assured destruction”—MAD, the U.S. threat of massive retaliation 
to a Soviet first strike—became America’s Cold War de facto strategic defense 
policy. In March 1983, however, President Ronald Reagan asked whether ballistic 
missiles could be destroyed before they reached the United States or its allies, 
thus catalyzing efforts for a national ballistic-missile-defense program that would 
undermine the need for MAD. That same year, the U.S. N avy commissioned USS 
Ticonderoga (CG 47), the first of what is to become a fleet of more than eighty 
Aegis warships. In 2012, these trends have converged, and Aegis ballistic-missile 
defense (BMD) is an increasingly important component of a robust national 
BMD System (BMDS).
National BMDS has morphed from President Reagan’s original vision of a 
system to deter and, if necessary, defeat Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) to one focused on deterring or defeating shorter-range ballistic missiles 
fired at the United States or its allies and friends by 
rogue nations or terrorist groups. So too the “pillars” of 
the national BMDS have changed. As other air, ground, 
and space pillars have advanced in fits and starts, and 
as related programs have been initiated and, some-
times, canceled, the seaborne component of national 
BMDS has become an increasingly central component 
of U.S. regional ballistic-missile defenses. Aegis BMD is 
now moving toward a role in the defense of the Ameri-
can homeland as well. 
F
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As more countries—many with hostile intentions toward U.S. allies in the 
Asia-Pacific region and Europe—have acquired the requisite technologies during 
the past three decades, many U.S. friends and allies have been obliged to contend 
with the threat of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). In northwest Asia, both Japan and Korea have built or are building 
Aegis BMD-capable ships. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in 
Europe have been dealing with ballistic-missile defense through the alliance’s 
Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) program and, since 
2009, also through the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), comprising 
“Aegis Afloat” and “Aegis Ashore.”
This new approach now also includes forward-basing four Aegis BMD-
capable warships in Rota, Spain. “With four Aegis ships at Rota, the alliance is 
significantly boosting combined naval capabilities in the Mediterranean, and 
enhancing our ability to ensure the security of this vital region,” Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta noted on 5 October 2011.1 
These ships will also support NATO’s critical efforts to build effective missile defense. 
Alongside important agreements that were recently concluded with Romania, Poland, 
and Turkey, Spain’s decision represents a critical step in implementing the European 
Phased Adaptive Approach. The United States is fully committed to building a missile 
defense capability for the full coverage and protection of all our NATO European 
populations, their territory and their forces against the growing threat posed by bal-
listic missiles.  
Today the steady growth of Aegis-capable ships in the U.S. Navy—as well as an 
increasing number of world navies fielding such ships—presents new opportu-
nities and challenges. The portion of the Navy’s fleet that is capable of ballistic-
missile defense is increasing from twenty-one ships now to a planned ninety-four 
in 2024.2 Given the well-publicized demand for these assets, Aegis BMD unques-
tionably is becoming an increasingly important component of BMD planning 
and operations of the unified commands’ combatant commanders. 
But some are questioning whether the Navy can afford to see multimission 
Aegis BMD ships abandon general-purpose, Navy-specific missions—such as air, 
surface, and subsurface defense and precision strike for carrier and expedition-
ary strike groups—to support the combatant commanders directly with their 
BMD capabilities.3 Some view Aegis BMD through the same lens as they would 
the strategic ballistic-missile submarine program and ask whether Aegis BMD 
is a mission the nation needs but the Navy cannot afford. However, Aegis BMD 
is an increasingly important element of the nation’s maritime strategy, and it 
differs from the ballistic-missile submarine in a way that enables Aegis BMD to 
satisfy both combatant-commander ballistic-missile-defense demands and Navy 
general-purpose requirements.4
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Moreover, the Navy and the nation have an opportunity to leverage more fully 
Aegis BMD capabilities to provide territorial defense as well as protection of co-
alition naval task forces. The vision, first expressed in 2005, of a former Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, of a “thousand-ship navy”—now 
transformed into a Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), in which nations and 
navies increasingly work together to ensure security of the global commons—is 
reaching fruition as the U.S. Navy works with increasing regularity with coalition 
partners in global and regional partnerships. Because some of these countries are 
acquiring Aegis-equipped ships, a nascent “Aegis Global Enterprise” is evolving, 
in which navies work together to capitalize on the capabilities of these ships for 
integrated fleet air defense and even ballistic-missile defense.
The vast majority of GMP missions, however, have been on the “low end” of, 
or completely outside, the “kill chain”—target identification, dispatch of forces, 
decision and order to attack, and destruction of the target. Such tasks as hu-
manitarian assistance, disaster relief, and antipiracy patrol dominate the shared 
mission set. With the increasing threat of ballistic missiles that can be armed with 
WMD, however, the Aegis BMD capabilities present in the navies of U.S. allies 
and friends can now provide the Global Maritime Partnership with a means to 
address the “high end” of the kill chain with combined, coordinated, ballistic-
missile defense: the Aegis BMD Global Enterprise.
This potential is already manifest in the Asia-Pacific region in the close work-
ing relationship between the United States and Japan. Korea and Australia could 
well join this Aegis network soon, giving the four governments the means to ad-
dress not only territorial BMD but also coordinated BMD of fleet units operating 
together. In Europe, plans are well along to provide robust territorial defense of 
European nations with ALTBMD and the EPAA. Together, these systems provide 
a nascent BMD capability today and promise an even more robust capability as 
the EPAA evolves over the next decade and a half.
But as demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Libya, NATO and the 
nations of Europe have equities often well beyond the territorial boundaries of 
the European continent. Also, a European military deployed beyond Europe’s 
borders will always have a naval component. This is therefore a propitious time 
to begin to link European allies more completely into an Aegis BMD Global En-
terprise in much the same way the U.S. Navy is linked to its Asia-Pacific partners
—Japan today, Korea soon, and thereafter Australia in the near future—in a high-
end Aegis BMD Global Maritime Partnership. 
A BMD IMPERATIVE 
The need for effective BMD has increased in the twenty-first century. More than 
thirty countries deploy ballistic missiles today, compared with only nine in 1972.5 
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Potential enemies possess both ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and today’s rogue leaders view WMD as weapons of choice, not of last 
resort. In 2007, the last year for which complete records are available, potential 
adversaries launched 120 ballistic missiles in tests and demonstrations. These 
foreign ballistic-missile launchings, especially in the short-to-intermediate-range 
category, occurred particularly in the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, 
and Iran. 
The broadened ballistic-missile threat, moreover, crosses strategic-, operational-, 
and tactical-level boundaries. Since the inception of U.S. BMD systems in the 
late 1980s, the main driver of their current versions—including Aegis BMD—
has been the threat posed by rogue nations like Iran and North Korea. Today, it 
is Iran’s organic missile development that poses perhaps the most immediate, 
technically developed threat to the interests of the United States and its allies and 
friends. Several midrange Iranian ballistic missiles have been launched over the 
past several years.6 In 2011, Tehran launched numerous ballistic missiles dur-
ing its GREAT PROPHET exercise. Some of these missiles were capable of striking 
American bases in the region as well as Israel, the Arabian Gulf states, and Turkey. 
The threat from Iran’s ballistic-missile developments takes on new urgency 
when juxtaposed with that nation’s WMD program. Then–CIA director Leon 
Panetta warned in 2010 that it could be a mere two years before Iran was able to 
threaten other states with nuclear warheads mounted on ballistic missiles.7 Like-
wise, the Defense Intelligence Agency has reported that Iran could field a WMD-
armed ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.8 Coupled with its 
determination to acquire WMD, it is Iran’s missiles that pose the gravest threat 
to U.S. and allied interests and to Middle Eastern, South Asian, and European 
allies—an assessment underscored by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
in November 2011.9
Ballistic-missile threat planning at both the regional and strategic levels must 
also take into account the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which already 
has conducted a nuclear weapon test. North Korea possesses a growing ballistic-
missile force that includes short-range Scud C, medium-range No Dong, and 
intermediate-range Taepo Dong 1 missiles, some of which have been transferred 
to other nations as well. South Korean defense minister Kim Kwan-Jin told his 
country’s parliament in June 2011 that North Korea may have already developed 
nuclear warheads small enough for ballistic-missile payloads. Likewise, former 
U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates in 2011 said that North Korea’s missiles and 
nuclear weapons would pose a threat to the United States within five years.10 
The actual pace of Iranian and North Korean intercontinental-range weapon 
development is still the subject of debate, at least in open sources. There is no 
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doubt, however, that the ballistic-missile threat at the regional or theater level is 
burgeoning. As the then director of the Joint Integrated Missile and Air Defense 
Organization, Rear Admiral Archer Macy, told a congressional subcommittee, 
“Congress and our warfighters have said the most pressing threat for our de-
ployed forces today is the increasing number of Short Range Ballistic Missiles 
(SRBMs) and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). Without going into 
classified details, suffice it to say that the sheer number and types of these threats 
grows [sic] daily and the nation needs to find a way to deal with them.”11 
As is the case with the ICBMs that they aim to develop, Iran and North Korea 
undoubtedly intend to create “strategic” effects with short-to-intermediate-
range weapons in their own neighborhoods. In some scenarios, they expect their 
ballistic-missile forces to generate concrete, operational-level military effects as 
well, particularly in antiaccess and area-denial contexts.
Iran and North Korea are not alone in leveraging this aspect of potential ballis-
tic-missile employment. China also is crafting an antiaccess/area-denial strategy 
for the western Pacific based in part on the operational-level use of ballistic mis-
siles. As underscored recently in these pages, “China seeks the capacity to find 
U.S. aircraft carriers roughly a thousand miles from the mainland and to attack 
them with homing ASBMs (antiship ballistic missiles).”12 The most prominent 
aspect of this threat is China’s development of the world’s first “carrier killer” 
ballistic missile, the DF-21D. Another commentator has declared, “The DF-21D 
is the ultimate carrier-killer missile.”13 
Indeed, as The Economist has pointed out, “The Pentagon has described Chi-
na’s programme as ‘the most active land-based ballistic- and cruise-missile pro-
gramme in the world.’ Missiles are good value. Compared with a fully equipped 
aircraft-carrier, which might cost $15 billion–20 billion, a missile costs about 
$1m. . . . And American strategists are closely watching an experimental anti-ship 
ballistic missile with a manoeuvrable warhead, which could make it hard for 
American fleets to approach the Chinese shore.”14 A January 2011 New York Times 
editorial captured the level of concern regarding China’s emerging capabilities:
Beijing’s drive to extend its military and territorial reach is making America’s close 
allies in the region nervous and raising legitimate questions about American diplo-
macy and future military procurement. The commander of America’s Pacific forces 
recently revealed that China could soon deploy a ballistic missile capable of threat-
ening American aircraft carriers in the region. The Pentagon has a long history of 
hyping the Chinese threat to justify expensive weapons purchases, and sinking well-
defended ships with ballistic missiles is notoriously hard. But what should rightly 
concern American military planners is not so much the missile but the new Chinese 
naval strategy behind it. China seems increasingly intent on challenging United States 
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naval supremacy in the western Pacific. At the same time it is aggressively pressing 
its claims to disputed offshore islands in the East and South China Seas. Washington 
must respond, carefully but firmly. The Pentagon must accelerate efforts to make 
American naval forces in Asia less vulnerable to Chinese missile threats by giving 
them the means to project their deterrent power from further offshore.15
Some would downplay the threat posed by China and the DF-21D missile, argu-
ing that—as a result of the “Walmart Factor” that intertwines the two economies
—state-on-state conflict with China is not likely.16 However, China needs only to 
make the likely cost to the United States of intervening in western Pacific affairs—
to counter Chinese threats against Taiwan or bullying of neighbors over disputed 
claims in the South China Sea—high enough to render intervention no longer a 
reasonable deterrent.17 Moreover, China’s increasing dependence on Mideast oil 
creates plausible scenarios in which it would export the DF-21D to countries like 
Iran. Given the marginal success of ongoing nonproliferation efforts, DF-21Ds 
could find their way to yet other governments or even to transnational or terror-
ist groups with animus toward the United States, its allies, or friends.
To counter the most pressing part of this spectrum of ballistic-missile threats—
states already possessing WMD-armed ballistic missiles—the United States has 
fielded an initial national-level BMDS, integrating land, sea, air, and space ele-
ments. The first priority of the BMDS implementation strategy—establishing 
a limited defensive capability against North Korean ballistic missiles—has largely 
been achieved, with Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC-3) batteries, the Ground-
Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, the forward-deployed AN/TPY-2 radar, 
and Aegis BMD ships for long-range search, cueing, and engagement. 
The Navy’s contribution, built around the Aegis weapon system, to U.S. ballistic-
missile defenses has grown in importance in recent years, even as national-level 
BMDS has expanded to encompass other potential threats. The Aegis BMD sys-
tem has been integrated with fleet and joint force war-fighting standards and 
BMDS command, control, battle-management, and communications (C2BMC) 
elements. Aegis BMD interoperates with ground-, air-, and space-based sensors 
and other in-theater assets, including the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) system. 
The Aegis weapon system’s adaptability has enabled the Navy to add improved 
hardware and software to successive Aegis “spiral” (phased) upgrades. The Aegis 
Combat System today consists of four major components: the AN/SPY-1 radar, 
the Aegis weapon system, the Mark 41 vertical-launching system (VLS), and 
the Standard surface-to-air missile family. Aegis BMD capability receives “block 
upgrades” every two years, increasing its capabilities at each step. The present 
configuration of Aegis BMD, Aegis 3.6, includes the BMD weapon system teamed 
with the advanced SM-3 Block IA missile. 
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The success of Aegis BMD arises from an acquisition strategy supported by a 
rigorous systems-engineering and integration approach and fueled by substantial 
and steady investment in baseline and upgraded system development. The Aegis 
weapon system represents nearly fifty years of research, development, testing, 
and real-world performance, and its missiles more than sixty years. All this un-
dergirds Aegis BMD. This success can be seen in the results of its test program, 
which as of late 2011 has involved twenty-six live firings at sea since January 
2002. These tests have become progressively more challenging and operationally 
realistic and have enjoyed unprecedented success: twenty-one hits in twenty-six 
shots, an 81 percent success rate, in spite of the fact that through 2011 the Aegis 
program accounted for only 10 percent of annual Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
budgets.18 
The twenty-fifth test—designated Flight Test Mission (FTM) 15—occurred 
on 15 April 2011, when the MDA conducted the first-ever “launch on remote” 
test of the system against an intermediate-range “separating target,” a warhead 
separating from its booster missile. In FTM-15 the guided-missile destroyer USS 
O’Kane (DDG 77), with a standard Aegis BMD system, fired a Standard Missile–3
Block IA missile in response to remote data provided by a forward-based AN/
TPY-2 radar. This pitted for the first time an in-service SM-3 Block IA mis-
sile against an intermediate-range (1,800–3,400 miles) modified Trident I/C-4 
ballistic-missile target, an LV-2. The demands of this test were well beyond Aegis 
BMD’s original design, which focused on short- and medium-range threats. The 
LV-2 had flown in two previous BMD live-fire tests but had not been hit—until 
FTM-15. 
Importantly, FTM-15 used technologies and systems that are at sea and in 
service today. There were no changes to O’Kane’s BMD suite for the test. More-
over, the success unveiled new possibilities for Aegis BMD using technologies and 
systems already available. Also important about FTM-15 is that it linked the ship 
to remote sensor data to increase coverage area and responsiveness. Once this ca-
pability is fully developed, interceptors—no longer constrained by the detection 
range of the Aegis radar against an incoming missile—can be launched sooner 
and fly farther.
The twenty-sixth Aegis BMD flight test, FTM-16, occurred on 1 September 
2011. The primary goal was to track and engage a separating ballistic-missile 
target with the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 Weapon System and the SM-3 Block IB missile, 
the block-upgrade successor of the SM-3 Block IA.19 FTM-16 was the first flight 
test of the Block IB. While the test yielded no intercept, USS Lake Erie (CG 70)
successfully detected and tracked the target and guided the SM-3. FTM-16 high-
lighted the difficulties and complexities of the ballistic defense mission. In accord 
with the Aegis “build a little, test a little, learn a lot” philosophy, the Navy and 
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the MDA will glean important information from FTM-16, incorporate it, and 
continue to advance Aegis BMD capabilities.
Aegis BMD’s accomplishments are even more impressive in light of the com-
plex technical challenges that all BMD systems must overcome. For example, 
THAAD went zero for six during the 1990s before achieving two hits. Then, after 
a five-year hiatus and redesign, the system achieved an eight-for-eight record. 
Likewise, the GMD system had eight successful intercepts in fifteen attempts. 
However, the two tests in January and December 2010 were failures; this per-
formance was behind the MDA decision to restructure the GMD test program. 
A “FOUNDATION OF GREATER COOPERATION” 
Aegis BMD functions as an integral node in the overall, integrated national BMDS 
but also can operate independently to defeat ballistic missiles. Furthermore, Ae-
gis BMD maintains this capability while also being able to carry out other naval 
warfare missions. This versatility makes Aegis BMD valuable as a component of 
an international effort to provide collective defense against ballistic missiles. The 
threat of WMD-armed ballistic missiles is no longer a U.S.-centric issue. During 
the past decade nations in Europe and Asia have increasingly looked for means 
to counter the emerging threat to their territories and forces. This presents new 
possibilities for the combined, coordinated, Aegis BMD enterprise.
The potential for a global BMD effort was highlighted in a 2009 report by 
the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense. It recommended limiting 
fixed, ground missile-defense deployments based on GMD in favor of expand-
ing theater/regional defenses centered on sea-based missile defenses (along with 
Aegis Ashore, land-based SM-3 missiles, and THAAD system radars). The report 
recommended, “Equip additional U.S. vessels with the Aegis anti-missile system. 
Encourage U.S. allies equipped with Aegis/SM to do the same.”20 
The Foundation: Aegis Abroad
The diffusion of Aegis BMD capability abroad is occurring quietly. Governments 
that have made naval force-structure investment decisions based primarily on 
inwardly focused national interests have discovered that their investments also 
enable them to combine their resources in collective defense. As the 2010 Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review acknowledged, 
Other allies already own or are working with the United States to acquire specific 
capabilities, such as naval vessels equipped with the Aegis defensive system that could 
be adapted to include a missile defense capability. . . . A primary U.S. emphasis is on 
ensuring appropriate burden sharing. The Administration recognizes that allies do 
not view the specifics of the missile threat in the same way, and do not have equal re-
sources to apply to this problem, but there is general recognition of a growing threat 
and the need to take steps now to address both existing threats and emerging ones.21 
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This effort to create a broad BMD enterprise builds on the current participa-
tion of allied navies in the Aegis program. This global effort started with a foreign 
military sales relationship with Japan, subsequently expanded to relationships 
with Australia and Korea, and now includes a commercial connection with Spain 
as well as an enterprise between Norway and Spain.22 Several other states have 
expressed interest in acquiring the Aegis weapon system and Aegis BMD. Im-
portantly, Australia and other countries that are acquiring the Aegis system are 
stipulating that the systems they buy must have the capability of adding BMD in 
the future.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was the first foreign navy to 
construct Aegis warships. The JMSDF as of late 2011 operated four Kongo-class 
destroyers; the lead ship of the class was commissioned in 1993. In 2000, the 
JMSDF won approval for two improved units, known as the Atago class; the lead 
ship of that class was commissioned in 2007.
Sharing, in light of an increasing regional threat, the U.S. interest in building 
ballistic-missile defenses, Japan decided in 2003 to upgrade its Kongo class with 
an Aegis BMD capability. U.S. foreign military sales upgraded all four ships ac-
cordingly, with SM-3 Block IA missiles. Japan subsequently decided to upgrade 
its Atago-class ships with Aegis BMD as well. That upgrade allows the JMSDF 
to meet the tenets of its New Defense Program Guidelines, which call for a total 
of six Aegis BMD-equipped ships to defend the country from missile threats, in 
conjunction with U.S. Navy warships.23 
U.S.-Japanese cooperation extends also to the SM-3 missile. The United States 
and Japan signed a memorandum of agreement in 1999 to cooperate in the 
development of the SM-3 Block IIA, with Japan contributing both funding and 
know-how. The Japanese technical contribution includes risk reduction in the 
areas of the kinetic kill vehicle, second-stage propulsion, and the nose cone. The 
success of the program led the U.S. Department of Defense to initiate talks aimed 
at urging Japan to relax its decades-long arms embargo and export the SM-3 
Block IIA to other countries, including U.S. European allies. In 2011, the Japanese 
government gave its assent to export the SM-3 Block IIA.24 This U.S./Japanese 
cooperation on Aegis BMD writ large and SM-3 Block IIA development specifi-
cally, as well as trilaterally among Japan, South Korea, and the United States, is 
increasingly evident in high-level Japanese publications, such as the 2011 Defense 
of Japan white paper, as well as in various conference and symposia reports where 
Japanese defense policy is discussed.25
Across the Sea of Japan, South Korea has announced plans to build six 5,600-
ton KDX-IIIA Aegis-equipped destroyers beginning in 2019 to complement the 
three Sejon-Daewan KDX-III Aegis destroyers that was in service by 2012. More-
over, in 2011 South Korea declared that it was establishing a defensive system to 
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combat air-breathing (that is, generally, cruise missile, either ramjet or turbojet 
powered) and ballistic-missile threats from North Korea. Scheduled to be in 
place by 2015, the Korea Air and Missile Defense system will be built around the 
capabilities inherent in its Aegis-equipped destroyers and its modified PAC-3 
ground-based interceptors.
The Aegis weapon system is becoming an antiair/BMD weapon of choice for 
other navies also. The Spanish navy in early 2012 operated four Aegis-equipped 
air-defense frigates of the Alvaro de Bazan (F100) class, with another under con-
struction. Spain’s interest in Aegis and its shipbuilding expertise have been “ex-
ported” to the Norwegian and Australian navies. In 2011, the Royal Norwegian 
Navy received the last of five frigates of the Fridtjof Nansen (F310) class—a some-
what austere but still capable version of the F100—built by Navantia shipyard in 
Ferrol, Spain. The Australian government likewise is partnering with Navantia 
to build three air-defense destroyers of the Hobart class at the ASC Shipbuilding 
facility in South Australia. 
Following in the path established by the U.S. Navy, non-U.S. Aegis operators 
have been taking steps to exploit the system’s BMD capabilities. The JMSDF 
has progressed farthest in this regard, closely integrating its activities with its 
American counterparts. The destroyer Kirishima was the first foreign warship 
to participate in a U.S. Aegis BMD flight test, in June 2006. Eighteen months 
later, during the JMSDF’s first flight-test mission, Kongo became the first ship 
of an allied navy to engage successfully a ballistic-missile target. Between 2007 
and 2010, four separate JMSDF ships launched SM-3 missiles at medium-range, 
separating-warhead targets.26 Spain too has evaluated the possibilities presented 
by Aegis BMD. The Spanish navy’s Mendez Nunez (F104), outfitted with BMD 
software, tracked a ballistic-missile target during a 2007 flight test.
The network framework of the Aegis enterprise enables other European na-
vies, those that do not operate Aegis warships, to join a broader, Aegis-centered 
naval BMD architecture. The Netherlands navy’s Tromp, a frigate fitted with a 
modified SMART-L surveillance radar and the Advanced Phased Array Radar 
(APAR), demonstrated this potential when it tracked a ballistic-missile target 
during a December 2006 Aegis BMD flight test. The German navy also operates 
three frigates fitted with SMART-L, APAR, and the Mark 41 VLS. Denmark is 
planning to build similarly equipped patrol frigates, suggesting another avenue 
by which BMD capability can migrate across NATO navies.
Aegis Ashore
The diffusion of Aegis capabilities globally was accelerated when the Barack 
Obama administration announced a new U.S. ballistic-missile defense policy 
in September 2009.27 President Obama’s decision upended the George W. Bush 
administration’s plan to place missile-defense radar sites and ground-based 
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interceptors in Eastern Europe, opting instead for a “Phased Adaptive Approach” 
(PAA)—a global sea- and land-based missile-defense capability centered initially 
on the Navy’s Aegis BMD system and the SM-3.28 The decision to make this major 
shift in U.S. ballistic-missile policy—deferring the planned fixed-site ground-
based system in Europe in favor of Aegis BMD afloat and ashore—was a direct 
response to the threat of short-to-intermediate-range Iranian ballistic missiles 
carrying WMD, slower than anticipated development of Iranian ICBMs, and a 
desire to engage Russia—which was vehemently opposed to GMD deployment 
in Eastern Europe—in BMD plans.29 
At the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, President Obama highlighted 
the importance of the Phased Adaptive Approach as well as the potential of Aegis 
BMD to undergird global partnerships:
We must strengthen the full range of capabilities that are needed to protect our 
people and prepare for the missions of tomorrow. . . . Another necessary alliance ca-
pability is missile defense of NATO territory, which is needed to address the real and 
growing threat from ballistic missiles. The Phased Adaptive Approach to European 
missile defense that I announced last year will provide a strong and effective defense 
of the territory and people of Europe and our deployed American forces. Moreover, 
it forms the foundation of greater collaboration—with a role for all allies, protection 
for all allies, and an opportunity to cooperate with Russia, which is also threatened by 
ballistic missiles.30
The PAA comprises four phases. In Phase 1 (2011), existing sea-based Aegis 
missile-defense ships and radars have been deployed to defend against short- and 
medium-range ballistic missiles potentially threatening southern Europe. On 7 
March 2011, USS Monterey (CG 61) left its home port of Norfolk, Virginia, for a 
six-month deployment to the Mediterranean as the first Aegis BMD ship to de-
ploy specifically in support of the EPAA.31 This historic deployment was widely 
reported in the national and international media.
In PAA phases 2 (2015), 3 (2018), and 4 (2020), the Aegis SM-3 missiles will 
be successively upgraded to provide coverage against medium- and intermediate-
range missiles. By Phase 4, the Block IIB variant of the SM-3 should have an 
intercept capability against ICBMs as well.32
Momentum had been growing in Europe to build an alliance-wide missile-
defense system compatible with Aegis BMD; Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s 
secretary general, declared, “Missile defense presents the greatest potential for 
enhancing our cooperation.”33 The issue of collective ballistic-missile defense 
was a major theme during the Lisbon summit, which approved a plan for Aegis-
enabled European BMD as a core element in NATO’s new strategic concept: 
“NATO will actively seek cooperation on missile defense with Russia and other 
Euro-Atlantic partners.”34 
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NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral James Stavridis, USN, noted 
that a plan to link the American PAA with a NATO missile-defense shield to pro-
vide a European theater-wide BMD shield is under development by U.S. Europe-
an Command.35 Well before the summit, NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic 
Missile Defence program had conducted tests with the U.S. C2BMC system, with 
the ultimate, long-sought goal of international command-and-control interop-
erability. All twenty-eight NATO allies were already engaged in discussions as 
to how to connect the European members’ short- and medium-range theater 
missile-defense systems via NATO to the U.S. long-range missile-defense system. 
AN AEGIS BMD FOCUS FOR THE GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIP
By early 2012, Aegis was deployed on eighty-eight ships, with another eighteen 
under construction or planned. The vast majority of these belong to the U.S. 
Navy, but the number of non-U.S. Aegis platforms is growing as well. Addition-
ally, more nations are buying or considering BMD capabilities for their Aegis-
equipped ships.
The value of encouraging the increased adoption of Aegis-like capabilities—as 
well as interoperability with existing Aegis platforms afloat and ashore—is clear. 
Even the current, somewhat circumscribed, distribution of Aegis assets constitutes 
a foundation for a potential “sensor/shooter” mix for a global ballistic-missile 
defense enterprise. The shooter component can be shared, as well as the part-
ners’ agreed-on rules of engagement. For example, if the United States and Japan 
agree to form a defensive sensor shield over Japan and U.S. forces surrounding 
Japan against a North Korean missile launch, this shield can be accompanied by 
a missile-defense strike capability against the North’s launch sites. The urgent 
need to deepen Japanese collaboration with the United States for missile defense 
in response to North Korea’s testing of nuclear weapons has been recognized by 
both governments.36 As South Korea proceeds along its current path, it too could 
well join the Aegis Afloat BMD partnership.
At the end of the day, sovereign interdependence and interoperability will 
remain core attributes of any Aegis global enterprise. The Aegis BMD system is 
already integrated and interoperable with other U.S. assets, and it will eventu-
ally be brought to the same standard with regard to coalition operations as well. 
Adoption of Aegis-type capabilities by allied militaries does not have to mean the 
exact replication of U.S. equipment and architecture, as demonstrated by South 
Korea’s concentration on a national, vice regional, missile-defense plan. At the 
technical level, however, reliance of non-U.S. assets on American hardware and 
software in systems like Aegis goes a long way toward syncing allied capabilities 
and interoperability. 
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In Europe, the decision as to whether and how to connect the European NATO 
allies’ short- and medium-range theater missile-defense systems to the U.S. long-
range missile defense system will be critical to the coherence of alliance-wide 
BMD. A high level of commitment to international partnership on the parts of 
both the United States and its allies—already evinced by ALTBMD and C2BMC 
shared situational-awareness tests—will encourage interoperability initiatives. 
This interoperability will, in turn, help ensure the success of the U.S. Phased 
Adaptive Approach. 
Ultimately, commitment to international partnership by the United States and 
its allies and friends to make Aegis BMD afloat a bulwark of global missile de-
fense will do much to prepare all concerned for combating the growing threat of 
ballistic missiles of all colors and hues. It also offers the strong potential—more 
than anything else has in the years since Admiral Mullen’s 2005 speech—to gird 
the Global Maritime Partnership for “high end” warfare. But this will not happen 
without leadership and stewardship at the highest level. 
TOWARD EXTRAORDINARY REWARDS 
Close cooperation in the area of Aegis BMD between the United States and Japan, 
possibly Korea, and potentially Australia does not in itself qualify as an “Aegis 
BMD Global Enterprise.” But to include European nations in an Aegis-afloat 
enterprise of capabilities approaching those planned for the ALTBMD/EPAA 
system would. But why would European nations, with defense budgets dwarfed 
by that of the United States, embark on such an enterprise? The reason is clear: 
NATO and the European governments have interests often well beyond the ter-
ritorial boundaries of the European continent. 
European navies are now deployed worldwide fulfilling the vision of a Global 
Maritime Partnership: supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting 
in Libya, conducting antipiracy patrols in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, and 
supporting humanitarian assistance operations around the world. There could be 
no more propitious time to begin to link more completely European allies in an 
Aegis BMD Global Enterprise, in much the same way the U.S. Navy is now linked 
to its Asia-Pacific partners in a high-end Aegis BMD Global Maritime Partner-
ship. Such an enterprise would enable these nations—with U.S. participation
—to deal with such compelling threats as China’s DF-21D “ship killer” ballistic 
missile, especially if this missile is exported to China’s friends. This creates an 
ideal opportunity to create a “high end” Global Maritime Partnership supported 
by Aegis BMD.
But it is unlikely that such a venture would succeed without ongoing U.S. lead-
ership, the same sort of leadership that is supporting sea-based Aegis BMD for 
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LEARNING FROM LEBANON 
Airpower and Strategy in Israel’s 2006 War against Hezbollah 
Benjamin S. Lambeth
rom 12 July until 15 August 2006, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) waged a 
thirty-four-day war against the Iranian terrorist proxy organization Hezbollah 
in response to a well-planned raid by a team of Hezbollah combatants from 
southern Lebanon into northern Israel. That raid resulted in the abduction of 
two IDF soldiers, who had then been taken back into Lebanon for use as hos-
tages.1 Code-named Operation CHANGE OF DIRECTION, the greatly escalated 
counteroffensive that the raid prompted has since been widely regarded as the 
IDF’s most inconclusive combat performance in Israel’s history. Waged under 
the direction of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his minister of defense at the 
time, Amir Peretz, the campaign was dominated by precision standoff attacks 
by the Israel Air Force (IAF) and by IDF artillery and battlefield rockets, with 
no significant commitment of conventional ground troops until the last days of 
fighting before a cease-fire went into effect.
What mostly accounted for the frustration felt throughout Israel as the con-
flict unfolded was the fact that at no time during the thirty-four days of combat 
were IDF forces able to stem the relentless daily barrage of short-range Katyusha 
rockets that Hezbollah fired into civilian population centers in northern Israel 
until the cease-fire finally ended that deadly harassment.2 Beyond that, the war’s 
achievements fell well short of what Prime Minister Olmert had promised the 
Israeli people at the campaign’s start, namely, an unconditional return of the two 
abducted soldiers and a decisive crushing of Hezbollah as an effective military 
presence in southern Lebanon. The IDF’s lackluster performance severely un-
dermined the long-standing image of Israel’s invincibility in the eyes of the Arab 
world and the West. It also reflected manifold failures in strategy choice at the 
highest levels of the Israeli government, both uniformed and civilian. 
F
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The IDF’s chief of staff at the time, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, had pre-
viously served as commander of the IAF and was the first airman ever to have 
occupied the country’s top military position. Because his initial response to 
Hezbollah’s provocation was to rely almost exclusively on precision standoff at-
tacks for their hoped-for coercive effects rather than opt for a concurrent large-
scale commitment of IDF troops on the ground, the campaign’s less than decisive 
outcome led many to conclude afterward that because he was an airman he had 
succumbed to a natural belief that airpower alone would suffice. 
Furthermore, in a widespread early inference that persists to this day, many 
also adjudged that because of Halutz’s initial choice of a strategy that forwent any 
significant use of ground forces, the IDF’s eventual disappointing performance 
attested, at bottom, to a “failure of airpower.” That premature and baseless infer-
ence ignored the important fact that from its initial moments onward the IDF’s 
counteroffensive entailed not only around-the-clock strikes by IAF fighters and 
attack helicopters but also thousands of daily rounds of ground-force artillery 
and rockets fired into southern Lebanon against enemy targets, as well as covert 
hit-and-run raids into Hezbollah-infested territory by teams of Israeli special 
operations forces (SOF). Nevertheless, as a British Royal Air Force officer writing 
almost a year after the fighting ended observed, in commenting on the range of 
public impressions of the campaign experience to date, the idea that the IDF’s 
flawed performance reflected a simple “failure of airpower” rather than an ac-
cumulation of larger sins of omission and commission by the Israeli civilian and 
military leadership “appeared at the time to be the most general understanding 
of this particular campaign within the more thoughtful elements of the media.”3
All the same, a duly informed understanding of the campaign’s essence must 
recognize that the Olmert government’s chosen initial move for responding to 
Hezbollah’s provocation was never simplistically an air-only gambit but rather a 
resort to standoff attacks that also included heavy use of IDF ground-force artil-
lery and rockets. In this situation not just Halutz but also his civilian superiors 
and the IDF’s leading ground commanders were not ready, at least at the outset, 
to commit to a major land push into southern Lebanon, owing to the high troop 
casualties that any such resort would inevitably produce. Without question, ma-
jor errors in situation assessment and strategy choice were made by the topmost 
Israeli leadership, errors that were directly responsible for the campaign’s less 
than satisfactory outcome. Yet if anything “failed” in this accumulation of poor 
leadership judgment calls, it was not Israeli airpower or any other instrument of 
warfare per se but rather a blend of ill-founded military and civilian decisions at 
the highest level with respect to the nature and aims of Israel’s opponent; initially 
avowed goals that were unachievable through any mix of military force that the 
Israeli people and the international community would likely countenance; the 
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ultimate choice of a strategy for pursuing the campaign’s objectives; and the 
government’s mismanagement of public expectations as the counteroffensive 
unfolded.
THE HIGHLIGHTS OF IDF COMBAT OPERATIONS
The casus belli for Israel’s second Lebanon war came at 9:05 on the morning of 12 
July 2006, when a well-practiced team of Hezbollah terrorists crossed the border 
at an unmonitored point and ambushed an IDF patrol during a fleeting vulner-
able moment, killing three soldiers, capturing two more, and taking the latter 
back into Lebanon. Once the IDF’s Northern Command became aware that one 
of its patrols had failed to check in, it immediately declared a HANNIBAL incident 
(for a suspected troop abduction) and dispatched another detachment equipped 
with a Merkava tank to search for the missing soldiers. Immediately after that 
unit crossed into southern Lebanon in pursuit of the abductors, it got suckered 
into a trap, resulting in the Merkava’s being blown up by a mine and four more 
soldiers being killed. The event was observed by an IAF unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) orbiting overhead, and streaming electro-optical and infrared imagery of 
the explosion was transmitted in real time to monitors in IDF command posts 
and operations centers throughout Israel. 
The first IAF contribution to the gathering campaign was a two-plane element 
of attack helicopters that had been launched to investigate the successive inci-
dents. As soon as he learned of the abduction, Minister of Defense Peretz autho-
rized the immediate execution of two preplanned response options—attacking
all of Hezbollah’s positions along the Lebanese border with Israel and closing 
off likely escape routes deeper inside Lebanon with quick-reaction air attacks. 
A little more than an hour later, the first wave of IAF strike fighters crossed into 
Lebanon. In this initial attack wave, F-16s destroyed all of Hezbollah’s observa-
tion posts along the border and dropped the first of numerous bridges across the 
Litani River farther north. Concurrently, units of the IDF’s 91st Division initiated 
massive artillery fire against Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon. 
Shortly after noon that first day, Prime Minister Olmert convened a press 
conference and declared both emphatically and without any foundation in fact, 
“The events of this morning cannot be considered a terrorist strike; they are acts 
of a sovereign state that has attacked Israel without cause.” He further announced 
that his government would assemble that evening to decide on a more definitive 
course of action and that the IDF’s response would be “thundering.”4 
Further compounding that initial misstep, Olmert announced to Israel’s par-
liament five days later, in a speech that showed no sign of any serious prior strat-
egy deliberation, four objectives of his government’s intended response—an un-
conditional return of the two kidnapped soldiers by Hezbollah, the establishment 
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of a “new situation” along the Israeli-Lebanese border, enhanced IDF deterrence 
against outside threats, and the disarming and removal of all Hezbollah forces in 
southern Lebanon.5 The first of these avowed goals was excessive to a fault, since 
all Hezbollah’s leader, the fiery terrorist Hassan Nasrallah, would need to do to be 
able to claim “victory” would be to refuse to return the abducted soldiers, thereby 
depriving Olmert of the ability to make good on his promise to the Israeli people. 
More important, it also was counter to Halutz’s more realistic determination 
that any notion of seeking a return of the abducted soldiers should be rejected 
forthwith as unattainable—which instantly raises a most basic question as to why 
Halutz accepted it without challenge.6 
Olmert’s second avowed goal was equally a reach, but at least it was achiev-
able in principle, were a bold strategy to be followed. The third raised the obvi-
ous question of how. The fourth declared goal was as extravagant as the first. 
Although likewise achievable in principle, it could only be attained at a cost far 
greater than the Israeli people would most likely have been willing to pay in terms 
of IDF casualties incurred and a renewed Israeli presence in southern Lebanon 
with no end in sight. 
As the first day of IDF strike operations neared an end, it became increas-
ingly clear that the government’s preferred approach, at least for the time be-
ing, would be to rely exclusively on standoff attacks by IAF fighters and attack 
helicopters, supplemented as appropriate by IDF artillery and M270 Multiple-
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) fire against known Hezbollah positions south of 
the Litani, rather than resorting to any early insertion of troops on the ground. 
Several months before, in planning for a possible showdown—of just the sort 
that was now unfolding—against Hezbollah, the IDF’s operations directorate 
had developed two fairly elaborate contingency-response options. The first, 
code-named ICEBREAKER (Shoveret Ha’kerach in Hebrew), called for a precision 
standoff-attack operation lasting from forty-eight to seventy-two hours, along 
with concurrent preparations for a possible limited land counteroffensive to fol-
low promptly thereafter. The second, labeled SUPERNAL WATERS (Mei Marom), 
likewise envisaged several days of standoff-only preparation, a concurrent call-up 
of reserve forces for possible imminent commitment, and either a halt to standoff 
fires alone after forty-eight to seventy-two hours or a determined escalation to 
combined air-land operations aimed at decisively pushing Hezbollah’s forces in 
southern Lebanon north of the Litani River.7
As the crisis gathered, Halutz, determined to avoid any return to what Israelis 
had come to call “the Lebanese mud” (after the IDF’s forgettable eighteen-year 
presence in that country), opted not to implement either of these two preplanned 
options. He chose instead to pursue a standoff-only counteroffensive, at least for 
the moment, out of a desire to forgo needless risk of early troop fatalities, should 
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standoff attacks alone be enough to coerce the desired response on Nasrallah’s 
part. In this considered choice, he gained the ready assent of both Olmert and 
Peretz, who likewise feared implicitly that Israel’s rank and file would be un-
willing to abide the large number of IDF casualties that the alternatives would 
almost surely produce. Accordingly, Halutz issued the order for previously tasked 
IAF fighter squadrons to begin preparing to execute, later that night, a carefully 
planned preemptive strike, code-named Operation MISHKAL SGULI (Specific 
Weight), against Hezbollah’s known and targetable medium-range-rocket stor-
age sites.
Although its success was not publicized at the time by the Olmert government, 
the IAF operation was conducted without a hitch during the early morning hours 
of 13 July. In the course of a thirty-four-minute offensive involving forty F-15I 
and F-16I fighters equipped with imaging infrared targeting pods, only some 
twenty Lebanese civilians (most likely Hezbollah supporters who happened to be 
occupying the targeted structures) were assessed by IDF intelligence afterward as 
having been killed. A senior IAF intelligence officer later characterized the per-
formance as “a case study in operational perfection.”8 
The sudden and unexpected combination of Operation MISHKAL SGULI and a 
determined IAF strike soon thereafter on Hezbollah’s Al Manar television station 
provoked, by way of an escalated enemy response, what two Israeli journalists 
termed “Hezbollah’s rocket war.”9 That sustained reprisal exposed, for the first 
time ever, the full extent of the vulnerability of Israel’s home front to often deadly, 
if militarily ineffective, Katyusha fire from southern Lebanon. In addition to its 
continual barrage of short-range Katyushas, Hezbollah also, for the first time, 
fired a volley of medium-range rockets into northern Israel, several landing near 
the town of Afula, thirty miles south of the Lebanese border. One such rocket 
landed in the suburbs of Haifa during the afternoon of 13 July. That was the 
deepest that Hezbollah had ever struck into Israel.10 The attack had the almost 
instant effect of shutting down Israel’s third-largest city and sending thousands 
of its residents down the southbound highways to escape. 
In response to these escalated acts of enemy aggression, the Olmert govern-
ment raised its own ante in turn by attacking the heart of Hezbollah’s command 
and control complex in the dahiye section of south Beirut. Its air strikes into 
the dahiye began during the early evening of 14 July. All civilians were assessed 
as having previously evacuated the area after the IDF gave a twenty-four-hour 
advance warning of its intent to attack. In the initial wave, some fifteen headquar-
ters buildings were destroyed by two-thousand-pound, satellite-aided GBU-31 
Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) delivered by F-15Is.11 A second target 
complex, consisting of Nasrallah’s personal headquarters and residence, sus-
tained forty JDAM hits within a minute. A senior Israeli official later confirmed 
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that Nasrallah himself had been targeted in that attack.12 The military benefits of 
the attack were negligible; Nasrallah and other top Hezbollah leaders were most 
likely in an underground bunker that could not be breached by the munitions 
employed. Nevertheless, the IDF had deemed the dahiye complex to be so impor-
tant, as the most visible symbol of Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon, that it had 
had no choice but to go after it with all determination.
Shortly thereafter, Hezbollah upped the ante yet again by targeting the Israeli 
naval vessel Hanit (Spear), a Saar-5 corvette built in 1994 and carrying some 
eighty crew members, which was patrolling in Lebanese waters eight miles 
west of Beirut. The attack was conducted by what soon proved to have been an 
Iranian-made variant of the Chinese-developed C-802 antishipping missile, a 
weapon that IDF intelligence had not even known was in Hezbollah’s possession. 
The missile struck the stern of Hanit at 8:42 PM, killing four crew members and 
causing considerable damage. A second missile, targeted against another Israeli 
ship, overflew Hanit and, apparently inadvertently, struck and sank a foreign 
merchant vessel cruising thirty-five miles off the Lebanese coast. Hanit, disabled 
by the C-802 but still afloat, got out of the line of fire and eventually made its 
way back to Ashdod for repairs under its own power. It was later determined that 
the antimissile radar on board Hanit had been out of service the evening of the 
attack, that the watch officer in charge of the ship’s defensive electronic systems 
had turned some of those systems off without informing the captain, and that 
the Israeli naval leadership had never directed its crews at sea to bring their an-
timissile capabilities to alert status—even after the campaign was under way. At 
bottom, Hanit’s crew had not activated its defenses against the possibility of a 
cruise-missile attack because IDF intelligence had not identified such a threat.13 
As a result, the ship was defenseless when it was attacked. 
IDF intelligence officials strongly suspected that a team of skilled Iranian tech-
nical experts had either fired or supervised the firing of the C-802 against Hanit. 
Soon after, the head of the IDF’s operations directorate, Major General Gadi 
Eisenkott, disclosed that the enemy combatants who fired the C-802 had received 
targeting information from Lebanese naval radar stations in Beirut and else-
where. Those facilities were accordingly struck by IAF attack helicopters.14 The 
head of the IDF’s planning directorate, then–Brigadier General Ido Nehushtan 
of the IAF, subsequently reported that the air attacks on Lebanon’s port areas had 
been aimed expressly at eliminating the radar installations said to have supported 
Hezbollah’s attack on Hanit. He added, “We see this [C-802] attack as a very clear 
fingerprint of Iranian involvement.” Nehushtan characterized the struck radar 
facilities as emerging targets of opportunity: “Sometimes new targets come up, 
like the sea radar, that we will go after.”15 In all, ten Lebanese radar stations along 
the coast were struck on 15 July and were either destroyed or disabled. The IDF 
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concurrently imposed a naval blockade along Lebanon’s coast, closing the main 
channel to both incoming and departing traffic.
During the first seven days of fighting, the IAF flew some two thousand fighter 
and attack-helicopter sorties, engaging around 650 targets with more than a 
thousand munitions.16 Yet by the end of that first week it was becoming increas-
ingly apparent that standoff attacks alone would never bring about the Olmert 
government’s declared objectives. All the same, despite that gathering recogni-
tion, Israel’s ground commanders were making it unambiguously clear that they 
had no appetite whatever for a reprise of the massive land invasion that Israel 
had launched into Lebanon in 1982. A former chief of staff, retired lieutenant 
general Amnon Lipkin-Shahak of the ground forces, frankly acknowledged the 
IDF’s deep reluctance to commit a large number of troops to close combat with 
Hezbollah, owing to the all but certain prospect of heavy losses.17 
On 20 July, however, in its largest troop activation in four years, the IDF be-
gan mobilizing three reserve divisions and concurrently broadcast warnings for 
all civilians residing in southern Lebanon to evacuate to safer environs north of 
the Litani. Taken together, those two steps foreshadowed a major Israeli ground 
push sooner or later. As the move to significant ground operations drew nearer, a 
debate arose within Israel’s defense community over whether limited forays with 
SOF teams would suffice or whether the IDF should now commit larger numbers 
of heavy infantry and armored forces. One serving general predicted that the IDF 
would continue to rely mainly on air operations for the time being, out of a hope 
that the United States and the international community would not press Israel for 
an early curtailment of the fighting: “We have no . . . desire to go back in force into 
Lebanon. But if I’m wrong and there’s not enough time and if airpower proves 
ineffective, then we’ll do it.”18 
With the continuing daily onslaught of short-range rocket fire into northern 
Israel, ever more vocal calls began to be heard for a massive ground incursion 
aimed at driving Hezbollah’s forces out of southern Lebanon once and for all. 
The Olmert government, however, continued to opt for the existing, lower-key 
ground operations, out of a clear realization that a major land offensive would 
yield no instant solution to the Katyusha problem. Yet on 26 July, as a reluctant 
but determined IDF ground push drew closer, General Nehushtan, the head of 
the IDF’s planning directorate and an IAF fighter pilot, told Halutz, “Without a 
major ground campaign, the IDF [cannot] stop the Katyusha rockets. You must 
bring this before the government. You need to tell them straight that without 
a major ground operation, we cannot remove the Katyusha threat. If the gov-
ernment does not approve it . . . we should tell them that they must stop the 
campaign now.” The same day, the IDF’s deputy chief, Major General Moshe 
Kaplinsky, likewise went to Halutz: “We can’t go on like this. You must demand a 
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ground offensive at tomorrow’s cabinet meeting.”19 This time Halutz agreed that 
both were right. 
The next day, Olmert’s inner council approved a formal call-up of the now-
mobilizing IDF reservists (some thirty thousand in all), while still ruling out for 
the time being a major escalation on the ground. Only on 1 August, after another 
week of resisting a ground offensive, did the IDF’s leaders finally bow to the inevi-
table and begin preparing for a major incursion into southern Lebanon. This halt-
ing embrace of a major ground assault as the campaign continued to drag on was 
an all but explicit testament to the dawning realization among Israel’s top leaders 
that standoff attacks alone had failed to bring about the government’s avowed 
goals. It also highlighted their gradual understanding that the continuing rocket 
attacks constituted a centerpiece of Hezbollah’s strategic concept of operations. 
The 9 August meeting of Olmert’s cabinet, which the next day yielded the 
decision to commit IDF troops to major combat, was the most momentous lead-
ership gathering of the thirty-four-day confrontation. By then, the IDF had ac-
cepted the inevitability of a large-scale ground push if the government’s eventu-
ally expressed determination to reduce the rate of enemy rocket fire into northern 
Israel was to be honored. To be sure, there remained a deep-seated reluctance at 
all levels to follow through, but the IDF’s leaders saw no other alternative at that 
point. With the benefit of hindsight, had such an alternative been adopted by 
the IDF from the campaign’s start, it might well have produced a more decisive 
outcome for Israel. However, it came instead only at the last possible moment, 
just days before a cease-fire brokered by the United Nations was to go into effect. 
The formal order for forward-deployed Israeli troops to move in force into 
southern Lebanon reached IDF Northern Command’s headquarters at five 
o’clock in the afternoon of 11 August. Two days later, aerial preparation by the 
IAF and insertions of heli-borne Israeli troops into southern Lebanon sought to 
extend the IDF’s ground presence all the way to the Litani. Not surprisingly, the 
IDF suffered its highest casualty rate during those last three days of peak-intensity 
fighting. On 15 August the cease-fire previously agreed to by both sides went into 
effect. At that, civilians in northern Israel at long last emerged from their bomb 
shelters, and Nasrallah, fully mindful of the crucial importance of the war of 
narratives, artfully claimed to have achieved a “strategic and historic victory.”20 
In the war’s eventual tally sheet, the IDF’s ground contribution entailed some 
thirty thousand troops operating in southern Lebanon. As for friendly losses, 
the final report of the Winograd Commission (so named for its chair, Eliyahu 
Winograd, a retired judge) convened by Olmert to assess his government’s per-
formance in the campaign cited 119 IDF troops (half reservists) killed in action, 
628 wounded, and 45 Israeli civilians killed by rocket attacks. Hezbollah claimed 
a mere eighty-one of its fighters killed in action, though the IDF insisted that 
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the true number was substantially higher. Official IDF figures later stated that 
Hezbollah, in fact, lost around six hundred trained combatants—more than a 
tenth of the organization’s estimated total personnel strength.21 For its part, the IAF 
flew nearly nineteen thousand sorties throughout the thirty-four-day campaign. 
Yet as effective as the IAF’s combat performance was in a narrow sense, the 
Olmert government’s originally stated goals of recovering the two abducted sol-
diers and extirpating Hezbollah as a viable fighting force in southern Lebanon 
were not achieved. During the war’s last twenty-four hours Hezbollah fired an 
all-time high of 250 Katyushas into northern Israel, offering a ringing testimony 
to its tenacity and to the IDF’s inability to reduce the rate of short-range rocket 
fire to any significant degree at any time throughout the campaign.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
For the most part, in mission areas in which it naturally excelled the IAF per-
formed to its usual high standards of competence. Indeed, the service exceeded 
the government’s expectations in many respects. Any shortfalls in its effective-
ness were due mainly to an absence of adequate actionable intelligence on such 
vital targets as hidden stockpiles of Katyushas. Bearing credible witness to this 
performance, the Winograd Commission’s final report, issued in January 2008, 
concluded that the IAF had displayed “exceptional capabilities” and had turned in 
some “impressive achievements” throughout the course of the counteroffensive. 
That document further noted that the scope of IAF operations had been “unprec-
edented” and that the service had “executed most of its preplanned assignments 
well.” It added that the service’s performance in some cases “helped to compen-
sate for the severity of the ground force’s failure [in key respects].”22
To be sure, the airspace over Lebanon presented a relatively benign operating 
environment for the IAF. There were no air-to-air threats or significant enemy 
surface defenses to contend with, aside from sporadic fire from infrared surface-
to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery. In all, out of its total of nearly nineteen 
thousand combat and combat support sorties flown the IAF experienced just one 
aircraft loss as a direct result of enemy fire (a CH-53 helicopter during a night 
troop insertion operation during the campaign’s last days) and three more due 
to accidents. As that record well attested, IAF aircrews were essentially able to 
operate with impunity throughout Lebanon’s airspace, enjoying both freedom 
from attack and freedom to attack. The IAF’s most notable combat achievements 
were its unprecedented level of sustained combat-sortie generation, its first-ever 
preemptive attack against an enemy ballistic missile inventory, its skillful integra-
tion of UAVs into both independent air operations and joint air-ground combat, 
and its courageous combat airlift and search and rescue operations under often 
intense enemy fire.23
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More than in any previous combat involvement by the IAF, precision strike 
operations played a prominent role in Operation CHANGE OF DIRECTION. 
Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) made up 36 percent of the total number of 
air-delivered weapons expended. For targets in built-up areas, where the avoid-
ance of collateral damage was a major concern, the use of PGMs of various sorts 
was more on the order of 60 percent. In one instance, a series of attacks against 
Hezbollah’s command and control complex in the dahiye sector of south Beirut, 
all of the weapons expended were PGMs of one sort or another. 
Yet alongside these achievements, the IAF also experienced its share of dif-
ficulties throughout the course of the second Lebanon war. Two problem areas 
in particular—Hezbollah’s short-range rockets, which were dispersed across 
southern Lebanon, and unsuccessful attempts to eliminate the terrorist organiza-
tion’s most senior leaders—were occasioned by an absence of adequate real-time 
intelligence regarding the location of those high-value assets. Two other areas in 
which the IAF was fairly faulted both during and after the war—the extent of 
Lebanese noncombatant casualties inflicted by bombing and the associated dam-
age done to Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure and economy—were the results of 
ill-advised targeting choices handed down by the Olmert government. Finally, in 
the realm of air-land integration once ground combat got under way in earnest, 
both the IAF and the IDF’s ground forces later acknowledged multiple break-
downs in their efforts at coordinated joint-force employment resulting from their 
not having routinely conducted serious large-force training exercises throughout 
the preceding six years. During those years, the IDF had been almost exclusively 
fixated on the more immediate and pressing lower-intensity problem of dealing 
with the Palestinian intifada in the occupied territories.
With respect to the intractable Katyusha challenge, Hezbollah fired some 
720 of those short-range rockets into northern Israel during the war’s first week 
alone. Six days of relentless IAF retaliatory attacks on the terrorist organization’s 
key military and infrastructure assets throughout Lebanon did nothing whatever 
to dissuade Nasrallah from continuing this rocket war against Israel. Nor did the 
IAF’s attacks reduce to any significant degree Hezbollah’s ability to keep firing 
Katyushas into Israel virtually at will. By the beginning of the campaign’s third 
week, a steady rain of incoming rockets, an average of 170 or more a day, had 
driven more than a million residents of northern Israel either into bomb shelters 
or to safer haven farther south. This unrelenting onslaught finally drove home 
a clear awareness among Israel’s security principals that the short-range rocket 
challenge presented by Hezbollah was a core strategic threat to Israel’s civilian 
population.
The heart of the IDF’s predicament lay in the fact that the Katyushas were es-
sentially untargetable for standoff attacks. Concentrated within a six-mile-deep 
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strip along Israel’s northern border with Lebanon, the rockets were typically hid-
den in nondescript buildings and storerooms attached to private homes. It was all 
but impossible for fighter aircrews looking through their targeting pods from al-
titudes of twenty thousand feet or higher to distinguish a launcher being readied 
for firing from its surroundings, thanks to Hezbollah’s accomplished techniques 
of dispersal, concealment, and collocation of its launchers with civilian struc-
tures. In addition, enemy rocket squads purposely embedded themselves among 
innocent civilians, whom they used without compunction as human shields, 
posing for the IAF the constant danger of inadvertent noncombatant casualties. 
General Halutz later recalled the persistence of daily harassment by Hezbollah’s 
Katyushas as a “major source of frustration” for the Olmert government.24 Yet 
the IDF’s own failure to undertake any concerted effort to negate the short-range 
rocket threat, or even to take it seriously until the campaign’s last week, was the 
main reason for the counteroffensive’s indecisive conclusion and the associated 
perception that Hezbollah’s survival to fight another day represented an IDF 
failure. From a purely tactical perspective, of course, Hezbollah’s Katyushas, even 
at worst, were like mosquitoes—annoying in the extreme but of no real military 
consequence. Yet Hezbollah’s rockets were comparable in effect to Iraq’s Scuds 
fired into Israel in 1991 in terms of their political and strategic utility—a factor 
that the IDF’s leadership never fully recognized or duly acted on. The problem 
was not so much the actual physical destruction, injuries, and fatalities caused 
by the Katyushas as the intolerable spectacle of large numbers of Israeli citizens 
hunkered down in shelters for days on end as a result of that unending threat. 
Ultimately, to negate the Katyushas in a timely way the IDF would have had to 
go in on the ground in large numbers at least to the Litani River. The Olmert 
government’s determination to avoid high troop casualties at all costs drove the 
IDF to rely instead largely on standoff attack operations rather than undertake 
such a costly land offensive. 
Not long after the cease-fire went into effect, many were quick to fault the 
IAF for having failed to negate the Katyusha threat. That charge, however, was 
without merit. No one in the IAF had ever suggested that such negation was 
something that Israel’s air assets could effectively attempt, let alone ensure. On 
the contrary, the IAF’s leaders freely espoused the opposite view, and their clear 
stance in that respect was well known by the government long before CHANGE 
OF DIRECTION was initiated. Just a month before the crisis broke, the IDF had 
rehearsed its plan for exactly such a situation in a command-post exercise that 
began with an abduction incident much like the one that eventually occurred on 
12 July. At the time, the IAF’s commander, Major General Eliezer Shkedy, made 
it clear that the IAF could not prevent Hezbollah from launching short-range 
rockets at will, that the IAF’s success rate against Katyusha stocks would be only 
96
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/22
 94  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
around 3 percent at best, and that effective neutralization of these hidden rockets 
would require determined IDF ground operations.25 An important lesson driven 
home by this experience for the IDF was the absolute need, from the very start 
of any future crisis of a comparable nature, to be more forceful in controlling the 
expectations of both the civilian leadership and the Israeli rank and file regarding 
what airpower could and could not be expected to deliver.26 
THE SECOND LEBANON WAR IN STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 
As the foregoing discussion has shown in enough detail to make the point, the 
inconclusive result of Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah in no way reflected a 
“failure of airpower,” a gross mischaracterization of the Olmert government’s 
flawed approach that unfortunately remains the predominant view among many 
to this day. The initial belief that the many frustrations experienced by Israelis 
during the second Lebanon war all emanated simply from the parochial pursuit 
of an air-only strategy by the fighter pilot who happened to be serving at the 
time as the IDF’s chief has remained remarkably persistent over time despite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.27
In fact, the IDF’s combat doctrine that prevailed on the eve of the second Leb-
anon war was in no way air-centric beyond the bounds of reason in the context 
of the many challenges that Israel faces across the conflict spectrum. Although 
a career fighter pilot by background who naturally believed in the transformed 
character of contemporary air warfare capabilities, General Halutz had repeat-
edly voiced balanced views on the evolved role of airpower in joint warfare. He 
freely admitted his long-standing recognition that an air arm by itself, whatever 
its combat advantages, “cannot stick the flag on a hilltop.”28
More important, the doctrinal elevation of precision standoff attack over 
close-quarters ground maneuver as the IDF’s preferred approach to modern 
warfare was not, as many have suggested, a forced concoction by Halutz derived 
from his natural prejudices in favor of airpower. On the contrary, that reorienta-
tion had been first instituted several years before the second Lebanon war by the 
IDF’s then–chief of staff, Ehud Barak, a ground-forces general. Barak had deter-
mined that in light of recent technology improvements and the accumulation of 
American aerial-warfare successes since Operation DESERT STORM, the primary 
focus of IDF options planning for major contingencies should be, as one Israeli 
scholar put it, “on fire and not on maneuver, on neutralizing the enemy and not 
on decisively defeating it via conquest of territory.”29
Finally, Halutz had scarcely been left unprepared by his upbringing as an 
airman to serve in the position of IDF chief of staff. After the disappointing 
conclusion of Israel’s second Lebanon war, some retired IDF ground force crit-
ics complained that he had spent his entire service life in an antiseptic airman’s 
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world totally removed from the gritty realities of “boots on the ground.” Yet 
the fact is that on entering the general-officer ranks Halutz gained exposure to 
ground-force issues to a degree uncommon for an airman, thanks to a succession 
of senior seasoning assignments in Israel’s joint arena. Starting in 1998, he served 
a two-year tour as head of the IDF’s operations directorate. In 2004, after his 
subsequent four-year stint as IAF commander beginning in 2000, he moved up to 
become the IDF’s deputy chief of staff before being picked in 2005 by then–Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon as the first IAF general to be trusted with the nation’s top 
military leadership position. Halutz testified to the Winograd Commission that 
on assuming the position of chief of staff he had felt that he was entering office 
with “a large measure of familiarity with the essence of ground operations.” He 
added that when Barak, by then minister of defense, had appointed him com-
mander of the IAF in 2000, Barak had commented that Halutz was already “the 
greenest blue helmet in the IDF.”30 
True enough, on the surface, and to many unversed in the details of ongoing 
combat operations at the time, the first two weeks of Operation CHANGE OF 
DIRECTION indeed bore ample signs of being an air-only effort. We now know, 
however, with the benefit of subsequent revelations regarding the Olmert govern-
ment’s inner deliberations as the campaign unfolded, that Halutz never insisted 
on such an approach based on a belief that it offered the most promising solu-
tion to mission needs. On the contrary, after the campaign ended he declared 
categorically in response to charges that he had wrongly sought to achieve the 
government’s goals with an air-only strategy, “I never said an aerial campaign 
would suffice [for the IDF] to prevail. The original plan was to combine an aerial 
campaign with a [possible eventual] ground maneuver.”31 
Halutz also stressed repeatedly that he had never used the term “airpower” in 
characterizing his counteroffensive plan. Rather, what he had sought to employ 
to useful effect was standoff firepower. The IDF’s response to Hezbollah’s provo-
cation of 12 July, Halutz rightly emphasized, was neither initiated as, nor ever 
envisaged as being, an air-only campaign. In clear testimony to that fact, IDF 
operations from the campaign’s first day until the cease-fire went into effect also 
included the firing of some 173,000 artillery shells and MLRS rounds, more than 
were expended during the much more intense Yom Kippur War of 1973.32
If the flaws in the IDF’s performance during its second Lebanon war did not 
emanate from misplaced reliance on the assumed promise of airpower, then 
wherein lies their explanation? The main reason behind the Olmert government’s 
initial strategy for responding to Hezbollah’s provocation was simply that no one 
among the senior Israeli leadership, military or civilian, wanted an open-ended 
ground war. It was not as if, as one American commentator later put it, General 
Halutz was somehow “guilty of ‘preventing’ the ground forces from otherwise 
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carrying out their preferred and the optimum plan.”33 The IDF’s ground com-
manders were equally opposed to a major land push for numerous reasons, not 
least of which was the fact that Israel’s ground forces were unprepared for major 
combat against a robust opponent like Hezbollah, having conducted only do-
mestic policing actions against the Palestinian resistance during the preceding 
six years.
Yet at the same time, Halutz wanted to teach Hezbollah a lesson that its leaders 
would not soon forget. Ever since the IDF’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon 
in 2000, Nasrallah’s combatants had systematically taken up positions vacated by 
the departing Israeli forces. The preeminent challenge for the IDF in that situa-
tion, it naturally followed, was to contain Hezbollah’s looming military presence, 
notwithstanding the many tactical advantages that the terrorist organization ac-
crued from its new perches just across the Lebanese border. 
During his previous assignment as the IAF’s commander, Halutz had main-
tained that the Barak government’s policy of answering with restraint Hezbollah’s 
continued tests of the limits of Israel’s tolerance—unprovoked border incidents 
and random rocket firings into northern Israel—was prejudicial to the nation’s 
security interests. He later demanded, in an order to the IDF’s operations director-
ate in May 2006, a concrete contingency plan against Hezbollah.34 With the final 
provocation of the abduction on 12 July 2006, Halutz decided that the time had 
come to engineer a sea change, to implement a fundamentally different approach
—hence his decision to code-name the IDF’s counteroffensive Operation 
CHANGE OF DIRECTION. 
In any case, the decision to begin the campaign with standoff-only attacks 
was not Halutz’s alone. It was the consensus view among Israel’s top civilian and 
military leaders, because it appeared to be the country’s best available option as 
an initial response. As Lieutenant General Shaul Mofaz, a land combatant, former 
IDF chief of staff, and serving member of Olmert’s cabinet, later explained in his 
testimony to the Winograd Commission, “If you can do it from the air, it is better. 
I do not believe any of us would want to use ground forces if you can attain [your 
objectives] otherwise.”35 
Another reason for initiating the counteroffensive with standoff-only attacks 
was the leadership’s keen appreciation that, as noted above, Israel’s ground forces 
were not ready for major combat. As one IDF unit commander later recalled in 
this regard, “Our main problem was that everyone in the army knew what had to 
be done, and [yet] no one wanted to do it, especially since we knew that it would 
cost us a lot of casualties.”36 During the government’s initial deliberations over 
such a daunting strategy alternative, the IDF’s deputy chief, General Kaplinsky, 
and other land force generals warned Olmert that a major ground invasion could 
cost the IDF as many as four hundred soldiers killed in action.37
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In his memoirs published in 2010, Halutz reminded readers of the more mod-
est goals that he had issued to the IAF and to Northern Command: “The IDF 
embarked on the Lebanon II war with predefined aims. These aims were limited. 
Not one of them defined the war as aiming to destroy, crush, or wipe out the 
Hezbollah organization from the map of Lebanese reality.”38 Yet the inescapable 
fact remains that the former IDF chief ’s prime minister had avowed precisely 
such a goal, to all intents and purposes, in a public pronouncement six days into 
the campaign. That declaration by the nation’s top leader gave instant rise to un-
realistic expectations on the part of the Israeli public, expectations that the IDF 
lacked the wherewithal to fulfill with any combination of air and ground forces 
that domestic and international opinion would likely countenance. Worse yet, it 
played perfectly into Nasrallah’s hands by allowing him to claim at the campaign’s 
end, with complete credibility in the eyes of the Arab world and of most Western 
observers, that Hezbollah had emerged “victorious” from the IDF’s counter-
offensive simply by having survived.
On this point, important for a proper understanding of where the IDF’s 
campaign plan ultimately went wrong, Halutz remarked in passing and all but 
dismissively in his memoirs that “among the public and also at the political level, 
there were unrealistically high expectations that were built, among other things, 
by flawed public relations.”39 Yet as correct as that statement was, strictly speaking 
and as far as it went, it was exactly that palpable disconnect that in the end proved 
most consequential. The disconnect between what the prime minister had prom-
ised the Israeli people during the campaign’s first week and what the IDF had set 
about more modestly to accomplish on the battlefield yielded an outcome that 
gave both self-interested and neutral onlookers alike every reason to conclude 
that the IDF’s counteroffensive had ended in “failure.” 
In fact, Prime Minister Olmert, seemingly on impulse, promised consider-
ably more during the campaign’s first week than all of Israel’s forces together 
could possibly have delivered at a price that anyone in the country would have 
been willing to pay. For his part, General Halutz evidently failed to preempt that 
egregious overreach by making it unambiguously clear to his political superior 
beforehand what the IDF could and could not do. As a result, he and Olmert 
marched to different drummers throughout the campaign, a fact that was largely 
responsible for the mounting sense among the Israeli people and most outside 
observers as the endgame neared that Israel had failed to achieve its avowed goals. 
Nasrallah lost no time in leveraging the point for maximum propaganda value 
by claiming a “divine victory” for Hezbollah as the cease-fire went into effect.40
In the end, informed observers can reasonably disagree in hindsight about the 
appropriateness of Halutz’s standoff-only initial move for Operation CHANGE 
OF DIRECTION. That choice, it bears repeating, was shared at first not only by the 
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Olmert government’s top civilian leaders but also by the IDF’s leading ground-
force commanders. Yet it is all but impossible to avoid concluding that for what-
ever reason, Halutz failed to prevent his prime minister from writing a check that 
the IDF could not cash—that is, from articulating unattainable goals on the cam-
paign’s sixth day and thereafter allowing them to persist in the minds of Israeli 
citizens and outside observers. That lapse had profound adverse consequences 
for how the campaign has been viewed ever since, however more tolerably, and 
even positively, that matters may ultimately have turned out for Israel—a point 
to which we will return. 
There was nothing wrong in principle with the Olmert government’s deci-
sion to respond to Hezbollah’s provocation with escalated force. Yet its chosen 
response was apparently not explored in all its ramifications before being set in 
motion. Clearly there was more than one conceivable alternative available to the 
IDF in the immediate aftermath of the provocation. By all signs, however, those 
alternatives were not systematically identified, explored, or rank-ordered by the 
civilian leadership or General Halutz. As a result, the IDF initiated its counterof-
fensive without anyone in the government’s having given adequate thought to the 
campaign’s likely conclusion.
An especially glaring deficiency in the government’s chosen approach was that 
from the very start it offered no ready way of dealing with Hezbollah’s Katyusha 
fire should coercion solely through standoff attacks fail to elicit the desired result. 
A no less glaring failure of situation assessment and strategy, this time particu-
larly on the IDF’s part, was that until very late stemming the rate of short-range 
rocket fire into northern Israel was never high on its list of priorities. Indeed, 
both the IDF’s uniformed principals and the government’s civilian leaders mis-
understood fundamentally the strategic significance of the Katyushas until they 
finally awakened, in the campaign’s last days, to the corrosive effect that the unre-
lenting, daily rocket fire was having on Israeli morale. Until then, their tendency 
had been to dismiss the Katyushas as representing merely a nuisance factor. 
Yet another shortcoming in the IDF’s planning and conduct of the war was a 
failure of insight into the true essence of the opponent it was facing. Indeed, Is-
rael’s entire security establishment erred in not recognizing from the campaign’s 
start that it was fighting not just a homegrown Lebanese terrorist organization 
but a well-equipped and well-resourced vanguard of Iran. An associated issue 
here has to do with what was needed to defeat a stateless opponent, a challenge 
that entailed a fundamentally new paradigm of combat. Nasrallah, for his part, 
as the IAF’s Brigadier General Itai Brun later pointed out, “correctly identified 
Israel’s need for a clear and unambiguous victory in a short war. Thus, Hezbollah 
only had to survive” and to demonstrate its survivability by continuing to fire 
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rockets at a peak rate right up to the cease-fire. Hezbollah’s strategy was, at its 
heart, “victory through nondefeat.”41 
In hindsight, the immediate challenge presented to Prime Minister Olmert and 
his government by Hezbollah’s provocation of 12 July 2006 was clear and simple. 
If going in on the ground massively from the very start was unacceptable, then 
the proper opening move by the IDF should instead have been a sharp but short 
standoff reprisal with the aim of causing as much physical harm to Hezbollah’s 
military infrastructure as possible within a finite period of time. With Nasrallah 
having thus been made to feel the greatest possible pain for his transgression, the 
punitive response would then have been abruptly halted, in the satisfaction that 
a clear message had been sent to Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors. 
If, alternatively, the Olmert government had deemed it essential to eradicate 
once and for all Hezbollah’s ability to rain at will short-range rocket fire on in-
nocent Israeli civilians, a properly targeted campaign of precision standoff at-
tacks accompanied by a large-scale ground counteroffensive to regain control of 
southern Lebanon up to the Litani River was the only serviceable option. Either 
way, the image of Israel and the credibility of its deterrent would be preserved. 
No halfway solution would have worked, and yet that is exactly the kind of option 
that the Olmert government attempted to find in the end.
All of that said, looking back on Israel’s second Lebanon war six years later, 
one can fairly ask whether the IDF’s campaign was really that much of a lost 
cause after all. To begin with, it was easy enough for Nasrallah to proclaim in the 
war’s early aftermath that he had “prevailed” simply by virtue of having survived. 
Yet the fact is that as a result of the IDF’s sustained onslaught, his organization 
took a major beating and paid a high price for its abduction of the two Israeli 
soldiers. The IDF by its own accounting killed more than six hundred of his 
most seasoned combatants and severely wounded around a thousand more.42 In 
addition, a considerable portion of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure through-
out Lebanon was destroyed or badly damaged by the IDF’s relentless aerial and 
artillery bombardment. The campaign also made for an instructive experience 
for the IDF, in that it unmasked the true nature of Hezbollah, its strengths and 
weaknesses, how it fights, and the lethality of its Iran-supplied rockets and an-
titank weapons. By undertaking its response with such sustained intensity and 
vigor, Israel showed its determination to deal with Hezbollah using grossly dis-
proportionate measures should a future challenge by the terrorist organization 
be deemed to require such force majeure.
In sum, the IDF’s campaign against Hezbollah was not quite the unqualified 
setback for Israel that many had initially thought. Consider, in this regard, the 
new strategic reality that the second Lebanon war occasioned for both Hezbollah 
102
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/22
 100  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
and Israel. From the first weeks of his elevation to Hezbollah’s leadership in 1992 
all the way up to the start of Operation CHANGE OF DIRECTION, Nasrallah had 
lobbed short-range rockets into northern Israel from time to time with madden-
ing regularity and impunity. Yet not a single rocket was fired from Lebanon into 
Israel during the years after the campaign ended until three were launched, des-
ultorily and without effect, during the IDF’s twenty-three-day operation against 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009. Even though 
Hezbollah had by that time accumulated more short-range rockets than ever 
before, its leaders were quick to disavow any responsibility for those launches. 
This suggests that Nasrallah’s postcampaign motivations and conduct were most 
decidedly affected by the significant bloodying that was dealt to his organization 
by the IDF in July and August 2006. 
Finally, Hezbollah’s role as a forward combat arm of Iran was starkly drama-
tized by the campaign experience, thus bringing into sharper focus the IDF’s 
already keen appreciation of the seriousness of the Iranian threat. Moreover, 
Israel’s sobering experience during the second Lebanon war drove home the 
emergent fact that a nonstate opponent of Hezbollah’s sophistication was far 
more than just a nuisance factor for the country’s security planning. On the con-
trary, with its revealed ability to hold large numbers of Israeli civilians at risk, the 
radical Islamist movement had in fact become what one Israeli analyst described 
as “a strategic threat of the first order.”43 In light of the substantial setback that 
was dealt by the IDF’s counteroffensive both to Hezbollah as a terrorist organiza-
tion and to the overarching strategic interests of Iran, to say nothing of the calm 
that has prevailed along Israel’s northern border ever since the cease-fire went 
into effect in August 2006, one can fairly say about CHANGE OF DIRECTION what 
Mark Twain once said of Wagnerian opera—it’s not as bad as it sounds. The only 
real remaining downside, as the IAF’s Brigadier General Brun frankly admitted 
in an after-campaign reflection, is that “we [the IDF and the Olmert government] 
failed to protect Israel’s civilian population and did not succeed in shortening 
the war.”44
ON BALANCE
Operation CHANGE OF DIRECTION represented the first time in Israel’s six-
decade history that a major confrontation ended without a clear-cut military 
victory. The campaign’s less than satisfactory outcome for Tel Aviv did not ema-
nate from any particular single-point failure, least of all on the part of the IAF’s 
universally acclaimed combat edge. Rather, in the words of two informed Israeli 
commentators, it stemmed from “an overall accumulation of circumstances.”45 
More to the point, the war’s outcome in no way represented a failure of Israel’s air 
assets to perform to the fullest extent of their considerable, though not unlimited, 
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capabilities. Instead, it reflected an overarching deficiency in strategy choice, the 
most flawed elements of which were a failure by the IDF to update standing con-
tingency plans for the immediate needs of the challenge at hand; an inconsistency 
between avowed goals, available means, and will to pursue them successfully; and 
placement by the leadership of friendly casualty avoidance above mission accom-
plishment in its rank-ordering of combat priorities.
Viewed in retrospect, it was clearly an overreach for Prime Minister Olmert 
to announce the all but unattainable goal of extirpating, in a single and limited 
combat operation, Hezbollah’s deeply entrenched military presence in southern 
Lebanon. As a former IDF ground force general later observed in this regard, the 
government’s decision to rely mainly on precision standoff attacks rather than to 
commit strength on the ground in pursuit of the prime minister’s ephemeral goal 
stemmed not from any preexisting bias on Halutz’s part in favor of airpower but 
rather from his superiors’ “setting unrealistic objectives . . . and [then] creating 
the illusion that they were achievable . . . at a low price.”46 That is, buying into 
a baseless view of what airpower (or, more correctly, standoff firepower) alone 
could achieve by way of coercing desired enemy behavior was not where the Ol-
mert government went astray. Rather, its most consequential misstep was taking 
an unreflective view of what military power of any kind, unaided by an effective 
strategy, might achieve in a campaign in which declared goals were so ambitious 
and unbounded.
That misstep going into Israel’s war against Hezbollah in July 2006 was round-
ly corrected by the time the IDF was ready, a little more than two years later, to 
embark on its campaign against Hamas in response to similar rocket firings from 
Gaza against civilian population centers in southern Israel. Indeed, if there ever 
was an instance of lessons indicated by one disappointing combat performance 
being truly learned and assimilated by a defense establishment in preparation for 
its next high-stakes showdown, this was an exemplary case in point. The IDF’s 
response to the insights driven home by its sobering experience during the sec-
ond Lebanon war represents a classic example of institutional adaptability and 
self-improvement. As the director of the IDF’s Dado Center for Interdisciplinary 
Military Studies recounted in an after-action reflection on the implications of 
Israel’s response to Hezbollah in 2006, the IDF internalized a substantial number 
of appropriate conclusions from its manifest errors in planning and readiness. 
These conclusions included assessed needs for significant increases in regular 
and reserve ground force training, for renewed emphasis on high- as well as low-
intensity warfare contingencies in planning, training, and force development, 
and for greater stress on cross-service integration in planning and training across 
the entire spectrum of likely future warfare.47 
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For their part, the IAF’s leaders gleaned a similar but more service-specific 
set of conclusions from their rocky experience of working with Israel’s ground 
forces during the second Lebanon war. Those conclusions included a need for 
deeper and more intimate mutual acquaintance and understanding between 
Israel’s air and land warfare communities; joint planning of ground schemes of 
maneuver that routinely include IAF participation from the very start; stronger 
IAF representation at division and brigade levels; and decentralized control of 
attack-helicopter operations in air-land warfare.48 
The IDF’s subsequent twenty-three-day counteroffensive against Hamas in 
the Gaza Strip in late December 2008 and early January 2009 stood in marked 
contrast to the Olmert government’s flawed conduct of the second Lebanon war. 
It was dominated by a more realistic matching of desired ends with available 
means. It also featured a greater willingness by Israel’s political and military lead-
ers to risk paying the campaign’s likely price if need be.49 In the more focused and 
disciplined way in which they planned and carried out their successful campaign 
against Hamas, those leaders substantially erased any residual doubts about the 
credibility of Israel’s deterrent against any would-be regional challengers, for at 
least the near term. 
N O T E S 
1. Hezbollah, which means “Party of God” in 
Arabic, is a virulently radical transnational Is-
lamist movement that first arose in Lebanon 
in the 1980s and 1990s. It further deepened 
its roots there in the early aftermath of 
Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon 
in 2000 after the latter’s occupation of that 
region for eighteen years following the first 
Lebanon war, of 1982. It is lavishly funded 
by Iran and is unswervingly devoted to the 
destruction of Israel. For an overview of the 
terrorist organization, see Augustus Richard 
Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Prince-
ton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007).
2. The Katyusha is an inaccurate, unguided 
107 mm or 122 mm rocket with a range of 
between twelve and twenty miles. It is es-
sentially the same weapon as that employed 
by the Soviet army against the Wehrmacht 
on the Eastern Front during World War II. 
Hezbollah had an estimated thirteen thou-
sand or more of them stockpiled in southern 
Lebanon when the war began. 
3. Group Capt. Neville Parton, Royal Air Force, 
“Israel’s 2006 Campaign in the Lebanon: A 
Failure of Air Power or a Failure of Doc-
trine?,” Royal Air Force Air Power Review 
(Summer 2007), p. 81. 
4. Roger Cohen, “Price of Disengagement: 
Beirut and Gaza Burn,” International Herald 
Tribune, 15 July 2006; “The Crisis Widens,” 
Economist, 15 July 2006, p. 45.
5. Maj. Gen. Isaac Ben-Israel, IAF (Ret.), The 
First Israel-Hezbollah Missile War (Tel Aviv: 
Program for Security Studies, College of 
Policy and Government, Tel Aviv Univ., 
May 2007; available in Hebrew only), p. 19; 
Amos Har’el and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: 
Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 
107–108.
6. Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, IAF (Ret.), interview, 
IAF Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 26 March 2008.
7. Head of the IAF’s Campaign Planning 
Department during Operation CHANGE OF 
105
War College: Summer 2012 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 L A M B E T H  103
DIRECTION, interview, IAF Headquarters, Tel 
Aviv, 26 March 2008. 
8. Brig. Gen. Itai Brun, IAF, Director, Dado 
Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, 
interview, Glilot Base, Tel Aviv, 26 March 
2008.
9. Har’el and Issacharoff, 34 Days, p. viii.
10. Karby Leggett, Jay Solomon, and Neil King, 
Jr., “Threat of Wider Mideast War Grows,” 
Wall Street Journal, 14 July 2006.
11. Lt. Col. David Eshel, IDF (Ret.), “Summary 
of Israeli Air Force Strikes: 12–21 July 2006,” 
Defense Update: News Analysis by David Eshel, 
www.defense-update.com/. 
12. Ken Ellingwood, “Hezbollah Wields Im-
proved Arsenal,” Los Angeles Times, 15 July 
2006. 
13. Mark Mazetti and Thom Shanker, “Arming 
of Hezbollah Reveals U.S. and Israeli Blind 
Spots,” New York Times, 19 July 2006.
14. Alon Ben-David, “Hizbullah Hits Israeli 
Corvette,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 July 2006, 
p. 18. 
15. Greg Myre, “Israel Widens Scope of Attacks 
across Lebanon,” New York Times, 16 July 
2006.
16. Helene Cooper and Steven Erlanger, “U.S. 
Appears to Be Waiting to Act on Israeli Air-
strikes,” New York Times, 19 July 2006.
17. Jay Solomon, Mariam Fam, Karby Leggett, 
and Neil King, Jr., “Israel Weighs Ground 
Offensive in Southern Lebanon,” Wall Street 
Journal, 20 July 2006. 
18. Gerald F. Seib, “Mideast: Israel Draws Little 
U.S. Ire,” Wall Street Journal, 22 July 2006.
19. Quoted in “IDF Shake-Up over Hezbollah 
War,” JINSA Online, 23 March 2007, www
.jinsa.org/. 
20. John Kifner, “Fragile Cease-Fire Allows Thou-
sands to Return Home,” New York Times, 15 
August 2006.
21. For further discussion and documentation 
of these and related figures, see Lambeth, Air 
Operations in Israel’s War against Hezbollah, 
pp. 70–71.
22. Final Winograd Report on the Second Lebanon 
War (Washington, D.C.: February 2008), 
chap. 9, “Arms, Combat Support Units, and 
 Special Operations,” s.v. “The Air Force, 
Facts,” paras. 8, 18, 24, and 26.
23. For more detailed amplification on these 
and other achievements, see Lambeth, Air 
Operations in Israel’s War against Hezbollah, 
pp. 73–133. 
24. Halutz, interview.
25. Har’el and Issacharoff, 34 Days, p. 62.
26. Brig. Gen. Yohanan Locker, IAF, head of the 
Air Division, interview, IAF Headquarters, Tel 
Aviv, 27 March 2008.
27. In an early example of this persistent miscon-
ception, the usually balanced and authorita-
tive London-based International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS), in its annual survey 
of the international security scene issued sev-
eral months after the war ended, concluded 
that Halutz, IAF airman and presumed air-
power enthusiast that he was, had “convinced 
the militarily naïve [Israeli] political leader-
ship . . . that air power alone could bring 
Hezbollah to its knees.” Strategic Survey 2007: 
The Annual Review of World Affairs (London: 
IISS, 2007), p. 231 [emphasis added].
28. Arie Egozi, “Israeli Air Power Falls Short,” 
Flight International, 1–7 August 2006.
29. Ofer Shelah, The Israeli Army: A Radical 
Proposal (Tel Aviv: Kinneret Zmora-Bitan, 
2003), p. 37. 
30. “Testimony by Lieutenant General Dan 
Halutz, IDF Chief of Staff, to the Winograd 
Commission Investigating the Second Leba-
non War,” unpublished English translation 
from the original Hebrew, Jerusalem, 28 
January 2007 [hereafter Halutz, testimony]. 
31. Alon Ben-David, “Israel Introspective after 
Lebanon Offensive,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 
August 2006, pp. 18–19.
32. Halutz, interview.
33. William M. Arkin, Divining Victory: Air Power 
in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 2007), p. 134 
[emphasis original].
34. Halutz, testimony. 
35. Testimony by Minister of Transportation 
Shaul Mofaz to the Winograd Commission 
Investigating the Second Lebanon War.
36. Har’el and Issacharoff, 34 Days, p. 119.
37. Ibid., p. 172.
106
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/22
 104  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
38. Dan Halutz, Begova Einayim [At Eye Level] 
(Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot Books, 2010; avail-
able in Hebrew only). 
39. Ibid.
40. Quoted in Arkin, Divining Victory, p. 242.
41. Brig. Gen. Itai Brun, IAF, “The Second Leba-
non War, 2006,” in A History of Air Warfare, 
ed. John Olsen (Washington, D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2009), p. 314.
42. Halutz, Begova Einayim.
43. Ron Tira, “Shifting Tectonic Plates: Basic 
Assumptions on the Peace Process Revisited,” 
Strategic Assessment (Tel Aviv) (June 2009), 
pp. 100, 102.
44. Brig. Gen. Itai Brun, IAF, “The Second 
Lebanon War as a ‘Wake-Up Call’: A Strategic 
Perspective and Major Lessons Learned” 
(undated briefing charts, Dado Center for 
Interdisciplinary Military Studies, Glilot Base, 
Tel Aviv). 
45. Har’el and Issacharoff, 34 Days, p. ix.
46. Brig. Gen. Shlomo Brom, IDF (Ret.), “Politi-
cal and Military Objectives in a Limited War 
against a Guerilla Organization,” in The 
Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives, 
ed. Shlomo Brom and Meir Elran (Tel Aviv: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2007), 
p. 20.
47. Brun, “Second Lebanon War as a ‘Wake-Up 
Call.’” 
48. Brig. Gen. Ya’akov Shaharabani, head of 
the IAF Helicopter Division, interview, IAF 
Headquarters, Tel Aviv, 31 March 2009. 
49. For a fuller account of this second IDF 
campaign and the many improvements in 
joint combat performance reflected in it, 
see Lambeth, Air Operations in Israel’s War 
against Hezbollah, pp. 221–76. 
107
War College: Summer 2012 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
CHINA’S AEROSPACE POWER TRAJECTORY IN THE 
NEAR SEAS 
Mr. Kostecka is a senior analyst for the U.S. Navy. In 
addition, he has worked for the Department of De-
fense and Government Accountability Office. He was 
an active-duty Air Force officer for ten years and still 
serves in the Air Force Reserve, with the rank of lieu-
tenant colonel. Mr. Kostecka has a bachelor of science 
degree in mathematics from Ohio State University, 
a master of liberal arts in military and diplomatic 
history from Harvard University, a master of arts in 
national security policy from the Patterson School of 
Diplomacy and International Commerce at the Uni-
versity of Kentucky, and a master of science in strate-
gic intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence 
College. He is also a graduate of the Squadron Officer 
School and the Air Command and Staff College. The 
views expressed in this article are those of the author 
and do not necessarily ref lect the views of the Depart-
ment of the Navy or Department of Defense.
Naval War College Review, Summer 2012, Vol. 65, No. 3
A
Daniel J. Kostecka
In order to defend the security of the national territory, marine territories 
and the waters within the First Island Chain, this proactive defense strat-
egy does not mean that our navy only stays within the First Island Chain. 
REAR ADMIRAL ZHANG ZHAOZHANG, APRIL 2009
ir and aerospace power has been fundamental for defending China’s “near 
seas”—encompassing the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, and the East and South 
China Seas—since the founding of the People’s Republic.1 While air and naval 
operations did not play a significant role in the Chinese Civil War, which was 
won by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the victorious Communist forces 
were threatened immediately by hostile air and naval forces from the maritime 
sphere. In 1949 the regime was ill equipped to defend its eleven thousand miles 
of coastline and more than six thousand islands against attacks and harassment 
from Nationalist Chinese air and naval forces occupy-
ing the large islands of Taiwan and Hainan, as well as 
several smaller islands, let alone protect the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) against the aircraft carriers of 
the powerful U.S. Seventh Fleet. Even before the Peo-
ple’s Republic was officially declared in October 1949, 
communist leaders immediately recognized the need 
for strong naval and air forces; the PLA’s commander, 
General Zhu De, stated in April 1949 that China “must 
build its own air forces and navy in order to boost 
national defense.”2 This need became apparent shortly 
thereafter, in June 1949, when the Kuomintang (KMT) 
government on Taiwan declared a blockade of coastal 
mainland ports and its naval and air forces began at-
tacking coastal shipping and ports as well as laying 
mines in river estuaries.3 
108
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/22
 106  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Over the course of the 1950s the PLA achieved only mixed success in protect-
ing China’s coastline. In 1949 Communist forces captured Hainan Island, the 
second-largest KMT-held island, and most of the smaller offshore islands fell in 
the early 1950s. The PLA was also successful in stopping raids on the mainland 
and its merchant and fishing fleets. However, KMT forces stubbornly held on to 
Jinmen and Matsu, as well as a few additional islands such as Taiping (Itu Aba) 
in the South China Sea. Also, the PLA never represented a serious invasion threat 
to Taiwan—an issue that persists to this day. Further, throughout the 1950s the 
PLA naval and air forces were impotent against powerful U.S. forces operating in 
China’s near seas, as evidenced by the Seventh Fleet’s role in resupplying Jinmen in 
1954–55, evacuating KMT troops and civilians from the Dachen Islands in 1955, 
and escorting KMT vessels resupplying Nationalist-held offshore islands in 1958.4 
Despite a clear need to defend China’s near seas, resource constraints in those 
years meant that coastal defense represented the extent of the operational capac-
ity of the PLA’s sea and air forces. The overall emphasis of the PLA Navy (PLAN) 
on coastal defense as opposed to longer-range operations was evidenced by the 
deployment of thirteen coastal-defense artillery regiments in 1951, the primary 
focus of naval aviation on air defense of fleet bases, and the disbanding of the 
PLAN marines in 1957, only three years after the force was established.5 While 
PLAN aviation and aircraft of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) flew several hundred 
sorties during the campaigns of the 1950s, they were primarily relegated to coast-
al air defense and operated under restrictive rules of engagement. On a positive 
note for the PRC, the 1950s ended with the KMT air force no longer operating 
at will over Fujian and Guangdong Provinces, due to a permanent presence of 
PLAAF and PLAN aviation along China’s eastern and southern coastlines.6 Over-
all though, while China’s air forces demonstrated the capacity to defend Chinese 
airspace against KMT aircraft, they could do little to counter U.S. air and naval 
operations in China’s near seas, as demonstrated by the Seventh Fleet’s operations 
in and around the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s and the freewheeling nature of U.S. 
Navy and Air Force air support to United Nations forces during the Korean War.7 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s PLA air forces continued to emphasize coast-
al air defense and possessed little ability to exert influence in China’s near seas. 
The KMT air force on Taiwan continued to fly reconnaissance missions over the 
mainland. (Several of these aircraft were shot down; in addition, PLAN fighters 
based on Hainan shot down a small number of U.S. Navy and Air Force fighters 
that strayed too close to Chinese airspace during the Vietnam War.)8 However, 
some PLA combat operations in the 1970s called for China’s air forces to push be-
yond the coastal-air-defense paradigm. In 1974, PLAN fighter aircraft flew thirty-
eight sorties in support of operations to seize the Paracel Islands from South Viet-
nam, a mission that to this day represents the longest-distance opposed landing 
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executed by the PLA. Further, in the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, PLAN 
aircraft flew 751 sorties in support of fleet units off Vietnam’s coast, although no 
information is available regarding the types of missions flown.9 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEAR SEAS DEFENSE
The need for China’s air forces to push their operations farther out over water 
gained significance in the 1980s as China’s naval strategy changed under the 
leadership of a dynamic commander. In 1982, new PLAN commander Admiral 
Liu Huaqing, building on developments of the 1970s, directed the Naval Research 
Institute to develop a regional naval strategy that was to become known as “Near 
Seas Defense” (more commonly, “offshore defense”), a strategy that would move 
the PLAN beyond coastal defense.10 Like all other PLAN commanders prior to 
1996 Admiral Liu had been originally an army officer, but—notably, in a mili-
tary often dominated by the “great infantry” concept—he was more than just an 
infantryman serving in a naval billet. Liu proved to be an aggressive and forward-
thinking maritime strategist, and by developing the strategy of Near Seas Defense 
and pushing for continued modernization he laid much of the intellectual and 
technical foundation of the PLAN of the early twenty-first century.11 
Near Seas Defense has been characterized in a number of ways and is often 
generically described as referring to operations within China’s two-hundred-
nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. Admiral Liu, however, defined it as op-
erations around and outside the “First Island Chain” (running from Japan to Tai-
wan and the Philippines), along with the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China 
Sea, and the islands in the latter—a zone that he considered inherently Chinese 
territory.12 Liu further defined Near Seas Defense as a regional, defensive strategy 
specific to China’s maritime claims and interests, and he did not advocate repli-
cating U.S. or Soviet global naval capabilities. Instead, he made comparisons to 
the 1980s-era naval strategies of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. 
Liu forcefully objected to the epithet “China’s Mahan” that some were giving him, 
arguing that Alfred Thayer Mahan had developed naval strategies to serve the 
expansionist needs of imperialists and capitalists, whereas his strategic goals were 
to defend China from aggression and protect its legitimate maritime rights.13 
While such talk may make for fine rhetoric, Liu’s articulation of offshore 
defense is in fact far closer to what Mahan advocated for the United States than 
most realize. Two U.S. Naval War College scholars state, “Close study will reveal 
that Mahan never counseled naval war for its own sake. Far from espousing an 
open-ended American naval buildup, he urged the U.S. Navy to assume the stra-
tegic defensive in vital waters, chiefly the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, 
expanses that would provide America its ‘gateway to the Pacific’ once the Panama 
Canal opened.”14
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Just as Mahan argued that the control of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico 
was essential to promoting America’s development and defending maritime com-
merce and that the Caribbean was the strategic key to U.S. maritime frontiers on 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Liu discussed the importance of the Yellow Sea, 
East China Sea, and South China Sea as resource-rich and protective screens to 
sustain and shield China’s development.15 Mahan viewed key geographic points 
such as Cuba and Jamaica as essential for controlling access to the Caribbean and 
thus the soon-to-be-completed Panama Canal. Similarly, the strategy of offshore 
defense is concerned with the strategic importance of the Spratly Islands in the 
South China Sea owing to their location along strategic sea-lanes linking China to 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as to their overall importance in protecting 
the South China Sea, which Liu called “the southern gate of our motherland.”16 
Additionally, while Liu wrote about Taiwan in terms of reunifying it with the 
homeland, subsequent Chinese strategists discuss Taiwan much as Mahan dis-
cussed islands like Cuba, Jamaica, and Hawaii—as keys to controlling maritime 
communications and protecting maritime interests or, if in the hands of foreign 
power, as barriers threatening trade and development.17 
However, for all of Admiral Liu’s strategic vision, he had to contend with 
something Mahan had not and for which Mahan’s writings offered no useful 
insight—the dominance of airpower in the maritime battle space. When the 
strategy of Near Seas Defense was first put in place in 1987, the PLAN’s lack of 
credible air defense for its surface ships and the obsolescence and short range of 
the fighter aircraft of both the PLAAF and PLAN meant that the latter could in 
fact do little to protect China’s near seas against a serious opponent.18 Beyond 
air defense in China’s near seas, a lack of long-range precision-strike capability 
within the PLAN, PLAAF, and China’s missile force, the Second Artillery, meant 
that China’s military could do little in terms of offensive operations against en-
emy air and naval forces during a conflict on the nation’s maritime periphery. 
As the 1980s gave way to the 1990s, the need for the PLAN to be able to execute 
a near-seas defensive strategy became crystal clear. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union eliminated a large-scale threat that China’s Central Military Commission 
had correctly recognized in 1985 was already diminishing. Operation DESERT 
STORM and subsequent U.S.-led operations against Iraq and in the Balkans 
throughout the 1990s demonstrated the effectiveness of long-range precision-
strike technology. It became clear to PRC leaders that an enemy equipped with 
such weaponry could launch it against China’s densely populated and economi-
cally vibrant coastal provinces from air and sea-based platforms outside the 
range of defenses. Further, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996—in which the United 
States deployed two aircraft carrier groups near Taiwan as a show of support 
against PRC missile-firing exercises intended to intimidate the island during its 
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first democratic elections—served as a harsh lesson to PRC leaders regarding 
their nation’s vulnerability against a first-class military.19 The 1996 crisis with 
Taiwan, along with U.S.-led air strikes in the Balkans in response to Serbian 
human-rights violations, also conveyed to Beijing that Washington was willing 
and able to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, further heightening 
concerns in the PRC that it was vulnerable to U.S. military coercion. Moderniza-
tion of both Japan’s and Taiwan’s navies and air forces, tensions on the Korean 
Peninsula, and China’s increased integration with the global economy (the nation 
became a net importer of oil in 1993) contributed to Beijing’s growing maritime 
security dilemma.20 All this made Liu Huaqing’s calls in the early 1980s for a 
navy capable of establishing command of the near seas seem prophetic indeed. 
The need for a modern navy capable of waging high-tech war to protect China’s 
maritime periphery took on added urgency.21 Concurrent with that need was a 
requirement for modern aerospace forces capable of projecting power into the 
near seas in order to cover Chinese naval forces, deny those areas to enemy avia-
tion, and hold at risk enemy air and naval forces and logistics bases. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERSTRIKE DOCTRINE FOR NEAR 
SEAS DEFENSE
In terms of potential conflicts in China’s near seas, a Taiwan contingency is the 
foremost issue on the minds of many strategists on both sides of the Pacific 
Ocean. While China has developed the capability to conduct robust firepower-
strike and blockade operations against Taiwan, the PLA does not now possess 
the ability to invade Taiwan. Therefore, in a time of crisis the overall goal for 
China would be to deter Taiwan from moving toward a formal declaration of 
independence while reserving the capability to punish Taiwan severely should 
it issue such a declaration and to prevent the United States, by threatening U.S. 
forces and bases throughout the western Pacific, from intervening on the island’s 
behalf.22 However, the focus on developing multimission platforms and weapons 
that can execute large-scale coercive and punishment operations against Taiwan 
is quietly evolving the PLA as a whole. It is becoming a balanced and flexible force 
capable of missions across the spectrum of military operations, including such 
nonwar operations as the ongoing counterpiracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden 
or the recent flood-relief operations in Pakistan. Additionally, the counterstrike 
capabilities that the PLA is developing to deter or defeat U.S. intervention in a 
Taiwan scenario would be just as useful for countering intervention in other 
contingencies in China’s near seas. Recent statements by high-level American 
officials regarding American interests in the South and East China Seas and the 
inflammatory Chinese rhetoric over the November 2010 participation of the 
aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) in exercises in the Yellow Sea 
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point to other potential areas of tension between Beijing and Washington in the 
western Pacific.23 
Over the past two decades the PLA has, in order to execute China’s Near Seas 
Defense strategy, pursued a counterstrike doctrine designed to take the fight to 
an enemy attempting to intervene in a regional conflict. Its operational element 
is known as “noncontact warfare.” Sometimes incorrectly characterized as a “Sun 
Tzu–esque” method of winning without fighting, noncontact warfare is in fact 
the employment of long-range precision-strike systems from outside an enemy’s 
defended zone against key nodes across the enemy’s strategic and operational 
depth.24 A standard 2005 work, Science of Military Strategy, discusses at length 
the need to conduct standoff attacks against key points and centers of gravity. 
Primary targets include command-and-control systems and logistics facilities. 
In fact, Science of Military Strategy holds that an enemy’s primary combat forces 
should be attacked only after the destruction of information and logistics assets, 
because the combat effectiveness of the main operational forces will thus have 
been significantly weakened. The goal is not the wholesale destruction of an 
enemy’s forces but their paralysis. The book draws analogies to the destruction 
of a body’s brain and central nervous system.25 For American planners, the rel-
evant aspect of this line of thought is that in a conflict between the United States 
and China in East Asia, the first American targets the PLA goes after may not be 
carrier strike groups or the runways and parking aprons at Kadena Air Base on 
Okinawa. Instead, the PLA may choose first to attack the replenishment vessels 
that supply the strike groups at sea, as well as land-based logistics and command-
and-control facilities. A December 2005 article in PLAN newspaper 人民海军 
(People’s Navy) pointed to the need for constant at-sea replenishment as one of 
the primary weaknesses of U.S. carrier strike groups.26 With regard to broader 
counterstrike operations, the air bases that receive the most attention from the 
PLA in the early stages of a conflict are likely to be those where the United States 
bases such assets as airborne tankers and command-and-control aircraft. 
The PLA’s counterstrike doctrine is not particularly new. Airpower theorists 
have been claiming since the 1920s that strategic strikes against key targets can 
paralyze an enemy’s war effort. In fact, the best articulation of the PLA’s counter-
strike doctrine can be found not in any book or article in Chinese but in a 1995 
article by Colonel John Warden of the U.S. Air Force (now retired), “The Enemy 
as a System.” Warden, one of the architects of the U.S.-led coalition’s air campaign 
in DESERT STORM, presents a five-ring model, where the rings represent, from the 
inside out, a potential enemy’s “leadership,” “organic essentials” (such as electric-
ity), “key infrastructure,” “population,” and “fielded forces.” In terms similar to 
those used by the Chinese, Warden describes a properly executed air campaign as 
one that involves attacks against key targets to induce strategic and operational 
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paralysis, making engagements with an enemy’s military forces either unneces-
sary or at least a virtually foregone conclusion.27 Not surprisingly, Warden’s views 
on airpower are known to the Chinese. Noted PLAAF general and military com-
mentator Liu Yazhou calls Warden the “Douhet of our time,” and the five-ring 
model receives prominent mention in the book Air Raid and Anti–Air Raid in the 
21st Century (2002).28 
The notion of inflicting strategic and operational paralysis through long-
range, precision air and missile strikes is controversial to say the least, and the 
issue will not be debated here. For now it is sufficient to say that the PLA has de-
veloped and is refining a counterstrike doctrine based on classic airpower theory 
and applied through a growing array of precision-strike weapons. Operationally, 
this doctrine flows from the strategic framework articulated in the Science of 
Military Strategy. In turn, Air Raid and Anti–Air Raid calls for organizing coun-
terstrike forces under a “counterattack operations group.” The forces assigned 
to, or at least coordinated by, this body include the fighter and attack-aviation 
forces of the PLAAF and PLAN, conventional ballistic- and cruise-missile units, 
attack helicopters, surface ships, submarines, and special-operations forces.29 
Key targets include command-and-control systems, logistics, air bases, aircraft 
carriers, and missile launchers. As for aerospace forces, the books Air Raid and 
Anti–Air Raid (already mentioned), Study on Joint Firepower Warfare Theory 
(2004), and a 2006 National Defense University version of Science of Campaigns 
detail missile and air counterattack against command-and-control systems, air 
bases, air defenses, and logistics facilities, with an emphasis on large, fixed targets. 
Command-and-control systems are specifically called out as important targets 
for missile and air strikes, being nerve centers and force multipliers for enemy 
forces. Missile counterattacks are to be launched first, in order to create favorable 
conditions for air counterattacks meant to reinforce the effects of long-range 
missile strikes.30 Additionally, naval-aviation fighter and bomber forces are tasked 
to perform counterstrike operations against enemy ships, while also providing air 
cover to PLAN forces at sea.31 When coordinated strikes are not possible because 
enemy aircraft carriers and air forces are out of range, the authoritative Science 
of Second Artillery Campaigns highlights the importance of long-range conven-
tional missiles in strikes against bases and carrier groups.32 
THE MODERNIZATION OF THE PLA’S COUNTERSTRIKE AEROSPACE 
FORCES
In order to defend China’s near seas and execute this ambitious counterstrike doc-
trine, the PLA has invested a great deal over the past two decades in modernizing 
the counterstrike capabilities of the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery. The 
result has been an impressive array of short- and medium-range conventional 
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ballistic missiles, ground- and air-launched cruise missiles, precision-guided 
land-attack munitions and the combat aircraft necessary to employ them, and 
highly capable antiship cruise missiles that can be fired from surface ships, 
submarines, maritime strike aircraft, and shore-based launchers. The Second 
Artillery is fielding the DF-21D (based on the CSS-5 airframe), a medium-range 
ballistic missile specifically designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers at sea.33 While 
the PLA is not as capable across the board as the U.S. military, its concentration 
on specific counterstrike capabilities has enabled it to develop pockets of excel-
lence in such areas as conventional ballistic missiles, submarines, antiship cruise 
missiles, and electronic warfare. As a result, the PLA is in a position to impose a 
high-risk calculus on opposing forces in the western Pacific in times of tension 
or war, particularly as they approach China’s near seas.34 
With regard to counterstrike aviation in the PLAN, the past decade has seen a 
transition from a primary concern with coastal air defense to a modern maritime-
strike force. In the 1990s the PLAN took delivery of only a small number of 
early models of the J-8II interceptor and JH-7 maritime-strike aircraft. Today, 
through acquisition of new blocks of these airframes and upgrades to older 
systems, the PLAN fields five regiments of the JH-7/JH-7A and two regiments 
of the J-8II. It also operates one regiment of modern Russian-built Su-30MK2 
Flanker multirole, maritime-strike fighters and is taking delivery of modern 
indigenous J-10 and J-11B (Chinese-built Flanker) fighter aircraft.35 The JH-7/
JH-7A, the PLAN’s workhorse maritime-strike fighter, has evolved into a highly 
capable two-seat aircraft capable of employing the YJ-83K antiship cruise mis-
sile and advanced electronic-warfare systems. Complementing the JH-7/JH-7A 
units, the Su-30MK2 regiment can employ antiship and antiradiation variants of 
the Russian-made Kh-31 air-to-surface missile.36 The J-8II, although based on an 
older design, can now employ, thanks to radar and avionics upgrades, modern 
beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles; its range can be extended by refueling 
from the PLAN’s small inventory of H-6 tanker aircraft.37 Additionally, once 
fully operational, the J-11B and J-10 will combine with the Su-30MK2s to give 
the PLAN an ability to extend air defense to Chinese task groups beyond coastal 
waters. Complementing the PLAN’s inventory of fighters and strike fighters are 
two regiments of H-6 maritime strike bombers (based on the Soviet Tu-16 of 
the 1950s but upgraded to employ modern antiship cruise missiles) and a single 
regiment of J-7E short-range interceptors.38 
While not a global expeditionary force, PLAN strike aviation is a modern 
regional force that is in theory capable of covering, from its bases on the Chi-
nese mainland, the near-seas defense areas defined by Liu Huaqing, including 
operations beyond the First Island Chain.39 However, it should be noted that 
this arsenal of modern maritime strike fighters is at least somewhat constrained 
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by the well trained and equipped U.S. and Japanese air forces based on China’s 
maritime periphery. 
The Second Artillery is arguably the primary arm of the PLA that is tasked 
with counterstrike operations in China’s near seas. The 2008 white paper on 
China’s national defense states, “The conventional missile force of the Second 
Artillery Force is charged mainly with the task of conducting medium- and 
long-range precision strikes against key strategic and operational targets of the 
enemy.”40 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, as of late 2009 the Sec-
ond Artillery had deployed over a thousand CSS-6 (six-hundred-kilometer) and 
CSS-7 (three-hundred-kilometer) short-range ballistic missiles within range of 
Taiwan, including a growing number with precision-strike capability. Addition-
ally, the Second Artillery reportedly possesses up to a hundred CSS-5 (1,750-
kilometer) medium-range ballistic missiles—the number is increasing—and 
up to five hundred DH-10 (1,500-kilometer) ground-launched cruise missiles. 
While the shorter-range ballistic missiles can only hit a limited target set beyond 
Taiwan, the growing number of conventionally armed and precision-strike-
capable CSS-5s and DH-10s demonstrates the PLA’s desire to be able to extend 
its counterstrike options throughout China’s near seas.41
In addition, the Second Artillery, with the development of the DF-21D, now 
has a maritime mission against U.S. carrier strike groups. This system, under 
development for several years, is now operational, according to Admiral Robert 
F. Willard, former commander of U.S. Pacific Command.42 A Second Artillery 
role in maritime strike was documented in PLA counterstrike doctrine almost a 
decade ago. Air Raid and Anti–Air Raid (2002) discusses the use of ballistic mis-
siles in “surprise attacks at sea,” and a February 2005 article in the journal 舰船
知识 (Naval and Merchant Ships), “Nemesis of Aircraft Carriers,” concluded that 
precision-guided ballistic missiles represented the best solution for overcoming 
an aircraft carrier’s layered defenses.43 The 2004 Study on Joint Firepower Warfare 
Theory stated that land-based-missile forces and naval forces should integrate 
high- and low-altitude missile attacks against aircraft carriers at sea and called 
for attacks on carriers in port.44
The PLAAF too plays an important role in counterstrike operations in 
China’s near seas. Over the past decade the PLAAF has grown from a force pri-
marily concerned with short-range air defense of the homeland to one capable 
of extending China’s air-defense envelope over the water and, increasingly, of 
conducting long-range precision-strike missions.45 A growing portion of the 
PLAAF comprises modern fighter aircraft like the imported Su-27 Flanker and 
the indigenous J-11B Flanker, the J-10, and (in upgraded variants) the J-8II. Ad-
ditionally, the PLAAF employs the multirole Su-30MKK Flanker imported from 
Russia and several regiments of the JH-7A strike fighters, equipped with the 
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KD-88 land-attack cruise missile.46 The PLAAF is upgrading its H-6 bombers 
to employ the YJ-63 and DH-10 land-attack cruise missiles. A significant part of 
this effort is the development of the H-6K, a new extended-range variant of the 
H-6 that when combined with the long-range DH-10 will be able to threaten U.S. 
bases, such as Guam, in the Second Island Chain.47 As the PLAAF’s inventory of 
long-range aircraft armed with standoff missiles grows, its capacity to expand the 
counterstrike envelope of China’s Near Seas Defense strategy will expand as well. 
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Another key element of China’s maritime aerospace power trajectory is the 
PLAN’s aircraft carrier program. The PLAN has refitted and modernized the 
Cold War–era Russian Kuznetsov-class carrier Varyag at Dalian shipyard; sea tri-
als began in August 2011. The ship’s air group is also taking shape. The PLAN’s 
developmental carrier fighter is a domestically produced carrier-capable variant 
of the Russian-designed Su-27 Flanker known as the J-15.48 Although the aircraft 
is still just a prototype and little is known about the program, it is reasonable 
to assume that the J-15 will possess the same radar, avionics suite, and weapons 
capabilities as the land-based J-11B.49
The former Varyag is equipped for ski-jump launch, and there is a strong pos-
sibility that at least the first domestically produced carrier will be likewise. Ac-
cordingly, in addition to the J-15, the PLAN is procuring and developing rotary-
wing airborne-early-warning (AEW) platforms. According to Russian press and 
Internet reporting, China is taking delivery of up to nine Ka-31 AEW helicopters, 
and Internet photographs indicate it has fielded a prototype of an AEW variant 
of the Z-8 medium-lift helicopter.50 At this writing it is unknown which will be 
chosen as the primary AEW helicopter for the PLAN’s aircraft carrier force. It is 
possible the PLAN sees an indigenous platform based on the Z-8 as a long-term 
solution, with Ka-31s imported from Russia to serve as gap fillers. 
It is unlikely China is developing aircraft carriers with the intent of employing 
them against U.S. Navy carrier strike groups in the Central Pacific in a twenty-
first-century rehash of the battle of the Philippine Sea.51 One Shanghai-based 
military expert states, “Our carrier will definitely not engage with powerful U.S. 
aircraft carrier fighting groups. But it is enough to be a symbolic threat among 
neighboring countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines who have 
territorial disputes with China.”52 Operationally, ski-jump carriers are much less 
capable than catapult-equipped carriers. In addition to limitations inherent in a 
rotary-wing AEW platform, fighters operating from ski-jump carriers are limited 
in the fuel and weapons they can carry and are generally relegated to providing 
air defense to the battle group rather than acting as offensive weapon systems. 
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However, this does not mean the PLAN’s future aircraft carrier force poses no 
potential problem for U.S. forces in conflicts in or around China’s near seas. In 
a regional conflict, land-based strike aircraft such as the JH-7A, H-6, J-11B, and 
Su-30MKK/MK2, as well as conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, could be 
called on for strikes, negating the need for the carrier’s air group itself to project 
offensive force, in the American style. In this case, a carrier and its air group 
would complement land-based aircraft, extending situational awareness and air 
defense in the region. PLA doctrine clearly sees air cover for landing operations in 
regional conflicts in areas like the South China Sea as one of the primary wartime 
missions for PLAN aircraft carriers. Both the 2000 and 2006 editions of Science of 
Campaigns discuss the importance of carriers in providing air cover to amphibi-
ous invasions of islands and reefs beyond the range of land-based aircraft.53 The 
1998 book Winning High-Tech Local Wars: Must Reading for Military Officers 
states that one or two aircraft carrier groups should protect amphibious forces 
engaged in long-distance landings stationed 100–150 nautical miles from the 
shore.54 While no conflict in the South China Sea is imminent, statements from 
Beijing asserting China’s sovereignty over islands and their surrounding waters, 
in response to concern in Washington over competing maritime claims, have 
brought increased international attention to this area of key Chinese national 
interest.55 Should the United States find itself involved in a conflict with China in 
the South China Sea, one or two PLAN carriers in the Spratly Islands providing 
air cover to landing operations and to surface combatants would complicate the 
efforts of U.S. forces to achieve air and sea superiority in the battle space.
Further, while future PLAN carriers might not provide much in the way of 
offensive strike potential against U.S. carrier groups, they could still play a key 
role in bringing combat power to bear. Admiral Liu Huaqing provided a specific 
geographic definition for Near Seas Defense, but some PLAN officers view it as 
an evolving concept that now extends farther out into the Pacific Ocean, as the 
PLAN’s ability to operate its forces with “the requisite amount of support and 
security” increases.56 As Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhang stated in April 2009,
The Chinese navy does not need to fight in the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean 
or at the center of the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese navy follows a proactive defense 
strategy. However, in order to defend the security of the national territory, marine 
territories, and the waters within the First Island Chain, this proactive defense strat-
egy does not mean that our navy only stays within the First Island Chain. Only when 
the Chinese navy goes beyond the First Island Chain, will China be able to expand its 
strategic depth of security for its marine territories.57 
Near Seas Defense is about more than operations within the First Island 
Chain. If China’s near seas are to be truly secure, the reach of the PLA’s aerospace 
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forces must extend beyond it, must be able to engage hostile forces as far out to 
sea as possible. While Air Raid and Anti–Air Raid in the 21st Century does not 
specifically call for employment of aircraft carriers in a counterstrike role, it does 
envision fighter units providing air cover to surface ships and the surface ships, in 
turn, attacking aircraft carriers.58 Even China’s most modern land-based fighter 
aircraft cannot provide persistent air cover beyond the First Island Chain, but an 
aircraft carrier employed in support of counterstrike operations could provide 
air and antisubmarine (ASW) protection to surface ships in order to get them 
within weapons range of a U.S. carrier group. 
SIGNIFICANT WEAKNESSES
The modernization of China’s aerospace forces—with an array of advanced fighter, 
bomber, and strike aircraft, conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, and an 
aircraft carrier program—is impressive and should be taken seriously. But in less 
glamorous programs the PLA’s aerospace forces experience significant shortfalls 
that impede their ability to conduct comprehensive counterstrike operations. 
Such capability gaps affect maritime helicopters, land-based maritime patrol and 
ASW aircraft, and airborne tankers. 
Naval helicopters arguably constitute the single most glaring weakness within 
the PLAN today. The navy employs a mix of helicopters for ASW, search and 
rescue (SAR), and general utility; it has found them invaluable in counterpiracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden. However, the PLAN’s current rotary-wing fleet 
is wholly inadequate to support its force structure now, let alone in the future. 
The PLAN now operates between thirty and thirty-five frigates and destroyers 
equipped with landing pads and hangars. Other ships equipped with helicopter 
facilities include the aviation-training ship Shichang, the two Type 071 LPDs 
(amphibious transport docks) and their sister ships under construction, the 
Type 920 hospital ship, and the navy’s three most modern at-sea-replenishment 
ships.59 The PLAN’s inventory of helicopters is approximately thirty-five. Only 
about twenty—the domestically produced Z-9s and Russian-made Ka-28s that 
perform ASW and SAR—are capable of operating from destroyers and frigates, 
though there is deck and hangar space for thirty or thirty-five. Additionally, 
about fifteen medium-sized Z-8s are capable of operating from larger ships, such 
as the LPDs and the hospital ship.60 
This situation will only get worse as the PLAN adds more helicopter-capable 
surface ships to the fleet. Aside from the carrier program, a second LPD recently 
joined the fleet; also, the press reports that China plans to develop the Type 
081 helicopter assault ship (LHD), similar in size and capability to the French 
Mistral-class LHD, approximately half the size of a U.S. Navy Wasp-class LHD.61 
The PLAN’s most modern frigate and destroyer classes, such as the Jiangkai II 
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guided-missile frigate and the Luyang II guided-missile destroyer, have helicopter 
facilities and are replacing older ships that cannot operate rotary-wing aircraft. 
The PLAN, accordingly, needs to add a substantial number of rotary-wing 
aircraft. This will likely be accomplished in the near term through the purchase 
of additional Ka-28s from Russia and production of additional Z-9s and Z-8s.62 
However, these solutions are not optimal, as China prefers domestic weapon sys-
tems to foreign purchases, the Z-9 is limited in capability owing to its small size, 
and the Z-8 suffers from engine problems. A potential future solution is a milita-
rized variant of the Z-15, China’s coproduced variant of the Eurocopter EC-175. 
However, the basic commercial variant of this platform is not expected to begin 
production until 2012; specialized military variants will thus not see production 
for several years at least.63 The acquisition of new platforms and the organizing, 
training, and equipping of an expanded rotary-wing force will take a significant 
amount of time and effort. {FIG ABOUT HERE}
Another weakness for PLA aerospace forces in the near seas is in special-mission 
aircraft, where a shortage of modern platforms and small overall numbers create 
significant capabilities gaps in maritime patrol and ASW. The PLAN operates a 
small number of patrol and AEW aircraft based on the four-engine turboprop 
Y-8 airframe, as well as a few SH-5 amphibious patrol aircraft.64 All were acquired 
in the 1980s and 1990s, and, while serviceable, none are up to Western standards. 
It appears that the PLAN is taking delivery of a small number of Y-8W/KJ-200 
AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft. The addition of the 
modern KJ-200 will add to the navy’s maritime surveillance capabilities, improv-
ing the ability of its fighters and strike aircraft to operate far out over water.65 
Also, the PLAN does not now possess a land-based fixed-wing ASW capability 
at all. Given that absence and insufficient numbers of helicopters, ASW repre-
sents a significant weakness for the ability of the PLAN and China’s aerospace 
forces in general to defend China’s near seas. The problem is particularly acute 
as the PLAN seeks to expand its near-seas defensive operations into deep waters 
beyond the First Island Chain into the Philippine Sea and the southern part of the 
South China Sea, where its forces could find themselves vulnerable to hostile sub-
marines in wartime. Internet reports claim the PLAN is developing the Y-8Q, an 
ASW aircraft similar to the U.S. P-3C, but (assuming this program exists) it will 
take several years for even a small number of airframes to become operational.66 
The PLA’s aerospace forces also suffer from a shortage of airborne tankers. The 
PLAAF now only possesses about ten tankers, based on the H-6 bomber, and the 
PLAN only three.67 While the PLAAF’s and PLAN’s J-8II and J-10 fighters are ca-
pable of refueling from the H-6 tanker, and fighter units equipped with refueling 
booms conduct over-water aerial-refueling exercises, the small number of tankers 
and the limited capacity of the H-6 make this of limited value.68 Using PLAAF 
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and PLAN tankers to give fighter aircraft added range would enhance the overall 
capability of a strike package in a specific tactical situation, but in practice the 
overall ability of the PLAAF and PLAN fighter forces to contribute to the expan-
sion of China’s strategic depth beyond the First Island Chain is constrained by 
an insufficiency of airframes. Making matters worse, a 2005 contract with Russia 
for between four and eight Il-78 tankers (along with some thirty-four Il-76 cargo 
aircraft) has not materialized, although rumors persist that it could be renegoti-
ated.69 Also, China’s aircraft industry is not now producing an airframe suitable 
for conversion to aerial refueling. The failure to procure or develop such larger 
tanker aircraft means that China’s Flanker-variant fighters cannot be refueled in 
the air, significantly limiting their usefulness. 
{LINE-SPACE}
As the PLA continues to modernize its forces and develop its counterstrike 
doctrine, its ability to expand its operations in support of China’s Near Seas 
Defense strategy will increase. A significant element of this growing counter-
strike capability resides in the aerospace forces of the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second 
Artillery. With an increasingly capable inventory of fighter and strike aircraft, 
conventional ballistic missiles, ground- and air-launched cruise missiles, and 
eventually aircraft carriers, the ability of the PLA’s aerospace forces to threaten 
U.S. naval and air forces and bases in the western and Central Pacific will grow. 
Additionally, aerospace systems not discussed here, such as unmanned aerial ve-
hicles and satellites, also have important roles in the development and growth of 
the PLA’s counterstrike forces. However, the PLA is not without its weaknesses in 
this area. A shortage of antisubmarine helicopters and fixed-wing ASW aircraft 
is a serious impediment to the PLAN’s ability to operate in deep water. The lack 
of airborne tankers limits the capacity of air force and navy fighter aircraft to 
sustain operations beyond the First Island Chain and in the southern part of the 
South China Sea. Finally, dominated as it is by what some officers call the “great 
infantry” concept, the PLA is inhibited in its ability to integrate its counterstrike 
capabilities into a joint force that is greater than the sum of its parts. While the 
PLA’s capacity to extend its strategic depth in the conduct of near-seas defensive 
operations is impressive and has grown significantly over the past decade, weak-
nesses and capabilities gaps still exist, and these will continue to limit China’s 
ability to defend its near seas. 
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PHASE ZERO
How China Exploits It, Why the United States Does Not
Scott D. McDonald, Brock Jones, and Jason M. Frazee
n October 2006 General Charles Wald, Deputy Commander U.S. European Com-
mand, brought “Phase Zero” into the joint lexicon with the publication of an 
article, “The Phase Zero Campaign.”1 Over the last five years the concept of taking 
coordinated action in peacetime to affect the strategic environment has become 
widely accepted and is now integrated into theater campaign plans. These activi-
ties focus on building capacity of partners and influencing potential adversaries 
to avoid war. In contrast, Chinese strategic culture has encouraged taking actions 
to defeat an enemy prior to the onset of hostilities for two and a half millennia. 
This accounts, in part, for the manner in which the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) applies the elements of national power in the steady-state environment to 
advance its strategic interests. While the United States remains focused on pre-
paring the environment and building partners, Chinese strategic culture states a 
preference for defeating an adversary before what Western thought thinks of as 
war has begun. This outlook ultimately places the PRC in a position of strategic 
advantage. To meet future challenges like that posed by the PRC, the United 
States should better integrate Phase Zero with contingency (crisis) planning, then 
design and execute operations in the steady-state environment that go beyond 
avoiding war and attempt to settle conflicts in accordance with the national in-
terests of the United States.
It is important to remember that the fundamental purpose of the military 
is war, which Clausewitz defines as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do 
our will.”2 If the purpose of Phase Zero is to be changed to reaching a decision
—winning—in the steady-state environment, it must be discussed not only in 
terms of bending the enemy’s will but as including all components of national 
power—diplomatic, informational, and economic, as well as military—that can 
be brought to bear against an adversary.
I
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U.S. military planners have used the term “Phase Zero” for only five years, and 
it has no equivalent in Chinese strategic tradition. However, as this article aims 
to influence the manner in which U.S. planners approach Phase Zero, the phrase 
will be used to discuss both U.S. and Chinese thinking on how to employ the 
instruments of national power prior to armed combat.
From that basis, this article will analyze how Chinese strategic culture encour-
ages decisive action prior to the onset of hostilities. Recent PRC actions will then 
be examined in this light to illustrate how a more decisive concept of Phase Zero 
can be implemented. The strategic culture of the United States will then be exam-
ined to understand why it has not more fully incorporated the concept of Phase 
Zero into planning and operations, despite the welcome the concept has enjoyed 
in the context of the operations against Islamic fundamentalists.
THE CHINESE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
The seeds of Chinese strategic culture were sown in the chaos of the Warring 
States period (475 to 221 BC). This epoch of continuous warfare saw seven states 
compete for dominance. They enlisted the aid of administrators and strategists 
who would eventually catalog the principles that came to epitomize Chinese 
political and military thought. These documents retain their relevance today, not 
only because of the longevity of Chinese civilization but because they are still 
read by, and influence, PRC decision makers.3
The Chinese intellectual tradition developed separately from that of the West 
and approaches the world from a different perspective. As one Western scholar 
notes, “Instead of seeking to pick out common features that are more or less fixed, 
more or less stable, it sets out to explore the limits of the possibilities of change.”4 
In fact, it is in this very notion of change that much of traditional Chinese strate-
gic thinking rests. Central to this understanding is the concept of shi (勢).5 Shi can 
be translated as “power,” “momentum,” “tendency,” or “state of affairs.”6 Another 
Western scholar, attempting to convey all its contextual meanings, translates it 
as “strategic configuration of power.”7 This is sufficient when discussing troop 
formations and physical force but seems to fall short in passages such as “[The 
king] displays his form but conceals his nature. He is like the heights of Heaven, 
which cannot be perceived. . . . If he should execute but does not, great thieves will 
appear. If strategic military power [shi] is not exercised, enemy states will grow 
strong.”8 This passage from The Six Secret Teachings of Tai Gong suggests that shi 
is more than bringing forces to bear but includes an existent potential that may 
or may not be employed by the king. In fact, it is in the sense of potential in any 
situation for change and development that shi helps shed light on how Chinese 
strategic culture views operations in what the West has come to call Phase Zero.
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Most confusing from the Western perspective is the sense that this latent po-
tential naturally comes to be. Various Chinese philosophical traditions admonish 
their followers for trying to alter the potentiality of a situation. In fact, attempting 
to change the future is often viewed as disadvantageous.9 If this is the case, how is 
strategy to be understood at all? How can there be any strategy at all? 
Mencius, who was arguably the most influential disciple of Confucius and 
whose teachings were influential in the development of Confucian thought, al-
ludes to this apparent dichotomy in his discussion of the spirit.10 He argues that 
the spirit must be nourished and protected but that one should not “try to assist 
its natural growth.” To illustrate he draws an analogy to a man who, in attempting 
to improve the size of his crop, ruins his corn by pulling on it. However, “those 
who think it useless to feed their spirit and simply let it alone are as it were ne-
glecting to weed their crops.”11 In other words, one must take action, but by nur-
turing the already developing situation and establishing the conditions necessary 
for the desired outcome, not by intervening directly in the process—that is, the 
potential of the corn’s natural growth.
To intervene as little as possible, one must intervene as early as possible. One 
gets a sense of this in Sunzi’s admonition that “the highest realization of warfare 
is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their 
army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.”12 By acting on a situation 
as early as possible—and as far away from the ultimate objective as possible—
one achieves the desired result with least effort. Sunzi also argues that he who 
excels at warfare “directs his measures toward victory, conquering those who are 
already defeated.”13 The general knows the outcome because he has read the situ-
ation correctly and influenced it well before battle is engaged. This sheds light on 
Sunzi’s often repeated dictum that the best general wins without fighting.14 He 
has intervened early enough in the situation that it develops toward his desired 
result without requiring a resort to armed force.
This sense is echoed by the Daoist philosopher Laozi. He specifically advises 
action as early in a process as possible, because it will be easier then to gain the 
desired result. A master of the Dao “anticipates things that are difficult while 
they are easy, and does things that would become great while they are small. All 
difficult things in the world are sure to arise from a previous state in which they 
were easy, and all great things from one in which they were small. Therefore the 
sage, while he never does what is great, is able on that account to accomplish the 
greatest things.”15 
He also saw the value in allowing the course of events to tend naturally toward 
a desired end state. However, “the sage” does intervene in the situation in order to 
place himself in a position to benefit from that tendency. Laozi uses the analogy 
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of a river, arguing that a state becomes great by placing itself downstream, where 
small states will incline naturally toward it: “thus it is that a great state, by con-
descending to small states, gains them for itself.”16 In other words, he advocates 
pretending to be humble to obscure one’s true intent from the adversary and 
allow it to move toward one of its own accord.
In sum, China’s strategic culture encourages intervening subtly in a situation 
long before armed conflict arrives to alter the strategic landscape. Or, to translate 
the concept into a Western context, by laying the groundwork in Phase Zero 
the strategic landscape can be altered so that the objectives of the state can be 
achieved, and with minimal fighting.
THE PRC AND PHASE ZERO OPERATIONS 
Examining a nation’s strategic culture is only useful if the knowledge gained aids 
in understanding actions taken by the modern state. Such an analysis requires 
examining recent PRC activities for signs that its leaders are attempting to nur-
ture the strategic environment through diverse actions that tend to develop the 
situation to their strategic advantage. Analyzing these actions from the perspec-
tive of the components of national power is useful in framing this analysis for a 
Western audience.
Diplomatic. The PRC has adeptly used the art of diplomatic protest. Such has 
been the case when Beijing protests U.S. and South Korean combined naval ex-
ercises in waters west of the Korean Peninsula. On more than one occasion the 
United States has acceded to PRC demands by either not deploying a carrier 
strike group or moving an exercise to the East Sea, off Korea’s east coast.17 Simply 
by nudging with a little rhetoric, Beijing gets the United States to comply with 
its interests and apparently to abandon its long-held principle of freedom of 
navigation. In the case mentioned the United States did eventually hold exercises 
in the Yellow Sea, but the fact that it first deferred to PRC interests has poten-
tial negative implications for the confidence allies have in the will of the United 
States to stand by them when the PRC disagrees.
The PRC has also effectively used diplomacy to limit the defensive capa-
bilities of Taiwan. In 2009 President Barack Obama approved six billion dol-
lars’ worth of arms sales to Taiwan.18 However, this sale did not include several 
items specifically requested by Taiwan and that Taiwan deems necessary to fill 
critical capability shortfalls. While the Taiwan Relations Act legally obliges the 
U.S. government to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense 
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a suf-
ficient self-defense capability,” the nature and timing of that support seem to be 
increasingly influenced by PRC pressure.19 While Washington publicly maintains 
a policy of not consulting the Chinese on arms sales to Taiwan, it is difficult to 
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view persistent delays in selling articles of a defensive nature as anything other 
than attempts to dodge their ire.
PRC diplomacy has also sought to encumber the United States through its 
support of North Korea and Iran. When it became apparent the South Korean 
corvette Cheonan had been sunk by a North Korean torpedo, the PRC remained 
tight-lipped, refusing to condemn the act or even to acknowledge North Korean 
involvement. Neither did Beijing issue a rebuke to North Korea for its artillery 
barrage of the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong. The PRC has also been suc-
cessful in undermining diplomatic efforts toward Iran, consistently opposing U.S. 
or multilateral actions to stop the development of Iranian nuclear weapons.20 
Taken together, this support of countries directly opposing the United States 
complicates the strategic environment in two ways. First, it requires Washington 
to continue to devote attention to these problems rather than to the disruption 
of the PRC’s strategic momentum. Second, should U.S.-PRC hostilities occur, it 
would complicate the military problem for the United States, which would have 
to worry always about what North Korea or Iran might do on its flank. 
In this light, it is hard to consider the Six Party Talks on North Korean nuclear 
weapons as other than a Beijing diplomatic victory. Seizing the opportunity to 
step onto the world stage and lead a multilateral process, the PRC has managed 
to gain praise from the Western world for contributing to international processes, 
thus fitting the West’s picture of a responsible stakeholder. However, the Chinese 
have most to gain from the Six Party process by keeping it going, thereby prevent-
ing resolution of one of the main security concerns of the United States, as well 
as keeping the world focused on North Korea rather than the PRC.
Informational. On 13 February 2011, USA Today published the results of a Gal-
lup Poll finding that 54 percent of Americans think the People’s Republic of 
China is the world’s leading economy, compared to 32 percent who think—
accurately—that the leading economy is still the United States. The fact itself 
may be irrelevant, but the sentiment speaks to the power of perceptions that the 
PRC is trying to influence. An understanding of this helps explain why the PRC 
has recently made courting and hosting high-profile international events a mat-
ter of national policy. The pageantry and grandeur of the 2008 Olympic opening 
ceremony in Beijing is the most obvious example of how the PRC is using these 
events in an attempt to have world opinion ratify its ascendance.
Marketing oneself to the world, however, is not the only goal of the informa-
tional component of national power. Even the manner in which information 
is disseminated has an impact on the strategic environment. For example, the 
People’s Liberation Army Air Force chose to demonstrate its new J-20 fighter 
while U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates was visiting Beijing.21 Choosing to 
display this new capability while ostensibly reestablishing military-to-military 
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relations with the United States sends a message to the world that the Chinese 
are conducting negotiations from a position of strength. It is not a stretch to 
conclude that it is the Chinese who are determining the tenor and pace of the 
bilateral relationship—a conclusion that neighboring states may well consider 
when determining their own policies relative to the PRC.
In the Internet age, controlling information is becoming as important as 
influencing opinions. Mounting evidence suggests not only that the PRC is 
very interested in this sort of activity but that it is behind many sophisticated 
computer-network operations. Attacks widely believed to have originated in the 
PRC have targeted diplomats from the United States and partners, politicians, 
human-rights campaigners, military networks, and corporations.22
Two Internet incidents in 2010 reveal attempts by an unknown actor to ma-
nipulate the very means by which information is transmitted. “In one, mass In-
ternet traffic, particularly that with U.S. military addresses, was routed through 
China for about twenty minutes. In another, Internet users in the United States 
and Chile found it impossible to contact certain Web sites that the Chinese gov-
ernment has deemed to be politically unacceptable to its own population.”23
While responsibility for the diversions has not been confirmed—it is often 
difficult to pinpoint the exact sources of Internet operations—if the PRC’s army 
of hackers can effectively control the world’s Internet routing, even if only briefly, 
the PRC will possess the capability to manage the information that its adversar-
ies receive. Even the integrity of one’s own information might then be called into 
doubt. 
Military. Faced with a qualitative disadvantage in conventional forces relative to 
the United States, the PRC has spent decades developing and producing a wide 
array of ballistic, cruise, and air-defense missiles that could avoid U.S. strengths, 
put assets at risk, and be relatively cheap to protect or replace. “For this reason, 
missiles have permeated the doctrine of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for 
every important kind of operation, from denial to blockade, and the PLA officer 
corps views them more and more as the way to level the playing field against a 
superior adversary.”24 A case in point is the antisatellite missile test of 11 January 
2007, wherein U.S. satellite command, control, and intelligence systems were put 
under threat.25 Now that these Chinese investments are bearing fruit, the strate-
gic balance of the western Pacific is changing. U.S. forces can be put at risk earlier 
in a regional conflict than was once possible, and many of their technological 
advantages are negated, by inexpensive missiles. The likelihood of rapid U.S. vic-
tory is seriously reduced and its probable cost increased. This potential affects 
the calculations both of a United States considering war and of regional nations 
considering accommodation.
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Of course, “soft power” influences the strategic landscape as well. With the 
launch of its own ten-thousand-ton hospital ship—pennant number 866—the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy has established a means of projecting “soft power” 
around the world.26 This capability may increase the PRC’s leverage by allowing 
it to display goodwill in places where previously it could offer only resource ex-
traction. This is a tool that the United States has used to great effect regionally, 
in part because no one else could employ it as quickly or efficiently. The hospital 
ship and new amphibious ships could, over time, aid the PRC in its desire to be 
seen as a U.S. peer in the region.
Economic. While there is debate over the actual role of the overvalued yuan (the 
PRC currency) in either the PRC’s strategic calculus or the economy of the Unit-
ed States, it has become a focal point of U.S. economic policy making. The Unit-
ed States has repeatedly argued the PRC is manipulating its currency to maintain 
leverage over the global market.27 Perhaps the most valuable part of the debate 
from the PRC’s perspective is that it keeps the United States focused there while 
Beijing pursues its own development strategy. Additionally, the perception that 
PRC markets are essential to U.S. businesses shapes economic calculations that 
reach into the debate on policy toward the PRC. For example, Boeing is one of 
the PRC’s largest suppliers of aviation technology, including half its commercial 
aircraft.28 It might seem that this should provide leverage to the United States, 
but instead it is Beijing that has been willing to use such linkages to threaten 
U.S. businesses. This occurred in the wake of the January 2010 announcement 
of arms sales to Taiwan, following which the PRC made an explicit threat to stop 
trading with any U.S. business that sold weapons to the island.29 
The Strategy. When the actions outlined above are taken as a whole, a strategy 
starts to emerge. Actions across the components of national power taken by the 
PRC coalesce into a single strategic momentum whereby Taiwan and its sur-
rounds are being isolated not just militarily but in the minds of decision makers 
in Washington and the western Pacific. The Chinese leaders are attempting to 
create the perception that the PRC is locally too strong, allies are too few, eco-
nomic and military costs are too high, and victory is too difficult to risk coming 
to Taiwan’s aid. The goal is to convince the United States to decide not to defend 
Taiwan, so that it can be easily absorbed—peacefully if possible, in a one-on-one 
battle if necessary. 
Anomalies. Despite the building strategic momentum outlined above, over the 
last two years the PRC has made several overt moves that appear to discard its 
strategic tradition in favor of a more overt and aggressive foreign policy. PRC 
vessels harassed USNS Impeccable on 8 March 2009.30 Then, repeated ramming 
of a Japan Coast Guard vessel by a Chinese fishing boat on 7 September 2010, in 
132
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/22
 130  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
waters administered by Japan but claimed by the PRC, became a blatant display 
of bullying when the PRC cut off rare-earth exports to Japan in retaliation for 
the arrest of the boat’s captain.31 
Though some might argue that these are merely examples of the PRC leader-
ship attempting to seize the initiative in situations that had already developed 
naturally to their own advantage, it could also be argued that the reaction of 
the United States and regional countries to this new assertiveness shows that the 
PRC would have been better off sticking to its cultural heritage and continuing 
to allow the world geostrategic situation to develop in its favor. In fact, recent 
public statements by Chen Bingde, chief of the PLA General Staff, emphasizing 
the large lead the United States enjoys in military technology and China’s weak-
nesses suggest that the PRC realizes it overreached and is attempting to return to 
a more measured path.32 
U.S. STRATEGIC CULTURE, DOCTRINE, AND 
PHASE ZERO OPERATIONS
Since General Wald brought the term “Phase Zero” into common usage five 
years ago, it has become a standard part of U.S. joint doctrine and is routinely 
discussed by operational planners and commanders. However, implementation 
falls short of meeting Phase Zero threats, such as those posed by the PRC. This 
failure is due to a combination of U.S. strategic culture, a doctrinal disconnect, 
and the tendency to refight the current conflict. 
U.S. Strategic Culture
In his well-known 1973 work The American Way of War, Russell Weigley argues 
that U.S. strategy has historically concentrated on destruction of enemy forces, 
not on the larger political context. Prior to the Second World War, he states, “the 
United States usually possessed no national strategy for the employment of force 
or the threat of force to attain political ends.”33 While the U.S. military has re-
cently refocused on small wars and counterinsurgency campaigns, its concern has 
been tactical. “Shaping” operations normally planned in Phase Zero (as discussed 
below) are focused on strengthening local populations against insurgents or their 
influence. Thus, two analysts argue that the question driving U.S. strategy in the 
future will be “where, when, and how America should help partners and allies 
build the capacity to defend and govern themselves in a legitimate and just and 
therefore sustainable manner.”34 
In fact, this idea that Phase Zero primarily supports partners has established a 
false dichotomy between Phase Zero operations and the military conflict in U.S. 
military thought. Criticism of the American inability to adapt to the “limited 
war” of Iraq and Afghanistan often faults the U.S. military for its difficulty in 
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“limited force” peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. The subtext 
of this criticism is a bias toward seeing conflict only in terms of the exercise of 
armed force.35 This is a reflection of the U.S. strategic narrative, which sees a 
battle of wills only as a competition of armed force, in the Clausewitzian tra-
dition, the corollary of which is to see limited-force operations only in terms 
of nonconflict. Consequently, only before or after the conflict does the United 
States focus on hearts, minds, and the distribution of humanitarian aid. What is 
missing is a concept of actively bending the will of potential adversaries without 
the resort to armed conflict. In short, because the United States views a battle of 
wills only in terms of armed force and has been preoccupied with strengthening 
populations against irregular threats, it has failed to recognize the value of the 
Phase Zero concept for bending an adversary’s will.
One scholar argues that as a result of America’s success in the Pacific for the 
last sixty years, individual service cultures now reinforce the idea that what has 
worked will work, that there is no need to change course. As a result of this 
conviction, the U.S. military may have become inflexible in the face of emerging 
threats and unprepared for the Pacific’s evolving security environment.36 
Doctrinal Disconnect
Further hampering the ability of the United States to counter the PRC’s strategic 
advantage is its own joint doctrine, which in its present incarnation encourages 
a bifurcation between Phase Zero and the rest of a campaign. While the United 
States has made advances in understanding how all elements of national power 
impact the operational environment, there is an artificial line between preconflict 
and conflict scenarios.
While formal theater campaign planning attempts to build an integrated ap-
proach to building partner capacity and deterring adversaries, it is not designed 
to counter an adversary’s own advances. A recent requirement to nest contin-
gency (crisis) plans in theater campaign plans appears to be a direct attempt to 
integrate Phase Zero into contingency planning, but this is still not the case in 
terms of doctrine.37 This is because the pertinent doctrinal publication, Joint 
Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (or JP 5-0), defines and limits Phase 
Zero operations as follows:
[Phase Zero operations] are executed continuously with the intent to enhance 
international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined 
national strategic and strategic military objectives. They are designed to assure suc-
cess by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and 
allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coali-
tion operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and 
providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.38
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This definition misses any sense of acting in accordance with a contingency 
plan to change the adversary’s will. In fact, JP 5-0 goes farther: “Planning that 
supports most ‘shaping’ requirements typically occurs in the context of day-to-
day security cooperation, and combatant commands may incorporate Phase 0 
activities and tasks into the SCP [security cooperation plan]. Thus, these require-
ments are beyond the scope of JP 5-0.”39 In short, the security cooperation and 
contingency planning are separated. This may make sense if Phase Zero is viewed 
only as a means for shaping the environment. However, if Phase Zero is truly part 
of resolving a contingency in one’s favor, it must be part of the planning for the 
contingency; so actions taken in Phase Zero are aimed at disrupting the adver-
sary’s plans and bending his will toward the desired end state.
The Obscurity of the Present
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the U.S. military to remember 
a forgotten tradition in small and irregular wars: the use of methods other than 
force to influence the strategic situation. However, because the current campaign 
focuses on counterinsurgency, the methods of influence revolve around shaping 
the environment by building support among the people. While this is important, 
it has led to the perception that Phase Zero, per se, is simply a tool for preparing 
an environment or building support among a populace, not a means of attack-
ing an adversary’s will. As has been noted, this movement in perception “occurs 
below the level of grand strategy and is largely reactive. The changes focus on the 
major problems at hand: large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization opera-
tions like those in Iraq and global efforts to track and locate known and suspected 
terrorists.”40 
Robert Gates stated this explicitly in 2007, as secretary of defense:
We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contempo-
rary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in na-
ture, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less 
a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, 
adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.41
One could argue Gates correctly identified the emerging nature of warfare and 
even adversaries as targets of shaping operations. However, by de-emphasizing 
“imposing one’s will,” which Clausewitz considered the fundamental element of 
war, he separated shaping operations from their most important role—defeat 
of an adversary in advance of armed conflict. Gates’s position suffered from a 
view of future warfare as a reflection of the last conflict. In fact, one analysis of 
the U.S. military’s use of culture notes the recent celebrity enjoyed by “culture” 
as a symptom of Washington’s willingness to throw money at almost anyone or 
anything that offers a solution to “contemporary problems.”42 
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Even General Wald’s introductory discussion of Phase Zero focused on hearts 
and minds of the populace.43 While this appeared to make sense in the preemp-
tive counterinsurgency campaign that U.S. European Command was running in 
Africa at the time the article was written, it does not actually lay the foundation for 
integrating Phase Zero into the resolution of contingencies in favor of the United 
States. As Wald noted, the European Command’s ultimate goal for Phase Zero is 
“building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, 
and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts.”44 While preventing or limiting 
conflict is an admirable goal, it is not useful if a conflict is already under way.
{LINE-SPACE}
What emerges from this study is a PRC whose leaders are drawing on a strategic 
culture that emphasizes acting early and subtly to manipulate adversaries into 
positions of disadvantage. They hope in this way to win strategic victories and 
bend the wills of their adversaries without ever engaging in physical combat. At 
a minimum, they hope to engage in combat with the upper hand. Standing in 
the way of the PRC’s objectives is the United States, a country with the world’s 
preeminent military but prevented from taking decisive action in peacetime by 
its own culture, habits, and doctrine. This bias prevents decision makers in the 
U.S. military and government from seeing PRC operations as part of a conflict in 
process, and it cedes the strategic momentum to an active adversary. 
While the United States has recognized the importance of Phase Zero, it has 
failed to take full advantage of the concept, because it has not integrated the 
principle with the idea of bending an adversary’s will. To do so, the United States 
should redefine Phase Zero as follows: acting across the components of national 
power during steady-state conditions in order to compel the adversary to do our 
will, thereby avoiding the need for combat or entering combat under more favorable 
conditions. This definition includes actions taken to support allies, partners, and 
even friendly populations, as the ultimate aim of such actions is to convince ad-
versaries that these groups are both capable of supporting us and willing to do so.
By redefining Phase Zero in this manner, the United States will force itself to 
reconsider the way it acts in the steady state, as well as the way it evaluates ac-
tions taken by others. This definition more fully integrates the concept of Phase 
Zero into the phase structure of contingency (or crisis) planning, emphasizing 
that the goal is to resolve a contingency successfully, not just prevent or limit it. 
This change not only encourages U.S. military planners to integrate day-to-day 
operations better with possible contingencies but facilitates the recognition that 
there are those in the world who are attempting to use their own understandings 
of strategy to undermine the will of the United States during peacetime. With this 
recognition, planners will be intellectually armed to take the actions required to 
disrupt the strategic momentum of those who wish the nation harm.
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Commanding Officers and Personal Misconduct 
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The supreme quality for leadership is unquestionably integrity. Without 
it, no real success is possible.
DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER
he U.S. Navy has an integrity problem in the ranks of its commanding of-
ficers (COs). Consider these headlines: “Cruiser CO Relieved for ‘Cruelty.’”1 
“CO Fired, Charged with Solicitation.”2 “CO of Attack Sub Fired for ‘Drunken-
ness.’”3 These are just a few cases in a recent deluge of early reliefs of “skippers.” 
In 2010, twenty-three Navy COs were relieved of command and “detached for 
cause,” an enormous increase over previous years. The trend continues: twenty-
one commanding officers were fired in 2011 as of the end of October.4 Even more 
worrisome is the fact that a large and increasing percentage of those dismissals 
are due to personal misconduct, such as sexual harassment, drunkenness, and 
fraternization. Although (as far as we can tell) over 97 percent of the Navy’s 
commanding officers conduct themselves honorably, the increasing number of 
those who do not raises concerns that the Navy must address. Alarms should be 
sounding at the highest levels of Navy leadership, but 
a review of recent literature reveals only a trickle of 
discussion on the subject of personal misconduct by 
military commanders. Instead of calling the service to 
action, a Navy spokesman said in January 2011 that 
there was “no indication that the reliefs are the result 
of any systemic problem.”5 
The premise of this article is that this is a systemic 
problem, that although the number of offenders is low, 
it is too high. The excessive (and increasing) number 
of COs fired for personal misconduct is symptomatic 
of cultural issues within the Navy and of a confusing 
T
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ethical context in society, combined with a failure to set effectively and uphold 
an ethical standard within the service. The Navy needs to make adjustments in 
priority, policy, training, and personnel processes in order to stem the tide of 
personal misconduct by leaders. As a new Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
ends the first year of his tour of command, this article opens the door for debate 
and reexamination of the Navy’s policies, standards for command, and ethical 
foundations. 
While the percentage of misconduct seems small, the impact is of such a 
magnitude that this issue absolutely must be addressed, and the Navy has demon-
strated that it can remedy this type of problem. Consider that in 2003 the Navy’s 
aviation mishap rate was 1.89 mishaps per hundred thousand hours flown and 
had hovered around that value for several years after decades of steady improve-
ment. At that time the secretary of defense directed that we reduce the mishap 
rate by 50 percent, because even that small figure included numerous costly 
mishaps that could and should have been prevented.6 At the secretary’s direction, 
Navy leadership undertook a fundamental effort to improve aviation safety. By 
2010 the priority and emphasis given by the leadership had dropped the rate to 
0.94 mishaps per hundred thousand flight hours, saving millions of dollars and 
dozens of lives.7 Similarly, today the number of COs fired for personal miscon-
duct is too high, and we can and must do better—but doing so will require that 
Navy leadership makes it a priority.
THE DATA: BACKGROUND
This article is based on data provided to the author by the Career Progression 
Division of the Naval Personnel Command. The data included administrative 
information and causes for dismissal of all commanding officers who were re-
lieved while in command from 1999 through 2010 and for whom “detachment 
for cause” (DFC) procedures had been initiated and approved. Because of the 
administrative burden of the DFC process, senior leaders may choose not to 
implement it after a CO has been fired, if the situation does not require the spe-
cific funding and personnel adjustments for which formal detachment for cause 
provides.8 The actual number of COs fired, then, is significantly larger than the 
DFC numbers cited here, but no comprehensive records exist of firings for which 
DFCs are not processed. The data also listed several officers in command posi-
tions with ranks of lieutenant commander (O-4) and below, which are excluded 
from this analysis. This article is intended to address character failures in more 
senior leaders who have had sufficient time in service to understand clearly the 
standards of command and in whom the Navy had opportunity to identify the 
potential for these failures of character before their consideration for command. 
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There exists a significant gap in the data concerning causes for dismissal. The 
summary information provided to the author indicated causes for dismissal 
by the categories used by the Navy’s Military Personnel Manual: misconduct, a 
significant event, unsatisfactory performance over time, or loss of confidence in 
the officer’s ability to command.9 In the 101 DFCs evaluated, every submission 
cited either “loss of confidence” or a “significant event,” with not one case citing 
misconduct or poor performance over time. In some cases an explanation am-
plified the category assignment; open-source information provided clarification 
in additional cases.10 Ultimately the causes for approximately 20 percent of the 
dismissals for cause cannot be effectively determined from the data and are omit-
ted from the analysis, but the trends are clear enough that valid conclusions may 
be drawn notwithstanding.
Although published literature on the subject is scarce, as noted, this is not 
the first study. In 2004, the Naval Inspector General (IG) conducted an in-depth 
review of COs fired between 1999 and 2004. The IG team had access to and ana-
lyzed information concerning all COs fired in that period, whether DFCs had 
been processed or not, and so produced a more statistically complete picture of 
the situation over that period.11 That study is valuable today as a source of ampli-
fying information and is used below as a basis for comparison. 
THE DATA: NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
Figure 1 presents the total number of DFCs from 1999 through 2010, “broken 
out” between professional causes (e.g., ship groundings or failed inspections) 
and personal misconduct (such as fraternization or alcohol incidents). For the 
purpose of this analysis, such ethical violations as cruelty and abusive leadership 
were grouped with the personal-misconduct causes, whereas more generalized 
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leadership failures, such as poor command climate or ineffective leadership, were 
classified as professional. The superimposed linear-regression trend lines make 
clear that while the rate of CO dismissals for cause for professional reasons is ris-
ing only slightly, there is a marked and increasing trend in the number of reliefs 
for personal and ethical causes. 
Figure 2 breaks out dismissals for cause of commanding officers due to per-
sonal misconduct by community within the Navy: surface, aviation, submarine, 
and other (including special warfare, Medical or Supply Corps, human resources, 
etc.). Each case is categorized by the community of the officer, as opposed to that 
of the command from which he or she was fired. For instance, an aviator serving 
as CO of a ship when relieved was grouped with the aviation community. 
For context, officers from the aviation and surface communities each hold 
about 25 percent of the total number of O-5 and O-6 (commander and captain) 
commands in the Navy, submariners about half as many. The remaining 37 per-
cent are held by officers of other communities. The data seem to indicate that 
the surface and submarine communities are largely responsible for the signifi-
cant spike in 2010, when the number of surface DFCs for personal misconduct 
was nearly an order of magnitude above that for any previous year. As for the 
aviation community, although it does not show an obvious increasing trend, it 
is responsible for the largest total number of dismissals for cause and the largest 
percentage of commanding officers fired.
Figure 3 presents commanding-officer DFCs for personal misconduct by rank. 
About 45 percent of Navy CO billets are for O-6s. Notably, the number of DFCs is 
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as great for captains, who are generally in their second or third command tours, 
as for commanders, even though there are fewer billets in the higher rank. 
Figure 4 compares CO DFCs with respect to shore-duty and sea-duty billets. 
About 62 percent of Navy CO billets are shore duty, involving nondeploying 
commands based ashore. The sea commands are either deploying shore-based 
units or vessels. Both have similar trend lines and raw numbers. Since there are 
fewer sea-duty billets, the similar totals mean that the percentage of commanding 
officers fired from sea-duty billets for personal misconduct is higher than that 
for COs on shore duty. 
We have noted that not all commanding officers fired are administratively 
“dismissed for cause.” Before proceeding, it is worth discussing the actual rela-
tionship between the two numbers. The 2004 Naval IG study listed seventy-eight 
COs fired between 1999 and 2004;12 the DFC data used for this article include 
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only thirty-seven for that period. The difference is partly explained by the scopes 
of the studies—the IG study included O-3 (lieutenant) and O-4 commanding 
officers and officers in charge (typically of very small units), who were specifi-
cally excluded from this analysis. Beyond that, the difference between the study 
results reflects that between the number of fired COs and the number processed 
for DFC. 
Despite the differences, this article points to trends that are consistent with the 
data from the earlier study. The Naval Inspector General reported that 36 percent 
of early reliefs occurred due to personal misconduct; this article records 42 per-
cent of DFCs for the same reason, with an increase over the time span covered.13 
Further, the studies are consistent with regard to the contribution of the various 
communities to early reliefs due to misconduct, with aviation being the most 
prolific and the submarine force the least. So while the numbers differ, a consis-
tent and logical argument emerges that a significant and increasing number of 
COs in the Navy are being fired for personal and ethical failures. 
ACADEMIC ANALYSIS
It is fundamental to understand that the COs fired for misconduct knew their 
actions were out of line. The IG report states that in “nearly every case, the of-
ficers relieved for personal behavior clearly knew the rules.”14 Interviews with 
active and retired flag officers reveal the same. Interviews likewise indicate that 
the COs who were fired did not feel that the rules did not apply to them. Instead, 
either they believed they would not be caught, that Navy leadership would not 
hold them accountable, or that their misconduct was worth risking their career, 
or they chose simply to ignore the consequences entirely. All of these logic trains 
are flawed, and that lack of judgment in our leaders is of concern in itself. But 
the basic issue is this: Why are detachments for cause due to misconduct by Navy 
leaders increasing, and how can we encourage future generations of leaders to 
reverse the unsettling trend?
One contributor to the barrage of incidents of CO misconduct is the fact that 
the personal and professional standards by which commanding officers are judged 
have become stricter in recent years. This fact was highlighted by Kevin Eyer, a re-
tired Navy captain and former Surface Warfare Officer, who cites a litany of cases 
in the 1980s in which abusive use of power and even alcohol-related arrests were 
ignored as long as the officers involved were effective in terms of accomplishing 
the mission.15 Few familiar with the Navy over the past twenty years are likely to 
dispute the point that actions once overlooked are today grounds for DFC. 
Is it right that the standards have changed? Yes, because the mission of today’s 
Navy demands tighter standards. Captain Eyer notes that he drew his examples 
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from the years of the Cold War;16 the mission of the Navy then was to be prepared 
to defeat the Soviets at sea and maintain freedom of navigation around the world. 
Today, the Navy’s missions go far beyond those objectives in complexity, includ-
ing engagement, partnership, security, and unprecedented levels of deterrence.17 
Modern technology, instant communications, and a twenty-four-hour news day 
are among the tools the Navy uses to leverage its global presence in support of those 
missions. But that same technology vastly increases the potential strategic impact 
of lapses in integrity by our ship captains and squadron commanders. 
Our credibility as a Navy and a nation suffers when our military leaders be-
have in ways contrary to the nation’s interests. One of the enduring U.S. national 
interests is “respect for universal values at home and around the world.”18 The 
most recent Barrett National Values Assessment for the United States identified 
honesty, compassion, respect, and responsibility/accountability as among the 
qualities most valued by Americans.19 Drunk driving, adultery, fraud, and cruelty 
are not in line with these interests or values, and such behavior jeopardizes our 
legitimacy as we endeavor to promote our values around the world. Thus mis-
conduct by a commanding officer is a mission failure, and offending individuals 
are rightfully being held accountable. 
As standards of behavior for COs have been raised, so has the likelihood of 
violators being caught. In years past, allegations of wrongdoing often remained 
mere allegations, because words alone are generally not sufficient to indict any-
one, let alone a commanding officer. However, e-mails, security cameras, cell-
phone cameras, electronic records of calls and texts, and “smart phones” with 
web access have changed the landscape dramatically. As Eyer points out, sub-
ordinates have a plethora of means to document and report perceived offenses 
of their skippers.20 Furthermore, that same technology has made it increasingly 
difficult to deal with such transgressions quietly and privately; it is just as easy 
to post incriminating evidence on YouTube as to send it to the officer’s superior. 
Commanding officers who violate the trust bestowed on them can expect tech-
nology to allow them to be caught and held accountable, often in the public eye. 
So why do some take the risk? 
Some psychologists contend that people’s actions may be products of their 
environment, and their research focuses on the extent an individual’s behavior 
can be linked to outside situations.21 Philip Zimbardo is among the camp that 
believes the environment can cause otherwise good people to become evil; he 
claims that the model explains the abuses of Abu Ghraib prisoners at the hands of 
American soldiers.22 Others cite the “Bathsheba Syndrome” (named for the object 
of biblical king David’s affection whose husband David sent to the front lines 
to be killed so the king could have her as his own), which is receiving attention 
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in academic and Navy circles for its lesson that many can be susceptible to the 
temptations that accompany power and authority.23 Is there a link between the 
culture and environment of command in the Navy and undesirable behavior? 
There are clearly cultural factors that work against the service’s efforts to im-
prove behavior, to raise and enforce standards of commanding-officer conduct. 
Historically, the captain of a Navy ship had to be strong and independent to 
maintain order among the crew in hostile environments and to execute missions 
far from home with only tenuous communications with superiors. Navy regula-
tions state that “the responsibility of the commanding officer for his or her com-
mand is absolute” and that “the authority of the commanding officer is commen-
surate with his or her responsibility.”24 As Lord Acton said in the late nineteenth 
century, “All power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”25 
The absolute authority bestowed on commanding officers by regulation could 
conceivably breed toxic leadership traits and cruelty. The data indicate signs of 
abusive leadership—three DFCs between 1999 and 2010 were due to cruelty or 
abusive leadership by the commanding officer—but abuse of power falls well 
short of fully explaining the broader trend of increasing misconduct.
Tradition suggests other possible explanations. The culture of the Navy is 
steeped in tales of behavior that does not fit the model to which we aspire today: 
drunkenness, bar fights, gender biases, womanizing—the list goes on. Sailors 
were expected to “let off steam” when their ships came into port, and they did. If 
this article were being written in the 1980s, there would be a fair argument that 
our culture promotes the behavior for which skippers today are being fired. But in 
the decades that followed, standards of acceptable behavior Navy-wide changed, 
along with standards for COs. Alcohol was deglamorized, and alcohol-related 
incidents became career ending for officers. Hazing ceased to be acceptable; cer-
emonies that had involved humiliation, degradation, and discomfort (chief petty 
officer initiations, “Crossing the Line” ceremonies) were transformed into events 
that built esprit de corps without hurting bodies, emotions, or spirits. Aviation 
stunts and joyriding (“flat-hatting”) were no longer acceptable. Commanding 
officers were held accountable for violations of the new standards in their units. 
But the behavioral standards now in place are in competition with long-standing 
cultural norms; they increase personal accountability without addressing the 
cultural or character deficiencies that underlie unacceptable behavior. Former 
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman exemplified this smoldering cultural legacy 
in his lament over the death of naval aviation culture.26 Furthermore, the exten-
sive social media feedback in support of his position from current naval officers 
demonstrates the power underlying his traditional sentiments. The result is a 
small but steady tradition-fed stream of misconduct at all levels—misconduct 
146
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/22
 144  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
that is more likely than it once was to be detected, more harmful to the Navy’s 
mission, and more likely to make headlines when it involves a CO. 
Another relevant aspect of Navy culture is intolerance for mistakes. A recent 
article, noting that as a junior office the celebrated Chester Nimitz ran a ship 
aground, postulated that the future fleet admiral would not have gone far in 
today’s Navy, with its risk aversion and intolerance for errors.27 That writer ob-
viously believes Navy leadership has gone too far recently in punishing errors, 
both professional and personal. Intolerance for professional mistakes is beyond 
the scope of this project, and we have already stated that personal misconduct on 
the part of Navy leaders must not be accepted. But the zero-defect mentality may 
cause behavioral problems in junior officers to be hidden or covered up, reduc-
ing the opportunity for correction, mentoring, development, and instruction in 
ethical standards. 
In addition to the culture of the service as a whole, each community within 
the Navy has its own convictions and subculture. Aviators are perceived by oth-
ers as cowboys, rule breakers, “Top Gun” officers’ club partiers, and flirts. The 
aviation community, as noted, has the highest number of CO DFCs for personal 
misconduct, on average 50 percent higher than for surface warriors. The averages 
fit the stereotype and culture of traditional naval aviation (as cited by former 
secretary Lehman and discussed above), but questions arise when the trends are 
examined. The aviation DFC rate has a virtually horizontal trend line, while the 
surface and submarine communities show recent spikes. One explanation is that 
the 1991 Tailhook debacle hit the aviation community much harder and closer 
to home than it did the others, meaning that “airdale” misconduct peaked years 
ago, before the period encompassed by our data. If this is true, then the very poli-
cies that Mr. Lehman rejected as stifling appear to have had a positive effect on 
aviation command. The ultimate cause of the absence of a significant increasing 
trend in the aviation community is not obvious in the present data, and further 
study is in order. However, the naval aviation culture, as glamorized in movies 
and naval history (and echoed by the former Secretary of the Navy) may con-
tinue to be attractive to people with adverse behavioral tendencies and may be 
conducive to unacceptable actions, despite the increased professionalism seen in 
the community in recent years.
On the other hand, surface officers are considered stoic and businesslike. 
Nonetheless, they are seen (at least by members of other communities) as high-
strung and competitive—it is often said that the surface subculture “eats its 
young.” Cultural traits in the surface community include public degradation and 
bullying.28 These factors could both reflect and produce abusive leadership, and 
such a stressful work environment might lead to alcohol abuse. But of the twelve 
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surface CO dismissals for cause for personal or ethical reasons, only one was due 
to abusive leadership, and none cited alcohol-related incidents. Yet in 2010 the 
surface community exhibited the greatest increase in DFCs in the Navy. (The in-
crease was largely in the category of sexual misconduct, which will be addressed 
shortly.) The argument that rising misconduct in the surface community is due 
to organizational culture or environment does not seem to hold much water.
The submarine community, finally, is quiet, intelligent, and secretive, and its 
officers mirror the platforms they operate. It is not surprising that little infor-
mation can be gleaned from the data in this study. It may be a testimony to the 
submariner culture that the causes of nearly half of the CO DFCs in the undersea 
community could not be determined.
Organizational culture notwithstanding, the most prevalent cause of DFCs of 
commanding officers in every community has been sexual misconduct, including 
inappropriate relationships, fraternization, and sexual harassment. Some have 
written that this phenomenon is a product of the Navy’s environment, that such 
failures are to be expected in the seagoing community, where men and women 
are now confined in close quarters for months at a time.29 Mixed-gender crews 
certainly present significant leadership challenges. Consider the commanding 
officer fired after nine chief petty officers aboard his ship were found to be hav-
ing sexual relationships with junior sailors under their charge, although that CO 
did not know about the relationships.30 But though fired for ineffective leader-
ship, he personally maintained the higher moral ground and did not fall to the 
temptation of an inappropriate relationship of his own, which is why he is not 
numbered with the personal DFCs. 
The problem is not mixed-gender crews. Of the forty-two personal CO DFCs 
in this study, twenty (48 percent) involved sexual misconduct. Fewer than half 
involved COs of shipboard commands. Of those, one involved a relationship 
between a submarine CO and an officer in the Army—clearly not a product of 
integrated crews. The propensity for sexual misconduct is obviously widespread, 
but not because men and women deploy together. Whether on a ship with a 
mixed crew or ashore, commanding officers must keep their relationships in line 
with the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for 
Courts-Martial prohibiting adultery and fraternization.31 Failure to do so (like 
any other misconduct) is a violation not only of the law but of the character that 
each commanding officer is entrusted with maintaining.
We should explore the concept of character further. General H. Norman 
Schwarzkopf highlighted the importance of character (but fell short of defining 
it) when he said, “Leadership is a potent combination of strategy and character. 
But if you must be without one, be without strategy.”32 The Josephson Institute 
lists as “the six pillars of character” trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, 
148
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/22
 146  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
fairness, caring, and citizenship.33 Closely related to character is ethics, the set of 
“standards of behavior that tell us how human beings ought to act in the many 
situations in which they find themselves.”34 Intuitively, one who exemplifies the 
pillars of character is likely to act in conformance with how a person “ought to 
act”—in other words, ethically. Ethics is not religion, nor is it adherence to law 
or cultural norms.35 It is about doing the right thing. 
Ethical decisions must be based on a standard of right and wrong, and find-
ing consensus for such a standard is especially difficult in today’s society.36 A 
high-ranking officer in the Navy’s chaplain community notes that while Navy 
standards have always been high, today’s social ethical context is confusing. 
For example, the media glamorize wealth, fame, sexual promiscuity, and self-
satisfaction, while the Navy is attempting to promote better behavior. News agen-
cies jump on any hint of misconduct in leadership but just as fervently scream 
foul when an institution’s standards seem too conservative or when they echo too 
closely religious tenets, of whatever faith. But in the midst of this confusion, the 
Markkula Center for Applied Ethics offers a simple question to test whether a giv-
en decision is ethical: “If I told someone I respect—or told a television audience
—which option I have chosen, what would they say?”37 The will to ask such a 
question, to embody the pillars of character even (especially?) when nobody is 
watching, and to allow one’s conduct to be driven by such ethical analysis is the 
foundation on which we want our leaders to be developed. 
ELEVATING THE CHARACTER OF NAVAL LEADERSHIP 
The Navy is holding commanding officers to a special behavioral standard, as well 
it should, but that alone will not solve the problem. Beyond merely holding COs 
accountable for misconduct, leadership needs, in order to improve the quality of 
our commanding officer corps and our service, to take positive action to develop 
each officer’s moral compass and establish an ethical standard. 
Step One: Establish a Sense of Urgency. Generating urgency has been called the 
first task in achieving transformational change in a large, complex organiza-
tion.38 In my view, it requires acknowledgment of the problem, identification of 
the impacts, and elevation of the priority of the issue on the basis of a full un-
derstanding of those impacts. On the first point, the Navy has made an effort to 
be transparent and open, but it has fallen short of fully acknowledging the prob-
lem. Personal misconduct by COs exists in all branches of the military, but the 
headlines seem to be predominantly Navy. Clearly, Navy leaders have committed 
themselves to holding commanding officers publicly accountable for their ac-
tions, which is vastly preferable to hiding them until a disgruntled subordinate 
posts a video online for the world to see. Unfortunately, beyond public firings, 
there has been no fundamental effort on the part of senior leadership to elevate 
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the issue to a level that will produce meaningful change. This article, appearing 
as it does in the first year of the tenure of a new Chief of Naval Operations, is an 
effort to try to spark that sense of urgency. 
Step Two: Set the Standard. The Deputy Secretary of Defense recently released a 
memo emphasizing the need for all Department of Defense personnel to act eth-
ically. “Fundamental values like integrity, impartiality, fairness, and respect must 
drive our actions, and these values must be reinforced by holding ourselves and 
each other accountable.”39 In the same vein, the Army has published a pamphlet, 
Army: Profession of Arms 2011, that explicitly stresses the need for adherence to 
an unfailing service ethical standard. It argues the necessity for all officers, es-
pecially leaders, to take the high moral ground in their discretionary judgments. 
Furthermore, the Army Operating Concept of 2010 includes three pages of ethical 
and behavioral discussion and draws attention to the Army’s core values: loyalty, 
duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.40 
There is no similar proclamation of ethical standards in Navy policy literature, 
and there is no parallel discussion in the Naval Operating Concept of 2010. The 
Navy’s core values—honor, courage, and commitment—are concise and easy to 
remember but make only implicit reference to ethical standards. If the Navy is to 
improve conduct from the top down, it must explicitly focus on the fundamental 
ethical standards that underlie the behaviors it wants to promote. Unless we stress 
ethical standards, our efforts to change behavior will always fall short.
A retired four-star admiral, noting the reluctance of leaders to implement 
ethical standards specifically, suggested that there was concern that such efforts 
would be construed as religious. But ethics are not religion. Another camp argues 
that the fact that character and ethics are “implicit” in the stated core values of the 
Navy is enough; one admiral observes, “You can’t have honor without integrity.” 
But if they make only implicit reference to character, we can expect only implicit 
compliance. A treatise on ethics in the Naval Operating Concept is unlikely to 
change a given officer’s behavior. But as one element of a Navy-wide campaign 
to emphasize character and set ethical standards for the officer corps, it might 
help create a shift in the mind-set and the culture as a whole, precisely what our 
service requires. Such a change will not occur unless the top level of Navy leader-
ship makes ethical behavior a clear priority. 
Step Three: Improve the Metrics. The Bureau of Personnel’s Fitness Report and 
Counseling Record (NAVPERS 1610/2) is the Navy’s basic periodic evaluation—
that is, the metric—for all officers in the grade of captain (O-6) and below. The 
effectiveness of the promotion and screening process is determined by whether 
the system correctly identifies officers worthy of selection—and perhaps more 
importantly, of nonselection. Our system needs improvement. Many of the COs 
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fired for personal misconduct should never have been selected for command. 
Nine of the dismissals for cause cited in this study were due to alcohol-related 
incidents, and it is likely that previous supervisors of these officers were aware 
of their propensity to drink. At least sixteen DFCs were for inappropriate rela-
tionships, and while some of them may have been difficult to foresee, in many 
cases signs were likely present that should have been addressed. Behaviors such 
as cruelty, abuse of position for personal gain, solicitation of prostitution, and 
indecent exposure typically do not suddenly or without warning appear in an 
otherwise upstanding officer. Somebody knew, or should have known, but did 
not document the behavior adequately to prevent selection for command.
Part of the problem is the previously noted dearth of published policy on 
character and behavior in this era of ethical confusion. Further, there is almost a 
complete lack of focus on ethical training for naval officers. In twenty-two years 
of active Navy service, the only Navy training on ethics the author received was 
on fraud and financial abuse, and that used a very legalistic approach, with little 
actual discussion of ethics. The “standards of conduct” training for COs recently 
mandated by the CNO (in the wake of the firing of those involved in the “XO 
Movie Night” episode) is merely Scotch tape on the problem—a robust, durable, 
career-long emphasis is still not in place.41 Once an officer has been selected for 
command, it is too late to try to develop integrity and character. This absence of 
training for all officers to a set standard has led to a failure of leadership. Many 
commanding officers have shown misguided support to junior officers who 
display character flaws such as alcohol abuse or infidelity. “I did that when I was 
younger, so why should I punish them for doing the same thing?” seems to be 
the theme. 
Ultimately, COs are charged with developing future COs. When character 
flaws become evident in the actions of their subordinates, commanding officers 
must actively engage the offenders. One of two responses is likely. If the junior 
officer admits fault, accepts responsibility, receives counseling, and makes cor-
rections, the “teaching moment” will have been achieved. If, however, the officer 
disputes the details, argues, and deflects blame, there may be an intrinsic ethical 
void that must be documented. Rather than being friends or drinking buddies 
of the officers under their charge, COs must explicitly demand integrity from 
them—and mentor or document shortcomings appropriately. Otherwise they 
encourage the behavior we want to eliminate in those chosen for command, 
which ensures the cycle will continue. 
Before throwing former supervisors under the bus for failing to document 
moral shortcomings that are doing such damage today, note that the fitness 
report does not facilitate such openness. The fitness-report system needs to 
be modified to measure explicitly what we want to see in future commanding 
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officers. Some believe the system is completely broken and should be rebuilt 
from scratch. Some have recommended incorporating elements of a “360 degree” 
evaluation into the fitness report process—that is, feedback from the officer’s 
peers and subordinates in addition to evaluation by supervisors.42 Mending all of 
the report’s faults is beyond the scope of this article, but some discussion on the 
evaluation process is worthwhile. 
Part of the fitness report’s problem is rooted in the zero-defect culture dis-
cussed earlier. Even a slightly less than glowing fitness-report narrative can be 
career ending. It is very difficult for reporting seniors to make the best stand out 
without killing the runners-up, and it is extremely difficult for selection boards 
to determine who is best. The 360-degree evaluation, however, is not the answer. 
Its value is in the self-awareness it provides to officers, allowing them to compare 
their own views of themselves to those of seniors, peers, and subordinates; in the 
context of this article, there is no indication that a 360-degree format would more 
effectively identify officers predisposed toward personal conduct prejudicial to 
command. None of the flag officers interviewed for this study supported whole-
sale changes to the fitness report system, and all believed that the reporting senior 
is the correct person—not peers or subordinates—to evaluate the suitability of of-
ficers for promotion and selection. However, something must be done in order to 
improve the fitness report’s utility in screening out adverse behavioral tendencies.
Fundamental problems with today’s fitness report system in identifying be-
havioral shortcomings are its lack of explicit evaluation with respect to ethical 
standards, the tendency of senior officers to reward mission accomplishment and 
performance regardless of personal failures, and the fact that all officers from en-
sign to captain are evaluated on the same criteria. The fitness report grades seven 
quantitative performance traits: “Professional Expertise,” “Command or Orga-
nizational Climate/Equal Opportunity,” “Military Bearing/Character,” “Team-
work,” “Mission Accomplishment and Initiative,” “Leadership,” and “Tactical 
Performance.” Military bearing is the trait widely considered to be the category 
for documenting issues concerning physical fitness and body composition (i.e., 
body-mass index), although by regulation (and as indicated on the form itself) 
it also includes character, appearance, demeanor, conduct, physical standards, 
and adherence to Navy core values.43 The core values include honor, and honor 
(as the admiral quoted above noted) implies integrity. But should we have to dig 
three levels to evaluate integrity, and should it be masked in the block regarded 
as concerning physical fitness? Not if we think it is important. In comparison, the 
Army’s Officer Evaluation Report requires input on all seven of the service’s core 
values as part of the character evaluation of the officer, including integrity and 
selfless service. Such specific evaluation of character is required to emphasize the 
priorities we desire in commanding officers. 
{LINE-SPACE}
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Only a small percentage of commanding officers are being fired for personal mis-
conduct, but the number is too high, and it continues to grow. Like the aviation 
mishap rate in the early 2000s, the magnitude of this problem can be significantly 
reduced, but only through elevation of this issue as a standing concern by the 
highest levels of leadership. While every flag officer interviewed for this article 
sees CO misconduct as an issue requiring attention, there does not seem to be 
consensus that it urgently demands transformational change. I think it does.
As noted, the Navy has taken some steps. Behavioral standards for COs are 
tighter than ever. The Chief of Naval Operations has issued a personal mes-
sage to all commanding officers outlining standards of conduct.44 A 360-degree 
evaluation has been included as part of the training process prior to assuming a 
command billet, as recommended by the 2004 Naval IG study.45 Unit command-
climate evaluation results are visible at higher echelons of leadership. Finally, 
each session of the Navy Command Leadership School, attended by officers or-
dered to command billets, is addressed by senior flag officers on ethical behavior. 
But instead of waiting for officers to be screened for command before setting 
and enforcing standards, we need a fundamental, enduring shift and meaningful, 
career-long training on integrity and character. 
Several changes are recommended. First of all, leadership must elevate the 
priority of ethical behavior and emphasize the need for change—including 
the creation of a central database of every CO relieved of command owing to 
personal or professional failures (recording the specific cause for the dismissal 
as well as demographic data), to facilitate future tracking and analysis. Second, 
the Navy must undertake an explicit campaign to set standards of integrity and 
honorable behavior. Personal integrity should be at the forefront of the service’s 
human-capital strategy and must be reflected in policy at the highest levels. 
Consideration should be given to expanding the Navy’s core values to include 
explicit mention of character, or at least to a redoubling of efforts to develop the 
concept of honor in our service. “Honor, courage, commitment, and character” 
has a nice ring to it (though “integrity,” “humility,” “trustworthiness,” and numer-
ous other, similar terms could work in the place of “character”). This campaign 
should include regular, lively, and meaningful emphasis on ethical behavior for 
all Navy personnel.
Finally, the officer fitness report, a powerful tool for embedding an organiza-
tional culture, should be modified in format and in concept to measure explicitly 
what leaders want to see, specifically addressing character and integrity.46 This 
change should be accompanied by training for reporting seniors on ethical 
expectations and on the need to include every aspect of individuals, including 
personal integrity, when determining who is qualified for command. With this 
proposal, let the debate begin on the merits of this study, on its conclusions and 
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recommendations, and on alternative methods of raising the bar of commanding 
officer behavior, integrity, and moral character. 
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BOOK REVIEWS
HOW SENIOR LEADERS VIEW THE WORLD
Saunders, Elizabeth N. Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell Univ. Press, 2011. 320pp. $35
In today’s political environment, mili-
tary intervention is frequently debated. 
These discussions often bring to light 
interesting points of agreement and per-
haps surprising instances of disagree-
ment. In the end, it is with the president 
that the final decision rests. Elizabeth 
Saunders explores the rationales that 
U.S. presidents have used for decid-
ing whether or not to initiate military 
interventions. Dr. Saunders, a graduate 
of Yale, now teaching at George Wash-
ington University, advances a thesis 
that the model of intervention depends 
mainly on a president’s formative ways 
of thinking about foreign policy. While 
it may seem that these views would fol-
low party lines, Saunders shows that this 
is not necessarily true. On one hand, the 
internal approach focuses on how the 
foreign state is organized and follows 
the transformative model. In contrast, 
the external approach looks at states’ 
outward behavior and uses a surgical 
strike–type model to coerce change in 
behavior. The author chose to examine 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, 
and Lyndon B. Johnson for two impor-
tant reasons. First, among the three a 
consensus would be expected based on 
the prevalent Cold War mentality and 
context. In fact, these three did not fol-
low in lockstep. The shared case of Viet-
nam, the second reason for the author’s 
selections, highlights their differences. 
Eisenhower was an externally focused 
president; if states’ external policies were 
successful, he chose largely to ignore 
internal issues in those same states. 
A decreased priority on conventional 
forces translated under Eisenhower 
to less investment in transformative 
capabilities. Lebanon was his only 
overt intervention; Eisenhower did not 
intervene in Vietnam in 1954 or in Iraq 
in 1958. In contrast, Kennedy sought to 
influence states’ domestic institutions. 
His predetermined agenda, based on his 
congressional career, explains his choice 
and method of intervention in Vietnam. 
This theme held true with the murder of 
Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, which preced-
ed Kennedy’s own assassination by only 
a few weeks. Johnson, despite his obvi-
ous ties to Kennedy, was an externally 
focused president as regarded foreign 
affairs. Saunders highlights that while 
this diverges from his transformative 
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domestic agenda, it explains Johnson’s 
expansion of the Vietnam War in such 
a different direction from Kennedy.
The well-researched text concludes 
by looking beyond Vietnam at how 
well the pattern holds under differ-
ent circumstances and time periods, 
to include the Iraq war. Saunders’s 
framework categorizes presidents as 
belonging to either of two ideal types. 
While this may hold from a strictly 
political science view, it falls short of 
the reality of history. For this reason, 
the book will appeal more to politi-
cal scientists or those seeking model-
centric explanations of events. This 
work should also have strong appeal 
for strategists and people serving on 
planning or policy staffs. Understand-
ing how senior leaders view the world 
is often as significant as factual knowl-
edge of a given situation when provid-
ing recommended courses of action. 
LT. COL. FREDERICK H. BLACK, JR., U.S. ARMY
Naval War College 
Marrin, Stephen. Improving Intelligence Analysis: 
Bridging the Gap between Scholarship and Prac-
tice. New York: Routledge, 2011. 192pp. $130
A former CIA analyst turned scholar, 
Stephen Marrin attempts to bridge the 
gap between intelligence studies as an 
academic discipline and intelligence as 
a bureaucratic function. His analysis 
grounded in the intelligence litera-
ture, Marrin provides readers a good 
overview of such intelligence-studies 
classics as those of Sherman Kent, 
Roger Hilsman, and Richards Heuer, 
along with more contemporary work 
by Roger George, James Bruce, Richard 
Betts, and Amy Zegart. Marrin certainly 
displays a penchant for the academic 
that is informed by his former role 
as an intelligence analyst. He believes 
“intelligence scholarship can provide 
knowledge and insight useful for the 
analytic practitioner; so useful in fact, 
that it will help improve the quality of 
the resulting intelligence analysis.” 
With such a goal, Marrin offers six 
ways to improve intelligence analysis, 
but it is unclear how he derives these. 
Marrin does not draw his conclusions 
from known cases of highly publicized 
intelligence assessments. In the case 
of Iraq, it would have been useful to 
illustrate why the State Department’s 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research had 
a better answer on the status of Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction program 
than the Defense Intelligence Agency. 
Had Marrin tested his advice against 
known intelligence failures or drawn 
from assessments of failed analysis, his 
advice would be more convincing.
With intelligence increasingly public 
and used to justify or explain foreign-
policy decisions, it seems one more 
piece of advice Marrin could offer 
is how to incorporate public discus-
sions or open sources into analysis. 
Fortunately or not, the intelligence 
community does not have a mo-
nopoly on the “facts,” so discussing 
the ways in which analysts can more 
readily connect with scholars and 
the private sector would be useful. 
To be fair, the book is focused on 
intelligence analysis, but it seems to 
ignore how, why, and where facts are 
collected. In an era when both schol-
ars and private citizens have access 
to information, it is important that 
Marrin address the epistemological 
underpinnings of what is being ana-
lyzed. There is a logical and important 
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relationship between collection and 
analysis that is in need of further study.
In spite of the book’s shortcomings, 
Marrin offers readers a look at what 
a junior CIA analyst does and offers 
a sketch of how to move beyond the 
“generalized intuition” that often afflicts 
intelligence analysis. His discussion of 
improving intelligence analysis through 
empathy is interesting and has implica-
tions for personnel recruiting. In fact, 
this slim volume should be valued by 
human-resources departments and 
senior managers as they prepare for the 
next reorganizations of their agencies.
DEREK REVERON
Naval War College
Rickards, James. Currency Wars: The Making of 
the Next Global Crisis. New York: Penguin Group, 
2011. 304pp. $26.95
Is the United States now engaged in a 
currency war? Are we involved in an 
international competition of currency 
devaluation that will impact America 
in seldom-studied ways that are critical 
to its defense? James Rickards suggests 
that we are, and that today’s cur-
rency war could be as devastating to 
national security as any kinetic war. 
James Rickards is a counselor, invest-
ment banker, and risk manager with 
over thirty years of experience in 
capital markets. He advises the De-
partment of Defense, the intelligence 
community, and major hedge funds 
on global finance. He served as a fa-
cilitator for the first-ever financial war 
games conducted by the Pentagon.
Rickards argues that currency con-
flicts should and must interest our 
military leaders. Such conflicts can 
and should be prepared for, because 
the cheap-dollar policies of both the 
present and immediate past administra-
tions portend a dollar crisis. Rickards 
argues that policy makers have lost the 
enormous national-security advan-
tages that dollar hegemony affords, 
by adopting weak-dollar policies. 
In part 1 Rickards discusses Pentagon-
sponsored “war” gaming in 2009, using 
rules of engagement (ROE) in which the 
only “weapons” allowed were currencies, 
stocks, bonds, and derivatives. Because 
the specific ROE were unrealistic, 
however, the results were inconclusive, 
although useful for future simulations. 
Then, in part 2, the author delves into 
historical accounts of what he calls 
“Currency War I” (1921–36) and 
“Currency War II” (1967–87). Rickards 
argues that we have now entered 
“Currency War III,” the three primary 
combatants being the United States, 
China, and Europe. He argues that there 
are four possible outcomes of Currency 
War III: a move to multiple reserve cur-
rencies, with the dollar playing a much 
smaller role; an International Monetary 
Fund–controlled world money, called 
“Special Drawing Rights”; a return to 
the gold standard, at a substantially 
higher gold price (the prospect en-
dorsed by Rickards); and chaos. This last 
possibility and the associated dollar col-
lapse appears most likely to the author. 
It is unfortunate that Rickards did not 
include any reference to Edward S. 
Miller’s Bankrupting the Enemy: The 
U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl 
Harbor (Naval Institute Press, 2007), 
written by a skilled financial analyst 
who discusses in great detail how the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration 
used dollar hegemony to block Japan 
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from world financial markets. One 
could argue that Currency War I cul-
minated on 25 July 1941 with Executive 
Order 8832, which froze Japanese fi-
nancial assets. Dollar hegemony was an 
essential national-security tool used to 
deprive Japan of the resources needed to 
wage war. Miller’s work is a useful illus-
tration of the utility of a strong dollar.
In summary, Rickards provides an 
excellent account of the currency 
wars. He provides information that 
should be at the fingertips of ev-
ery national security planner. 
EDWARD FULLER, Incline Village, Nevada, and 
ROBERT C. WHITTEN, Cupertino, California
Leffler, Melvyn P., and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds. In 
Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the 
Berlin Wall and 9/11. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. 
Press, 2011. 243pp. $19.95
This collection of ten essays focuses 
on the American government’s foreign 
policy through three administrations 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 
November 1989, and also after the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. 
Editors Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey Legro 
examine these events from the perspec-
tives of both the policy makers who 
were active in Presidents George H. W. 
Bush’s, Bill Clinton’s, and George W. 
Bush’s administrations and scholars 
who have analyzed the government’s 
actions. Government response to these 
events provides strong examples of 
how the United States reacts in times 
of uncertainty. The editors chose the 
Berlin Wall and 9/11 because both 
events impacted the global order to an 
extent requiring a complete reexami-
nation of the nation’s foreign policy.
The chapters written by scholars 
provide excellent background, discuss-
ing the situations before, during, and 
after the events. However, the chapters 
written by government officials involved 
in policy decisions greatly enhance and 
increase the success of this work. The 
collaborators from these administra-
tions have yet to publish their individual 
memoirs, making their perspectives 
not only unique but refreshing.
In his essay, “Shaping the Future: Plan-
ning at the Pentagon, 1989–1993,” Paul 
Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy during George H. W. Bush’s 
administration and U.S. Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense during George W. Bush’s 
administration, discusses how defense 
decisions made at the end of the Cold 
War influenced decisions after 9/11. His 
analysis of the similarities between stra-
tegic decisions made in 1989 and 2001, 
as well as of the impact that the 1989 
decisions had on 2001 strategy plans, 
is one of the most interesting parts 
of this book. Eric Edelman also does 
this especially well in his “The Strange 
Career of the 1992 Defense Planning 
Guidance,” in which he compares the 
1992 Defense Planning Guidance to 
2002’s National Security Strategy. He 
served George W. Bush as Under Sec-
retary of Defense for Policy, as well as 
Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice 
President for National Security Affairs. 
John Mueller, who holds the Woody 
Hayes Chair of National Security 
Studies at the Mershon Center, takes 
an approach different from those of 
his fellow collaborators in “Quest-
ing for Monsters to Destroy.” He adds 
2 September 1945, the end of World 
War II, and the Korean invasion by the 
North Koreans on 25 June 1950 as 
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equally important events for American 
foreign policy in times of uncertainty.
One of the major considerations for 
both policy makers and scholars is the 
impact these events had on the military. 
Whether to increase or decrease the ac-
tive forces was a complicated issue that 
caused disagreement among govern-
ment officials in both 1989 and 2001. 
Readers of this journal will find particu-
larly interesting the varying opinions 
regarding the military, especially in light 
of currently anticipated force restruc-
turings and budgetary constraints.
While each chapter can be read on its 
own, an author sometimes refers to 
another chapter, establishing a continu-
ity that may be lost or underappreciated 
otherwise. This is especially true for es-
says written by policy makers. The edi-
tors are to be congratulated on a timely 
and helpful volume that not only stud-
ies American foreign policy in the recent 
times of uncertainty but provides food 
for thought for the uncertainty of now. 
NORAH SCHNEIDER
Salve Regina University
Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. De-
mocratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat. 2nd 
ed. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 
2010. 360pp. $30 
In some ways, publishing a book that 
purports to capture contemporary 
African political trends, particularly 
involving the “progress of democracy,” 
faces the same basic problem as do 
books attempting to explain state-of-
the-art computers. Both information 
streams are now flowing so quickly that 
the truth you write about today may be 
very different from that of tomorrow. In 
fact, the African scholar has even harder 
going than his information-systems 
contemporary, because unlike computer 
technology, the course of democracy in 
Africa frequently changes direction and 
from time to time even reverses itself.
The editors of Democratization in Africa: 
Progress and Retreat are, as the title indi-
cates, well aware of this challenge. This 
is not surprising. This volume is part 
of the International Forum for Demo-
cratic Studies’ Journal of Democracy 
book series, and both Diamond and 
Plattner have edited numerous volumes.
The book is well written, well re-
searched, and well organized. The 
reader is first treated to a selection of 
seven readings, all looking at themes 
involving “progress and retreat.” The 
remainder of the book is divided into 
three sections, covering West Africa, 
East Africa, and southern and central 
Africa. Given the events in North Africa, 
the lack of coverage along Africa’s 
Mediterranean shore is regrettable and 
underscores the point about “lag time.” 
In general, the first section of the book 
is thought provoking and arguably 
the most useful. The topics are broad, 
and their panoramic view allows the 
authors to chart the many directions 
of emerging trends. For example, John 
Clark of Florida International Univer-
sity argues that the military coup as 
an instrument of regime change is in 
decline. While certain events indicate 
that the end of the African military 
coup is nowhere near in sight, in the 
main it seems that Clark is correct.
Despite the editors’ best efforts, shelf life 
remains a problem. Although updated 
for this new edition with new informa-
tion, many of the book’s chapters were 
written far enough in the past that the 
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situation itself is out-of-date. Despite 
the book’s 2010 publication date, 
twenty-one of the twenty-four essays 
here were originally published between 
2007 and 2009. Not all these essays are 
“expired,” Clark’s being a case in point. 
However, the careful reader is forced to 
spend far too much time checking other 
sources to learn the actual current “state 
of play.” In some cases, however, such 
as Côte d’Ivoire, the changes from the 
time of initial publication to the present 
is extreme. In others, such as Zimba-
bwe, current events have not called 
the author’s findings into question.
In the end, despite powerful writing, 
careful scholarship, and the best of 
intentions, Democratization in Af-
rica is too much of a “fly in amber.” 
Teachers, students, and lay readers 
alike would be better advised simply 
to subscribe to the Journal of Democ-
racy. For a slightly higher cost they 
would reap much greater gain.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Cohen, Eliot A. Conquered into Liberty: Two Cen-
turies of Battles along the Great Warpath That 
Made the American Way of War. New York: Free 
Press, 2011. 405pp. $30
The American way of war—a prod-
uct of two centuries of war with . . . 
Canada? How can that be? Civil War 
history and the experience and his-
tory of World War II have driven out 
of our minds a truth known to James 
Fenimore Cooper, Francis Parkman, 
and Kenneth Roberts. The American 
colonies, thereafter the United States, 
fought battle after battle with France, 
Britain, and Canada throughout most 
of the seventeenth century and un-
til the early nineteenth century. The 
place of these battles was then called 
the Great Warpath, stretching from 
Albany to Montreal and Quebec.
American readers who pick up Eliot 
Cohen’s Conquered into Liberty will 
most likely be embarrassed by learning 
how much they do not know (or only 
vaguely remember) about American 
war fighting in the colonial and early 
national periods. However, by the time 
the first chapter, about the Schenectady 
raid of 1690, is finished, American read-
ers will feel embraced, as though part of 
their American selves has been returned. 
Non-Americans will be surprised at first, 
and by the end of the book astonished.
Cohen teaches strategic studies at the 
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies, and he was a 
senior adviser to the secretary of state 
on strategic issues from 2007 to 2009. 
This book is a military history, as good 
a one as might ever be done. As a his-
torian, Cohen’s strongest suit is that he 
treats war as it is made by political and 
military leaders, by the regulars (and ir-
regulars and Native Americans), and by 
“leaders and managers who got things 
done.” By the last he means those (most-
ly citizen-soldiers) who improvised in 
combat and managed to supply forces 
under nearly impossible conditions. His 
insights regarding these sorts of men 
make up a large part of his understand-
ing of what the “American way of war” 
is about. Cohen quotes Germany’s 
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel to affirm 
that what was an eighteenth-century 
American quality has endured—the 
American speed of adaptation to 
armored warfare, Rommel wrote, is 
explained “by their extraordinary sense 
for the practical and the material and 
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by their complete lack of regard for 
tradition and worthless theories.”
American wars along the Great War-
path, Cohen reminds us, were parts 
of European wars. The Atlantic Ocean 
more linked us to Europe than it 
insulated us from it. Moreover, these 
wars exposed us to a full range of 
seventeenth-to-nineteenth-century 
European warfare, from set-piece 
battles to what could be called un-
conventional and secret warfare. They 
also brought the full horror of war to 
us. Cohen explodes the contemporary 
European notion that the United States 
did not become “the territory of war” 
or exposed to terror until 2001. Indeed, 
terror in the form of murderous raids 
on New York and New England villages 
marked much of its colonial period.
Among many other things, Cohen argues 
that the American appetite for the kind 
of unconditional surrender pursued by 
Franklin Roosevelt in World War II had 
its grounding in the eighteenth-century 
American intention to destroy the en-
emy polity that was Canada. More than 
that, America’s wars to attach Canada 
to itself were wars for the freedom of 
that polity. Cohen says, “If any countries 
have ever been ‘conquered into liberty,’ 
as the Continental Congress had written 
to the doubtful habitants of Canada 
in 1775, they were Germany, Italy, and 
Japan, occupied and transformed by 
armies that combined, in paradoxical 
degree, thoroughness in defeating an 
enemy and an unlimited, even naïve, 
commitment to liberating him.”
Cohen’s book is an astonishingly 
good read in addition to being highly 
thoughtful and often revelatory. 
KEN JENSEN
McLean, Virginia
Matzke, Rebecca Berens. Deterrence through 
Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policy 
under Pax Britannica. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska 
Press, 2011. 320pp. $45
Historians have long argued about the 
true mechanism behind a ninety-year 
period of relative peace in Europe, a 
period that began with the end of the 
Napoleonic wars and became known 
as the Pax Britannica. Over the years 
critics have questioned both aspects 
of this term—whether the period was 
actually as peaceful as its title suggests 
and whether that peace really was, 
in large part, due to Great Britain’s 
overwhelming and imposing com-
mercial, industrial, financial, and naval 
might. Through a searching analysis of 
political decision making during three 
different crises within an eight-year 
period, Rebecca Matzke’s book, itself a 
developed and published version of the 
author’s Cornell University dissertation, 
seeks to add weight to the notion that 
Britain did indeed use the strength and 
versatility of the Royal Navy as an effec-
tive deterrent force during this time. 
The author explains that on three sepa-
rate occasions between 1838 and 1846 
(Canadian trade and border disputes 
with the United States, 1838–42; the 
Syrian crisis, 1840–41; and the first 
Opium War of 1839–42), British politi-
cians, in particular Lord Palmerston, 
were not afraid to threaten the use of, or 
to use, naval power to further discrete 
British interests on the world stage and 
to coerce and influence the activities 
of their main rivals in Europe. In each 
case, while the immediate aim was 
obviously to benefit British regional 
activities, each was undertaken with 
an eye to preserving the broader peace 
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and stability of the international order 
as a whole. In other words, Britain’s 
defensive “status quo” policy was 
implemented by operationally offensive 
threats or means. Furthermore, Matzke 
clearly shows that the British politicians 
well understood that if they failed to 
respond to some of these lesser chal-
lenges (the Chinese opium war being a 
prime example), over time they risked 
weakening their ability to influence their 
major adversaries in the future, in situa-
tions where the stakes might be higher. 
During the course of her analysis, 
Matzke takes issue with established 
scholarship holding that the relative 
inactivity of the Royal Navy during this 
period was indicative of its compara-
tive weakness within Europe as a whole. 
On the contrary, she depicts an early 
Victorian navy that was well up to the 
task, possessing shipbuilding, logis-
tics, and manpower support superior 
to that of any competitor. It was this 
depth of capability that represented 
its major coercive value, particularly 
to the European rivals, often allow-
ing what she terms demonstrations of 
Thomas Schelling’s “skillful nonuse of 
military force.” Moreover, the British 
instinctively knew all this, giving them 
great confidence in their brinkmanship 
with rivals. The case of the successful 
coercion of France in the Egyptian/
Syrian crisis is a notable example.
Matzke’s work is meticulously re-
searched, using a wide array of contem-
porary archival material that focuses 
on the collected thoughts and writings 
of the main players involved, mate-
rial taken from their personal papers, 
letters, and diaries. The weakness in 
her work lies in the admittedly implicit 
assumption that this short period can 
be taken as truly illustrative of the 
situation throughout the whole of 
the Pax Britannica. Arguably, Matzke 
has found a narrow historical period 
where thesis and facts align, but she is 
less convincing over the broader time 
frame, and more work would likely be 
necessary to settle this point decisively. 
Less important, but nonetheless still 
of concern, is her rather rosy picture 
of the reliability of the steamships of 
the day. As John Beeler has forcefully 
demonstrated, truly globally deploy-
able, oceangoing steamers would have to 
wait until the late 1880s to be realized; 
their limitations until then, in terms of 
maintenance requirements and support 
while deployed, facts of which navies 
were only too well aware, do not come 
across well. That said, this is an impor-
tant work that successfully advances 
the study of British naval policy into 
an earlier period. When taken together 
with the more established scholarship 
of the late Victorian and Edwardian 
periods, it moves us closer to a more 
complete understanding of British 
efforts to wield naval power in sup-
port of a global free-trading system. 
As such, it has timeless relevance. 
ANGUS K. ROSS
Naval War College
Kleinen, John, and Manon Osseweijer, eds. Pi-
rates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives. Singapore and Lei-
den: ISEAS Press and International Institute for 
Asian Studies, 2010. 312pp. $74
Liss, Carolin. Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy 
and Transnational Security in Southeast Asia and 
Bangladesh. Singapore and Leiden: ISEAS Press 
and International Institute for Asian Studies, 
2011. 446pp. $82.35
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These two books from the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies Press share 
one single characteristic—a long delay 
between authorship and publica-
tion. This has no appreciable effect 
on Kleinen and Osseweijer’s edited 
collection, based on a 2005 confer-
ence, but it ill serves Carolin Liss. 
She evidently completed her book 
in 2006. Since then, however, vari-
ous maritime-security initiatives in 
the region whose births she observed, 
including the various Malacca Strait 
patrols and the ReCAAP information 
exchange, have matured. It would have 
been interesting to have her views on 
the decline in major incidents that 
gathered pace starting in 2005—as to 
the degree to which they contributed 
to this decline, and what caused the 
recent modest uptick in numbers. 
This is a disappointing shortcoming, be-
cause her survey up to 2006 adds much 
useful detail to what are now a number 
of well-established themes. Her contri-
butions are particularly welcome in two 
areas, first on small-scale piracy. There 
she advances a persuasive argument that 
the general and substantial increase in 
fishing-boat numbers and the use of 
more sophisticated search equipment 
beginning in the 1950s (which resulted 
in widespread overfishing) and, within 
that overall picture, the malign effects 
of large and sophisticated foreign ships 
operating illegally contributed, pos-
sibly significantly, to the rise of piracy 
everywhere from the Philippines to 
Bangladesh. Also welcome is her critical 
examination of the political, practical, 
and moral effects of substituting private 
security companies for government-
provided security. Among several obser-
vations none is more germane than that 
private security would be unnecessary 
if governments had more interest in 
protecting maritime trade and made 
a better job of it when they try. This 
point has relevance to the waters off 
Somalia as well. If Liss misses anything, 
it is that governments prior to the 
modern naval era expected individual 
ships to look after themselves and that 
the return of piracy at the end of the 
twentieth century is producing an edg-
ing back toward a similar expectation.
Kleinen and Osseweijer’s book is the 
fourth in a series from ISEAS that has 
focused primarily on modern piracy 
in Southeast Asia. In contrast to its 
predecessors, half the book is devoted 
to historical cases. It contains a num-
ber of noteworthy contributions to the 
literature on piracy studies, ranging 
from an excellent chapter by one of the 
editors, John Kleinen (on the inappli-
cability of Eric Hobsbawn’s radical and 
romantic thesis that bandits could be 
Robin Hoods), to the historical experi-
ence of piracy in Asia. Robert Antony’s 
detailed study of the frontier town of 
Giang Binh adds to our knowledge 
of the late-eighteenth-century south-
ern Chinese “water world,” which 
was first explored by Dian Murray. 
The majority of the essays, however, 
concentrate on waters between the 
southern Philippines and Borneo, 
centered on the Sulu Archipelago. James 
Warren adds to his indispensable work 
on the Sulu Zone with a chapter on 
the workings of the Sulu slave market 
between 1800 and 1850. Esther Velthoen 
examines Dutch attempts to tame 
coastal raiding up until 1905, efforts 
that have some remarkable similarities 
to Roman attempts to curb Cilician 
piracy. Stefan Amirell describes the 
region between 1959 and 1963, when 
Britain was left as the sole colonial 
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power, struggling to contain an upsurge 
of piracy following the withdrawal of 
the Americans from the Philippines 
and the Dutch from Indonesia. Two 
complementary studies of the con-
temporary situation, one by Carolin 
Liss, from the perspective of Sabah, 
and the second by Ikuya Tokoro, from 
the perspective of Sulu, complete this 
examination of a region where piracy 
was, and to an extent remains, a way 
of life for marginalized communities. 
MARTIN N. MURPHY
Washington, D.C.
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
THE EDWARD S. MILLER RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP IN NAVAL 
HISTORY
The Naval War College Foundation intends to award one grant of $1,000 to 
the researcher with the greatest need who can make the optimal use of the re-
search materials for naval history located in the Naval War College’s Archives, 
Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College Museum, and Henry E. Eccles 
Library. Further information on the manuscript and archival collections and 
copies of the registers for specific collections are available on request from 
the Head, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College (e-mail: evelyn
.cherpak@usnwc.edu). This information can be found on the website of the Naval 
War College (www.usnwc.edu), where there is a convenient link to the guides and 
registers for that collection (www.navaldocuments.org).
The recipient will be a research fellow in the Naval War College’s Maritime 
History Department, which will provide administrative support during the re-
search visit. Submit detailed research proposal that includes a full statement of 
financial need and comprehensive research plan for optimal use of Naval War 
College materials, curriculum vitae, at least two letters of recommendation, and 
relevant background information to Miller Naval History Fellowship Committee, 
Naval War College Foundation, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207, 
by 1 September 2012. For further information, contact the chair of the selection 
committee at john.hattendorf@usnwc.edu. Employees of the Naval War College 
or any agency of the U.S. Department of Defense are not eligible for consider-
ation; EEO/AA regulations apply. 
RECENT BOOKS
A selection of books of interest recently received at our editorial office, as de-
scribed by their publishers:
Peritz, Aki, and Eric Resenbach. Find, Fix, Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism 
Campaigns That Killed Bin Laden and Devastated Al-Qaeda. New York: Public-
Affairs, 2012. 308pp. $27.99
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“Two intelligence experts with unique access to inside sources reveal the fascinat-
ing story behind the evolution of America’s new, effective approach to counter-
terrorism.”
Eder, Mari K. Leading the Narrative: The Case for Strategic Communication. An-
napolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2011. 126pp. $24.95
“A primer on the art and science of strategic communication, this work offers a sol-
id foundation in communication strategies that is both practical and theoretical. 
Like no other communications expert, Mari Eder provides useful advice on the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary for successful media relations, cam-
paign planning, crisis management, and strategic communications.”
Delgado, James P. Silent Killers: Submarines and Underwater Warfare. New York: 
Osprey, 2011. 264pp. $24.95
“Few places on the planet maintain a mystery as deep and enduring as the world 
beneath the waves. In this book, James P. Delgado presents a detailed, stunningly 
visual, examination of the history and development of the submarine and its role 
in naval warfare, from the first practical experiments with submersible craft to 
the development of the modern nuclear submarine.” 
FUNDAMENTALS OF WAR GAMING 
The War Gaming Department of the Naval War College has issued a reprint of 
the third edition (1966) of Francis McHugh’s classic work, with a new foreword 
and minor corrections. The book describes the fundamentals of war gaming, its 
history, and some of the techniques employed. While intended primarily for the 
use of resident students at the Naval War College, the book is also a source of 
background information for other military officers, researchers, and the broad 
community that makes use of gaming techniques. Purchase a copy from the Gov-
ernment Printing Office online bookstore, at bookstore.gpo.gov/.
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
t’s not just what you know but whom you know. Among the great pleasures of life 
are the friends and characters you meet along the way. But even the most worldly 
and traveled individuals are limited in their ability to come to know the humble, 
the near-great, and the great personalities of their age. They can, however, vicari-
ously meet personalities from today, and from history, through the power of the 
written word. Hundreds of colorful characters inhabit the books of the CNO’s 
Professional Reading Program. The paragraphs that follow provide a glimpse of 
some of them.
In October 1918 a German corporal had been temporarily blinded by mustard gas 
in a British attack near Comines. While he lay in hospital in Pomerania defeat and 
revolutions swept over Germany. The son of an obscure Austrian customs official, he 
had nursed youthful dreams of becoming a great artist. Having failed to gain entry 
to the Academy of Art in Vienna, he had lived in poverty in that capital and later in 
Munich. Sometimes as a house-painter, often as a casual laborer, he suffered physical 
privations and bred a harsh though concealed resentment that the world had denied 
him success. Such were the early fortunes of Adolf Hitler.
To learn more about the factors that shaped the personality of one of the world’s 
most destructive leaders, read The Gathering Storm, by Winston Churchill. 
To take another example:
At twenty-four, [Porter] Halyburton was one of the younger American POWs in 
Vietnam. His six-foot frame, short brown hair, and wholesome good looks fit the 
prototype of the dashing fighter-jock whose love of danger and combat had been 
immortalized in film and literature. But Halyburton was also introspective and 
artistic, the product of a small college town that had nurtured his intellectual and 
creative pursuits. He wrote poems, carved wooden statues, and read widely on history 
and culture. He was also a family man, having married his college sweetheart. The 
couple’s baby daughter was born four weeks before he left for Vietnam. He was lucky 
to be alive. On October 17, 1965, his F-4 Phantom jet was shot down forty miles 
I
Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the 
CNO’s Navy Professional Reading Program.
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northeast of Hanoi, killing the pilot in a fiery explosion. He soon learned that the 
price of survival would be high. 
Discover more about the courage and faith that helped this officer survive the 
hells of North Vietnam prisons by reading Two Souls Indivisible, by James S. 
Hirsch. 
Here is another:
Not all Quakers failed to be impressed by the arguments against the peace testimony. 
. . . One of these renegade Quakers was a forty-two-year-old Philadelphian ship-
builder named Joshua Humphreys. . . . Like many professional shipbuilders, Joshua 
Humphreys had never been to sea, and by his own admission he had never even seen 
one of the great European battleships. But he had designed, built, or repaired perhaps 
three hundred merchantmen in the course of his thirty-year career, and he knew far 
more about marine architecture than the captains who took his creations to sea. . . . 
Joshua Humphreys proposed, in short, to build exceptionally large, heavily armed, 
fast-sailing frigates. 
Understand more about the architect of America’s first navy by reading Ian W. 
Toll’s Six Frigates. 
Yet another:
When [Commander Ernest E.] Evans arrived at the Seattle-Tacoma shipyard to over-
see the fitting out of the brand-new USS Johnston, DD-557, he impressed his crew 
immediately with the substance of his will. At the ship’s commissioning ceremony . . . 
he informed his raptly attentive audience: “This is going to be a fighting ship. I intend 
to go in harm’s way, and anyone who doesn’t want to go along had better get off right 
now.” As if to underscore the invitation, he added, “Now that I have a fighting ship, 
I will never retreat from an enemy force.” Something in the tone of his voice told his 
listeners that he was deadly serious. 
Reach across the decades to meet Commander Evans in James D. Hornfischer’s 
The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors.
And finally:
Even after [Ernest] Shackleton became an explorer famous for his incredible stamina, 
he would speak with pride of how he made it through his difficult initiation to life 
on the sea and seemed always to carry some sympathy for the suffering apprentice he 
had been. Years of unhappy apprenticeship had hardened him and, at the same time, 
made him more compassionate toward those who became ill, miserable, or homesick. 
He learned lessons that he never forgot: that a good boss could make the burden 
of work seem lighter, that refusing to use the best tools available unfairly burdened 
workers, and that one person could change an entire work environment. 
Meet Shackleton and his crew by reading Margot Morrell and S. Capparell’s 
Shackleton’s Way.
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Fascist leaders, war heroes, ship designers, destroyer skippers, and arctic ex-
plorers are only a handful of the characters you can meet within the pages of the 
books in the CNO’s Professional Reading Program. We invite you to get to know 
them all and allow them to help you see a larger world. 
JOHN E. JACKSON 
(with assistance from Commander Dan Dolan, USN) 
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